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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Confrontation Clause1 guarantees to the accused a process, 
not a product.2  The essential purpose of the Clause is to provide the 
accused with a meaningful3 opportunity to participate in the devel-
opment of the testimonial case against him or her, through the 
crucible of cross-examination, but does not guarantee to the accused 
that participation will produce either a favorable or a reliable result.4  
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” 
 2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“To be sure, the Clause’s ul-
timate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee.”).  See also Lagunas v. State, No. 03-03-00566-CR, 2005 WL 
2043678, at *9 (Tex. App. Aug. 26, 2005) (“A central holding of Crawford is that the 
Confrontation Clause is a rule of procedure, not of evidence.”). 
 3 “Meaningful” may be subject to interpretation.  See Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 
798, 801 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“Crawford does not expressly address the issue 
of whether the opportunity for cross must be ‘meaningful,’ although common sense 
suggests that this notion is implicit in Crawford.  Indeed, what constitutes a ‘meaning-
ful’ opportunity for cross might be the subject of much debate in the years to 
come.”). 
 4 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing 
in the crucible of cross-examination.”); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 
(1987) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)) (“[W]e agree with the 
answer suggested 18 years ago by Justice Harlan.  ‘[T]he Confrontation Clause guar-
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Likewise, the reliability of the testimonial evidence is not a substitute, 
under the Clause, for the absence of such a meaningful opportunity 
to participate.5  This is the essence of the Supreme Court’s new in-
terpretation of the Confrontation Clause in the case of Crawford v. 
Washington.6
The Crawford decision, by a significant 7-2 majority, rejected 
twenty-four years of flawed constitutional confrontation jurispru-
dence regarding the admission of hearsay against the criminal 
accused.7  Lower courts’ early reactions to this decision, though ex-
plored extensively below, include such remarks as these: 
 “[A] Copernican shift in federal constitutional law. . . .”8 
 “So what is all the fuss about?  A paradigm shift in 
[C]onfrontation [C]lause analysis, that’s what.”9 
 “Crawford redefines the scope and effect of the Confron-
tation Clause . . . .”10 
 “[A] recent and substantial change in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence announced by the United States Supreme 
Court . . . .”11 
 “[A] case of great importance.”12 
 “[Crawford] may fairly be characterized as a revolutionary 
decision in the law of evidence.”13 
antees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that 
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”’”). 
 5 “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin 
to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not what 
the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.  Here Justice Scalia ech-
oes a previous conclusion by Professor Jonakait: “Just as the state cannot deny an 
accused a jury trial by establishing that a nonjury trial was the better way to deter-
mine the facts, the accused cannot be denied an adversary criminal trial even if an 
inquisitorial proceeding would have determined the truth better in the accused’s 
case.”  Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 
35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 585 (1988). 
 6 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment only, wrote an opinion, joined by Justice 
O’Connor.  Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 7 In Crawford, the Court rejected its rationale and analytical framework from 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), for determining admissibility under the Confron-
tation Clause of “testimonial” hearsay against an accused.  For further discussion, see 
infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text (exploring the many criticisms of Roberts). 
 8 People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 9 People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 99 
P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
 10 United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 11 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 12 United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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 “[Crawford effected] a sea change in our understanding 
of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause . . . .”14 
One judge predicted that “the fallout from Justice Scalia’s ‘clarifica-
tion’ of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford will reverberate 
through the evidentiary landscape for some time to come and will 
create countless dilemmas for trial and appellate courts . . . .”15  Craw-
ford necessitates that we rethink our approach to the question of 
admissibility of hearsay on behalf of the prosecution under the Con-
frontation Clause.  The purpose of this Article is to clarify—to the 
extent that such is possible—this new approach, the rationale behind 
it, and to explore its present and potential impact. 
A. The Crawford Case 
The facts of Crawford are unremarkable.  Michael Crawford, ac-
companied by his wife Sylvia, sought out and located Kenneth Lee, 
ostensibly because Lee had attempted to rape Sylvia.16  Upon locating 
him in his apartment, a fight ensued between Michael and Lee.  As a 
result, Lee was stabbed, and Michael’s hand was cut during the alter-
cation.17  Police, after giving appropriate Miranda18 warnings, 
interrogated both Michael and Sylvia two times.19  Michael’s account 
of the incident was to the effect that prior to the blow, he “coulda 
swore” he saw Lee going for “somethin’.”20  Sylvia’s account, though 
generally corroborating Michael’s as it related to events leading up to 
the fight, differed in its description of the fight itself.  According to 
Sylvia, as Michael approached Lee, “[Lee] lifted his hand over his 
head maybe to strike Michael’s hand down or something and then he 
put his . . . right hand in his right pocket . . . took a step back . . . 
[and] Michael proceeded to stab him.”21  She added that, at that 
moment, Lee’s hands were out and open and he had nothing in 
them.22
 13 People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 498 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 14 State v. Grace, 111 P.3d 28, 36 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005). 
 15 Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (Crone, J., concur-
ring). 
 16 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 39. 
 22 Id. at 39–40. 
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Washington charged Michael Crawford with assault and at-
tempted murder.23  At his trial, Michael asserted that he acted in self-
defense.24  Michael prevented his wife from testifying by asserting a 
Washington evidentiary spousal privilege that permits an accused to 
prevent his or her spouse from testifying for the prosecution, but this 
privilege did not preclude the state from attempting to introduce 
otherwise admissible prior statements of Sylvia.25  The state success-
fully convinced the trial court to admit Sylvia’s custodial account of 
the fight over Michael’s hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections.  
The trial court found the declaration admissible under the state’s 
“statement against interest” hearsay exception.26
Regarding the Confrontation Clause issue, the trial court, apply-
ing the analytical framework espoused in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ohio v. Roberts,27 found sufficient “indicia of reliability” 
surrounding the making of Sylvia’s statement to satisfy the Clause and 
justify the introduction of the now-unavailable spouse’s prior state-
ment.28  Crawford was convicted of assault.29  The Washington Court 
of Appeals reversed, applying a nine-factor test for determining reli-
ability under the Roberts “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” 
prong.30  The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, 
finding that Sylvia’s declaration bore sufficient “guarantees of trust-
worthiness” because, since neither Michael’s nor Sylvia’s statements 
clearly asserted that Lee had a weapon in his hand before being 
 23 Id. at 40. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.  One issue not raised in the Supreme Court by the 
state in this case was that, by asserting the privilege, Michael in effect “waived” his 
right to cross-examine Sylvia and thereby was afforded his rights under the Confron-
tation Clause.  Before the Washington Court of Appeals, the state made the 
argument regarding waiver, but such was rejected.  Id. at 42 n.1.  That court found 
that requiring the defendant to choose between assertion of the marital privilege and 
confronting his spouse creates an impermissible “Hobson’s choice.”  Id. (citing State 
v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 660 (Wash. 2002)).  For discussion of the possible applica-
tion of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” rule as to these circumstances, see infra notes 
123–39 and accompanying text. 
 26 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
 27 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 28 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.  The trial court’s reasoning included: Sylvia was not 
trying to shift blame; she was somewhat supporting Michael’s claim of self defense or 
at least “justified reprisal”; she had first-hand knowledge; her statement was given 
shortly after the incident; and she gave the statement to a detective that was a “neu-
tral” interrogator.  Id. 
 29 Id. at 41. 
 30 Id.  That court found it unreliable, in part, because Sylvia’s statement contra-
dicted an earlier one (she said she shut her eyes at one point in the fight) and the 
statement contradicted rather than corroborated Michael’s statement.  Id. 
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stabbed, the statements overlapped and interlocked, thereby render-
ing Sylvia’s testimony reliable.31  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to decide whether the introduction of Sylvia’s dec-
laration violated the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.32
B. Crawford’s Holding 
Rejecting Ohio v. Roberts’s analytical approach and declining to 
“mine the record” for “indicia of reliability,” the Supreme Court held 
that the prosecution’s introduction of Sylvia’s “testimonial” hearsay 
statement violated Michael Crawford’s right of confrontation because 
Sylvia was unavailable at trial and Michael had no prior, meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine her.33  Chief Justice Rehnquist, though 
concurring in the judgment, wrote a separate opinion, joined by Jus-
tice O’Connor, claiming that the majority had unnecessarily 
overruled its previous seminal holding in Roberts and that the Court’s 
new interpretation of the Clause would create a “mantle of uncer-
tainty” in future criminal trials.34
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY 
As Professor Richard D. Friedman observed, since the Supreme 
Court held in Pointer v. Texas35 that the Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation in the United States Constitution was binding in state 
prosecutions, greater emphasis has been placed on the Confronta-
tion Clause’s relationship to the admissibility of hearsay in criminal 
prosecutions.36  Thus, the need for the Court to develop an analytical 
approach for determining the Clause’s role in regulating the intro-
duction of hearsay became more imperative.37  Though some argued 
that the Clause should not regulate hearsay at all and that its admissi-
bility should be governed only by evidence law,38 the Supreme Court 
rejected this view in California v. Green,39 stating: 
 31 Id. at 41–42. 
 32 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
 33 Id. at 68–69. 
 34 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 35 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 36 Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1011, 1014 (1998). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Professor John Wigmore, consistent with Justice Harlan, took the view that the 
Confrontation Clause merely requires that witnesses actually produced be subject to 
cross-examination by the accused and that a hearsay declarant, who is not produced, 
is not such a witness.  Therefore, in his view, the Clause did not regulate the admissi-
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
2006] CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD 333 
 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Con-
frontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, 
it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete 
and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a 
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they 
existed historically at common law.  Our decisions have never es-
tablished such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once 
found a violation of confrontation values even though the state-
ments in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized 
hearsay exception.  The converse is equally true: merely because 
evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule 
does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation 
rights have been denied.40
The parameters of the relationship of the Clause and the admissibil-
ity of hearsay were not delineated by the Supreme Court until Ohio v. 
Roberts, in which it concluded: 
 The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to re-
strict the range of admissible hearsay.  First, in conformance with 
the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth 
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. . . . 
 The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be un-
available.  Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy 
in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective 
means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only 
hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that “there is no mate-
rial departure from the reason of the general rule.”. . . 
 . . . . 
 In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires 
a showing that he is unavailable.  Even then, his statement is ad-
missible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.”  Reliability 
can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  In other cases, the evi-
dence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.41
Implicit in this holding is that every hearsay declarant is a “wit-
ness against” for confrontation purposes.  As such, that declarant’s 
out-of-court statement is admissible when the declarant does not tes-
tify at trial only if a “necessity” for the statement can be 
bility of hearsay at all.  Patricia W. Bennett, After White v. Illinois: Fundamental Guar-
antees to a Hollow Right to Confront Witnesses, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 159, 162 (1993). 
 39 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
 40 Id. at 155–56 (citations omitted). 
 41 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980) (citations omitted). 
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demonstrated, and the proponent is able to show that the hearsay was 
produced under circumstances so as to possess particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness.  In other words, hearsay from a non-testifying 
declarant, under the Clause, is admissible if it is intrinsically needed42 
and it is intrinsically reliable.43  Though the prosecutor has the bur-
den to demonstrate the intrinsic reliability of the hearsay sought to 
be admitted, such burden is substantially alleviated if the hearsay falls 
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.”44  According to some criti-
cal scholars, classifying hearsay as falling within a “firmly rooted” 
hearsay exception in order to avoid individualized analysis of reliabil-
ity further exacerbated the efficacy of the Clause’s protection because 
of the ease by which the classification of “firmly rooted” has been ap-
plied and the conclusive effect of such classification.45  Some argue 
 42 Originally, the Roberts framework seemed to contemplate that the usual cir-
cumstance justifying a finding of necessity would be the unavailability of the 
declarant’s present testimony.  However, the Court subsequently in United States v. 
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (affirming admission of co-conspirator statements 
whether or not the declarant is available), and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) 
(discussing excited utterances and statements for the purpose of diagnosis or treat-
ment), expanded the concept of necessity to include the need for the “better” 
evidence: that the hearsay was generated under circumstances that makes it arguably 
more reliable than the present, perhaps selfserving, testimony from the same decla-
rant.  See Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-To-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 863, 876 (1988) (“The Court in Inadi limited the ‘unavailable-first’ language of 
Roberts by stating that the prosecution need only demonstrate the witness’s unavail-
ability when the hearsay is a ‘weaker substitute for live testimony.’”). 
 43 In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Court, in a narrow 5-4 opinion, re-
jected the view that reliability for confrontation purposes could be determined by the 
existence of corroborating evidence that confirms the truth of what was asserted in 
the hearsay statement.  Id. at 820–24.  The majority concluded that the determina-
tion of reliability was limited to examining the circumstances of the creation of the 
hearsay in order to determine that the declarant was likely sincere and accurate 
when he asserted the facts contained in the hearsay.  Id.  These circumstances are 
called “indicia of reliability” or “guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id. at 815 (citing Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. at 66).  In Crawford v. Washington, the Court noted that the concept of 
“indicia of reliability” is quite subjectively identified; allows opposite construction of 
identical indicia; and the determination is likely influenced by the desired result.  
541 U.S. 36, 63–64 (2004). 
 44 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (“Reliability can be inferred without more in the case 
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”); White, 502 U.S. 
at 355 n.8 (“[I]t is this factor that has led us to conclude that ‘firmly rooted’ excep-
tions carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed 
by the Confrontation Clause.”). 
 45 See, e.g., Nancy H. Baughan, Recent Developments: White v. Illinois: The Confronta-
tion Clause and the Supreme Court’s Preference for Out-of-Court Statements, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
235, 261 (1993) (The Supreme Court has never defined what is a “firmly rooted” 
hearsay exception and that some courts have used criteria such as the longevity of 
the exception, an exception’s widespread acceptance, or its codification in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence to determine that a particular exception is indeed firmly 
rooted.  The author concludes that none of the justifications absolutely guarantees 
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that, since the decision in White v. Illinois,46 the Court has effectively 
constitutionalized the hearsay rules and most of the exceptions in 
spite of its previous declaration to the contrary in Green.47
Roberts’ two-pronged analytical framework has been applied by 
the Court to a diverse array of hearsay, such as the following: former 
testimony,48 co-conspirator admissions,49 excited utterances and 
statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment,50 and 
statements against interest.51  As these examples reflect, its applica-
tion was used to regulate more than simply “testimonial” declarations. 
Criticism of Roberts’ two-pronged analytical framework has been 
persistent, as reflected in this comment by one scholarly observer: 
the reliability of admitted hearsay and notes the risk that “a court will give a pre-
sumption of constitutionality to evidence that is not necessarily reliable” without a 
clear definition of “firmly rooted.”) (internal references omitted); John G. Douglass, 
Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Con-
front Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 207–08 (1999) (“Under the general 
approach of Roberts, a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception defines a class of hearsay 
statements so reliable that cross-examination would add very little to the jury’s ability 
to assess them.  Given these theoretical origins, one might expect that the two dec-
ades since Roberts would have produced a test for distinguishing ‘firm’ from ‘not so 
firm’ roots based on the likely reliability of statements falling within a given excep-
tion.  Instead, the Court’s standards—if there really are any standards at all—show 
little concern for reliability.”) (footnotes omitted); Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors: 
The Failure of the Supreme Court’s Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires a New 
Look at Confrontation, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 145, 154 (1993) (“The White majority’s accu-
racy rationale also fails because the doctrinal test it relies on—the concept of firmly 
rooted hearsay exceptions, originated in Ohio v. Roberts—shifts between longevity and 
political acceptance of the hearsay exceptions and, therefore, its application yields 
no meaningful guarantee of accuracy.”) (footnote omitted). 
 46 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 47 See Bennett, supra note 38, at 188–89: 
     . . . White virtually eviscerates the Confrontation Clause, consigning 
its corpse to burial in the hearsay rules of evidence.  Before White, the 
Court was careful not to join the Confrontation Clause and the eviden-
tiary hearsay rule. . . . As such, evidence law now defines the contours 
of the Confrontation Clause: hearsay definitions now shape the Clause.  
The White Court has pried the top off the evidentiary rules of hearsay, 
and dumped into its body the dictates of the Confrontation Clause. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 48 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72–73 (treating testimony in a preliminary hearing subject 
to cross-examination just like testimony in a prior trial). 
 49 Two cases focused on co-conspirator admissions are Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171 (1987), and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
 50 White, 502 U.S. at 355 (noting “substantial guarantees of . . . trustworthiness” 
associated with excited utterances and statements made in the course of obtaining 
medical care). 
 51 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999) (clarifying that accomplice admis-
sions that also support the guilt of a defendant are not within a firmly rooted 
exception). 
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 Commentators and certain contemporary Justices have long 
criticized and bemoaned the Supreme Court’s current analytical 
union between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.  
Such criticism has run the gambit between labeling the Court’s 
current approach as a “poor criter[ion]” for governing the Con-
frontation Clause to labeling the current approach as one which 
would “constitutionalize the hearsay rule.”  The Court’s current 
approach results in inconsistent results by setting forth ad hoc 
rules to justify prior holdings, while clinging to the precept that 
the hearsay rule somehow relates to the Confrontation Clause. 
 The specific problems associated with the Court’s current ap-
proach are numerous.  First, the Court’s current approach 
requires a constitutional analysis of every out-of-court statement 
offered at a criminal trial, no matter how tangential to the issues 
at hand.  Such a zealously broad approach could not have been 
intended by the framers.  Second, the rigid approach set forth by 
the Court could conceivably allow any out-of-court statement into 
evidence which fortuitously fell into a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception or which demonstrated indicia of reliability, even if such 
statement took the form of an ex parte affidavit or similar device.  
Such an underinclusive version of the Confrontation Clause is 
also inconsistent with the history of the Clause and with prior 
Court holdings.  Finally, the Court has bound the Confrontation 
Clause and the hearsay rule under extremely transitory principles 
causing prior precedent to continually be pitted against the new 
factual scenarios presented to the Court.  Instead of accepting the 
realization that the current doctrine does not work, the Court 
remains faithful to the inharmonious relationship between the 
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause by continually reinter-
preting past precedent to comport with contemporary facts.52
 52 Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: The Current 
State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763, 800–02 
(2000) (footnotes omitted). 
Other examples of pre-Crawford criticism of the Supreme Court’s analytical ap-
proach to hearsay under the Confrontation Clause include: Bennett, supra note 38, 
at 200 (“The Confrontation Clause certainly should stand for something.  At present, 
it is only a reflex to the rules of evidence.  The Framers intended the Clause to oc-
cupy a more prestigious position. . . . In trials after White, cross-examination promises 
to be a hollow right, and confrontation a vanishing guarantee.”); Margaret A. Berger, 
The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Re-
straint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 605–06 (1992) (“Others have so ably 
demonstrated the illusory protection afforded a defendant by the evidentiary version 
of confrontation . . . . If hearsay statements are being judicially analyzed to by-pass 
notions of trustworthiness and confrontation is measured by the parameters of the 
hearsay rule, then neither the evidentiary rule nor the constitutional doctrine will 
safeguard the accused.”) (footnotes omitted); Douglass, supra note 45, at 206 (“Al-
most twenty years after Roberts, it is hard to conclude that the Confrontation Clause, 
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Crawford v. Washington is the culmination of this dissatisfaction 
with the Roberts approach.  The Crawford Court echoed this criticism 
in rejecting the Roberts rationale, suggesting that it permitted admis-
sion of testimonial evidence, untested through the adversarial process 
of cross-examination, upon simply a judicial determination of reliabil-
ity.  As a result, other indicators of “reliability” became a permissible 
substitute for the “prescribed method of assessing reliability”—cross-
examination.53  Further, myriad factors may bear on a determination 
of reliability (an “amorphous” concept), and judicial identification 
and weighing of these factors are subjective processes that can be in-
fluenced by a desired result or lead to contradictory conclusions.54  
However, the main reason cited by the Court for rejecting the Roberts 
test is its “unpardonable” vice: that it permits core testimonial hear-
say, not subject to cross-examination either previously or presently, to 
be admitted merely upon a determination that it is “reliable” in spite 
of the fact that the “Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude” 
it.55
The Court refused to “mine the record” for Roberts’s indicia of 
reliability even though, had it done so, the result would likely have 
been the same.56  Instead, it concluded that the Confrontation Clause 
bars testimonial hearsay evidence unless the declarant presently is 
subject to cross-examination, or the declarant is unavailable and the 
accused was afforded a prior, meaningful opportunity to cross-
as an exclusionary rule, has much practical impact on hearsay in criminal trials. . . . 
The ‘general approach’ of Roberts has evolved into an exclusionary rule that excludes 
very little.”); Jonakait, supra note 5, at 622 (“In interpreting the confrontation clause, 
the Supreme Court has misunderstood the purpose of the provision.  As a result, evi-
dence law now controls the content of the confrontation clause, and the clause now 
offers an accused little protection.”); Massaro, supra note 42, at 881 (“This conflation 
of the hearsay rules and the sixth amendment likely was prompted by the Court’s 
frustration in attempts to develop a workable, independent theory of the clause.”); 
Carolyn M. Nichols, The Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause: Desire to Promote Per-
ceived Societal Benefits and Denial of the Resulting Difficulties Produces Dichotomy in the Law, 
26 N.M. L. REV. 393, 429 (1996) (“The [Court’s] notion that the clause is simply a 
guarantee of reliable evidence needs to be disregarded . . . .”); Swift, supra note 45, at 
152 (“Under the White majority’s accuracy rationale, there is no need for cross-
examination of the declarant when hearsay is admitted under firmly rooted hearsay 
exceptions.  The Court flatly states that such hearsay ‘is so trustworthy that adversar-
ial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability.’ . . . The Justices’ claim is 
overbroad, unjustified and embarrassing.  I know of no commentator—academic or 
practitioner—who shares this extreme view.”). 
 53 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004). 
 54 Id. at 63. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 68. 
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examine the declarant.57  Finding that the custodial interrogation of 
Michael Crawford’s unavailable wife, even though unsworn, was “tes-
timonial” and also finding that there was no prior opportunity for the 
accused to cross-examine her, its introduction violated the Sixth 
Amendment.58
Though Crawford’s impact is profound, its ultimate scope is 
problematic.  It seems clear, however, that some previous conclusions 
of the Court concerning confrontation survive and are applicable to 
testimonial statements.  These are: 
 The Confrontation Clause does not preclude non-
hearsay uses of testimonial statements against an accused. 
 When the prosecution seeks to admit testimonial hearsay 
against the accused, and the declarant presently testifies 
subject to cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause is 
satisfied. 
 When the prosecution seeks to introduce testimonial 
hearsay against an accused having no present opportu-
nity to cross-examine the declarant, it must demonstrate 
unavailability of the declarant after a good-faith effort to 
procure the witness. 
 When the accused procures the unavailability of the de-
clarant, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule prevents the 
accused from challenging testimonial hearsay on con-
frontation grounds. 
 When a court improperly admits testimonial hearsay over 
a confrontation objection, the constitutional harmless 
error analysis will be applicable. 
A brief exploration of these surviving elements of constitutional 
confrontation analysis may be helpful in understanding Crawford’s 
impact. 
A. Non-hearsay Use of Testimonial Statements 
In a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, citing Ten-
nessee v. Street,59 writes, “[t]he Clause does not bar the use of 
 57 Id.  See also State v. Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637, 646 (Wis. 2005) (noting that Craw-
ford “strongly suggests” that the Confrontation Clause cannot be satisfied by 
“confrontation by proxy,” and holding that a co-defendant’s prior opportunity to 
cross-examine a prosecution witness who testified in his separate trial, but who was 
no longer available, was insufficient to satisfy Crawford, and thus the former testimony 
of this witness was inadmissible). 
 58 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 59 471 U.S. 409 (1985). 
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testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth 
of the matter asserted.”60  Several post-Crawford cases, relying on this 
assertion, rejected confrontation claims regarding testimonial non-
hearsay statements.61  Illustrative of these cases is one decided by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court, which found no confrontation violation 
when a victim’s statement to police regarding alleged criminal activity 
by the defendant’s cousin was offered only as evidence establishing a 
motive for the defendant to retaliate against the victim.62  When a 
prosecutor uses a testimonial statement for non-hearsay purposes, it 
is the fact of the utterance that gives it its probative value, not its 
truth.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals commented that “Crawford 
does not apply where the reliability of testimonial evidence is not at is-
sue, and a defendant’s right of confrontation may be satisfied even 
 60 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing Street, 471 U.S. at 414). 
 61 See, e.g., People v. Combs, 101 P.3d 1007, 1020 (Cal. 2004) (determining that 
non-hearsay use of the co-perpetrator’s videotaped statement, made during a reen-
actment of a robbery and murder, and made in the presence of the defendant, 
provided the basis for the introduction of an adoptive admission by the defendant 
who reacted to it); People v. Lewis, 782 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (App. Div. 2004) (holding 
that officers’ testimony that they informed the defendant, prior to his confession, 
that the co-defendant had implicated him, was not admitted for a hearsay purpose 
but simply to describe the circumstances that prompted the defendant to admit his 
involvement).  See also United States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2005) (find-
ing that comparing the co-conspirator’s false alibi with the “false” confession of the 
defendant, for the purpose of demonstrating that the defendant was “aware” of the 
plan to falsely use a baseball game as an alibi, was a non-hearsay use and constituted 
no infringement of the confrontation guarantee); United States v. Eberhart, 388 F.3d 
1043, 1051 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding the confrontation issue not preserved and quot-
ing Crawford, the court went on to remark: “Were we to reach the argument on the 
merits, it would fail.  As discussed, Bolden’s statement was offered solely to explain 
the course of the investigation.  The Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of 
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted’”); People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431–32 (App. Div. 2004) (holding 
that statements of others relied upon by an expert witness as a basis for his opinion 
did not offend Crawford because they were “non-testimonial” and not offered as proof 
of the facts uttered); People v. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309–10 (App. Div. 2004) 
(finding that statements by a burglary witness offered to explain why police searched 
a shopping cart were non-hearsay and thus not controlled by Crawford); State v. 
Smith, 832 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (considering as non-hearsay a 
co-confidential informant’s taped statements, offered to show the effect they had on 
the defendant and to place in context the defendant’s admissible reply, and thus not 
implicating the Confrontation Clause); State v. McClanahan, No. 22277, 2005 WL 
1398835 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 2005) (admitting as not violating the Confrontation 
Clause an unidentified male’s report to a patrolling officer that a neighbor was 
shooting his gun off and pointing to defendant’s house for the non-hearsay purpose 
of explaining why the police went to that location and not to prove that the defen-
dant fired a weapon). 
 62 Dednam v. State, No. CR 04-573, 2005 WL 23329 (Ark. Jan. 6, 2005). 
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
340 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:327 
 
though the declarant does not testify.”63  Regarding non-hearsay, it is 
whether the statement was made, who made it, what was said, to 
whom it was said, or other circumstances surrounding its making that 
produces its relevancy, and such does not depend upon the decla-
rant’s credibility. 
Instead, its probative value depends simply upon the reporter of 
the statement who is in court and available for cross-examination.  In 
such cases, the reporter is, in essence, the “accuser” and he can be 
confronted.64  Ordinarily, upon the introduction of non-hearsay 
statements, a court will give a limiting instruction to the jury to con-
fine its consideration of the statement to its non-hearsay purpose.65  
Where there was no such limiting instruction, but the circumstances 
created no “risk that the jury would mistakenly assume the truth” of 
the out of court non-hearsay testimonial statement, one court found 
no Crawford violation.66  However, even where there is a plausible 
non-hearsay basis for introducing a testimonial statement, if the court 
fails to give a limiting instruction and there is a risk that the jury may 
have relied upon the statement for its truth, admission of the evi-
dence must be analyzed under Crawford as if it were testimonial 
hearsay.67  In some cases, even if an instruction is given, there may be 
a high likelihood that the jury would not or could not follow it.  If the 
jury disregarded the instruction and improperly considered the tes-
timonial statement for its truth, it would make the declarant a de 
facto accuser and therefore raise confrontation concerns.  In such 
cases, the use of the testimonial statement even for non-hearsay pur-
poses may offend the Confrontation Clause.68
 63 United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536, 544 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 64 Id. at 545 (noting that the opportunity to cross-examine the reporter of the 
out-of-court non-hearsay statement of an accomplice satisfies the Confrontation 
Clause). 
 65 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105 (allowing jury instructions when evidence is admitted 
for one purpose even though it would otherwise be inadmissible for another pur-
pose).  See also Lewis, 782 N.Y.S.2d at 322 (noting the presumption that a jury will 
follow such an instruction). 
 66 Trala, 386 F.3d at 545 (observing that the relevance of a particular statement 
was based upon the fact that it was “obviously false”). 
 67 State v. Clark, 598 S.E.2d 213, 220 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 68 Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136–37 (1968) (finding the risk too 
great that a jury would, notwithstanding a limiting instruction, misuse an accom-
plice’s extrajudicial, custodial confession, implicating the declarant and Bruton in a 
joint trial, and consider it against both the declarant and Bruton).  But see Tennessee 
v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (affirming admission of an accomplice’s extrajudicial, 
custodial statement in the prosecutor’s rebuttal case after the accused opened the 
door by referring to the accomplice’s statement in his case-in-chief). 
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B. The Present Availability of the Hearsay Declarant to Testify and be 
Cross-Examined by the Accused Satisfies the Confrontation Clause 
Crawford reinforces the previously settled constitutional confron-
tation view by stating: “[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints 
at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”69  In a series of 
cases prior to Crawford, the Court determined that the belated oppor-
tunity of the accused to cross-examine the hearsay declarant at the 
present trial satisfies the Clause.70  Even a substantial good faith lack 
of present memory by the declarant who testifies at trial will not de-
prive the defendant of a sufficient opportunity to confront his 
accuser, as long as the declarant is willing to answer questions pro-
pounded to him by the accused.71  In a recent post-Crawford case, the 
 69 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).  Post Crawford, the Colorado Supreme Court explained: 
Although the [Crawford] Court found the opportunity for cross-
examination to be the essential requirement of the Confrontation 
Clause, it did not hold that all testimonial statements must be subject 
to cross-examination at the time they were made.  To the contrary, if 
the declarant will appear at trial, cross-examination on the witness 
stand remains sufficient.  The Supreme Court was careful to explain 
that Crawford did not apply to instances where a witness testifies at trial.  
The opinion explicitly reaffirmed the Green decision . . . . 
People v. Argomaniz-Ramirez, 102 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Colo. 2004). 
 70 United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1987) (A correctional officer’s hos-
pital identification of Owens as the individual who brutally attacked him with a metal 
pipe was properly admitted over Owens’s confrontation objection since the officer 
testified at trial, subject to cross-examination, even though the officer, at trial, suf-
fered a failure of recollection regarding the identity of the attacker and other details.  
The court found this “belated” opportunity sufficient, quoting Justice Harlan: “[T]he 
Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination, 
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 
defense might wish.’”) (citations omitted); Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627–30 
(1971) (holding that admission of co-defendant Runnels’ pretrial confession impli-
cating himself and O’Neil over defendant O’Neil’s confrontation objection in their 
joint trial did not violate the Clause where Runnels subsequently testified in his own 
behalf, giving O’Neil a belated opportunity to cross-examine him); Green, 399 U.S. at 
161, 164–65 (No Confrontation Clause violation found in the introduction of a cus-
todial statement and preliminary hearing testimony of a sixteen-year-old drug seller, 
identifying the defendant as his drug supplier, where the defendant had a belated 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, even though the declarant admitted 
making the prior statements but could not “remember” much of their contents.  The 
Court stated that it was not convinced that contemporaneous cross-examination of 
the declarant at the time the statement is made and before the trier of fact is so 
much more effective than belated cross-examination of the declarant that the former 
should be made the “touchstone of the Confrontation Clause”). 
 71 Owens, 484 U.S. at 556, 561 (noting that Foster, the declarant, did have some 
significant recollection even though he suffered substantial memory loss).  One 
wonders whether a nearly complete good faith failure of recollection would still sat-
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Supreme Court of South Dakota found no Crawford violation arising 
from the admission of various statements of a four-year-old child to 
family, police, and clinicians because the child, though likely having 
no present, accurate recollection, was available to testify at trial.72  As 
a result, the South Dakota court reversed a pre-trial order that had 
excluded these statements.73
Similarly, a testifying declarant’s present bad faith claim of lack 
of memory would not preclude a court from finding a sufficient op-
isfy the Clause.  It would seem under such circumstances, the declarant would be, in 
effect, incompetent, and therefore “unavailable” for confrontation purposes.  On 
this we must await further clarification by the Supreme Court.  As to this issue, see 
State v. Gorman, 854 A.2d 1164 (Me. 2004).  In a prosecution of her son for murder, 
the mother testified for the state that she did not recall her son’s confession to her 
after the killing nor could she recall grand jury testimony to that effect.  Id. at 1177.  
The State thereupon introduced her prior inconsistent statement given at the grand 
jury proceeding under a hearsay exception.  Id.  In the Maine Supreme Court, the 
defendant contended his confrontation rights were violated under the Crawford test 
because the mother was essentially “unavailable” for present cross-examination.  Id.  
The Court rejected this contention stating: “In Owens, the United States Supreme 
Court held that even when a witness has no present memory of a prior out-of-court 
statement, the right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused has the opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness at trial . . . .”  Id.  See also United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 
46–47 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying Owens prior to Crawford, the court held that the in-
troduction of grand jury testimony by a witness who at trial testified and claimed that, 
due to drug addiction, she had no memory of her testimony or the basis for it, did 
not violate the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation); People v. Harless, 22 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 625, 637 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a child sexual assault victim’s partial 
memory failure, which neither precluded her from explaining her prior statements 
nor prevented the jury from assessing her demeanor and determining which was 
most credible—her present testimony or prior statements—afforded the defendant 
an opportunity for effective cross-examination so as not to violate the Confrontation 
Clause under Crawford); State v. Fields, No. 25455, 2005 WL 1274539 (Haw. Ct. App. 
May 31, 2005) (concluding that a girlfriend’s claim of lack of memory regarding the 
defendant’s abuse and her conversations with the police about it did not preclude 
her from being subject to cross-examination and negated any confrontation objec-
tion to the introduction of her prior testimonial statements); State v. Price, 110 P.3d 
1171, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the introduction of a four-year-old 
sexual abuse victim’s testimonial statement did not offend the Confrontation Clause 
where the child testified at trial subject to cross-examination even though, when 
asked to describe the abuse, she replied, “Me [sic] forgot”). 
 72 State v. Carothers, 692 N.W.2d 544, 549 (S.D. 2005).  See also Johnson v. State, 
878 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 2005) (holding that a detective’s trial testimony relating a 
statement made to him by a witness, wherein the witness revealed overhearing the 
defendant and another describing a burglary and shooting was admissible under 
Crawford since the witness testified subject to cross-examination, and the fact that the 
witness could not recall speaking to the detective and could not recall any details of 
the conversation between the defendant and the other person did not preclude satis-
faction of the accused’s confrontation rights). 
 73 Carothers, 692 N.W.2d at 549. 
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portunity for the accused to confront the accuser.74  In such a case, 
through examination of the declarant, the accused can inquire as to 
the reasons for the declarant’s faulty memory and other circum-
stances so that the jury can observe both the declarant’s demeanor 
and present testimony and then determine whether to rely on the 
current explanation or accept the prior testimonial statement.  Obvi-
ously, a declarant who appears at the present trial but refuses to 
answer questions propounded by the accused—or successfully asserts 
a privilege—would not be available for confrontation purposes.75  In 
one post-Crawford child sexual assault case, the twelve-year-old victim 
testified on direct to various matters but would not answer the prose-
cutor’s questions as to the assault’s details.76  On cross-examination, 
however, she answered every question (none of which related to the 
assault’s details) propounded by the defense.  There, the court con-
cluded that the child was available for cross-examination within the 
meaning of Crawford and stated, “[W]e need not decide what the le-
gal consequences would be, if any, if she had instead answered some, 
but not all, of those questions [on cross-examination].”77  Addition-
ally, severe and improper restrictions upon the scope of permissible 
cross-examination imposed by the trial court can preclude a mean-
ingful opportunity to confront the witness.78
 74 See, e.g., Dicaro v. United States, 772 F.2d 1314, 1327 (7th Cir. 1985) (An ac-
complice’s grand jury testimony was properly admitted in spite of the declarant’s 
present trial testimony that he had almost total amnesia.  The court, determining the 
claim to have been in bad faith and noting that the declarant responded to extensive 
questioning by the accused, stated that this “lapse nonetheless did not so negatively 
affect ‘the jury’s ability to determine the veracity of the out-of-court statement’” that 
it offended the Confrontation Clause) (citations omitted); but see State v. Williams, 
889 So. 2d 1093, 1101 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (No opportunity for effective cross-
examination existed where the declarant-accomplice denied making the prior state-
ment and refused to testify further on behalf of the state but agreed to answer the 
defendant’s questions.  The court stated, “It would make no sense for the defense to 
ask [the accomplice] about a statement that he testified he did not make.”). 
 75 Owens, 484 U.S. at 561–62 (“Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limita-
tions on the scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the 
witness may undermine the process to such a degree that meaningful cross-
examination within the meaning of the Rule no longer exists.”); see also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004) (Crawford’s wife was determined to be unavail-
able by asserting a spousal privilege). 
 76 People v. Sharp, 825 N.E.2d 706, 712–13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 77 Id. at 713. 
 78 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (noting the trial court’s restriction 
precluding defense questioning of a key prosecution witness as to his prior juvenile 
criminal behavior, which would have strongly suggested bias, violated the accused’s 
confrontation rights). 
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For the declarant to be present and subject to cross-examination 
by the accused, it need not always be the government that calls the 
declarant to testify.  In Nelson v. O’Neil,79 the declarant testified on his 
own behalf in the joint trial, satisfying his co-defendant’s confronta-
tion rights.80  There are times when the prosecution may desire to 
introduce testimonial hearsay in lieu of calling an available declarant.  
In such cases, the state, desiring to avoid a confrontation issue, may 
find a possible solution to this dilemma.  The evidentiary rule preva-
lent in the federal system81 and in many states82 permits a person 
against whom hearsay is admitted (in this case the accused) to call an 
available hearsay declarant exercising his right to Compulsory Proc-
ess,83 and then cross-examine the declarant regarding the statement.  
This procedure may satisfy the Clause if exercised84 and may consti-
tute a waiver of confrontation rights if not exercised.85  A number of 
commentators and one pre-Crawford court would likely ridicule this 
suggestion.86  Of course, for waiver to occur, the government must 
 79 402 U.S. 622 (1971). 
 80 Id. at 622. 
 81 FED. R. EVID. 806. 
 82 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.806 (1999).  See also Douglass, supra note 45, at 252 (re-
ferring to numerous states’ rules along with the common law). 
 83 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 84 See State v. Lanski, 696 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 2005) (concluding, without men-
tioning Rule 806, that a confrontation objection to introduction of the accused’s 
wife’s hearsay as a testimonial statement was waived by his calling her to testify). 
 85 See Douglass, supra note 45, at 229 (“Properly applied, however, a rule provid-
ing that defendants must request a subpoena to invoke the confrontation right 
should not work serious hardship on defendants.  In essence, the rule requires that a 
defendant mean what he says when he asks for confrontation.”); id. at 243 (reporting 
that the Supreme Court in “Inadi tells us that ‘if [the defendant] independently 
wanted to secure [the declarant’s] testimony, . . . [t]he Compulsory Process Clause 
would have aided [him] in obtaining the testimony’ and Federal Rule of Evidence 
806 would permit the defendant to question that declarant ‘as if under cross-
examination.’”) (footnote omitted).  One court recently went further and held that 
Crawford’s requirement that there be an “opportunity” for cross-examination is met 
when the accused is given notice of the charges against him, is given a copy of the 
witnesses’ statement, and he has an opportunity to depose that witness.  Blanton v. 
State, 880 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).  This appears a bit extreme.  But 
see Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the failure of the de-
fendant, in a child sexual assault prosecution, to call the available victim as a witness 
did not constitute a “waiver” of his confrontation rights, reasoning that such would 
create a constitutionally impermissible choice between exercising his right of con-
frontation or insisting on his due process right to have the state satisfy its burden of 
proof).  In contrast, compare these cases with State v. Cunningham, 903 So. 2d 1110 
(La. 2005), discussed infra notes 274–75. 
 86 One such commentator writes as follows: 
     The ultimate in burden-shifting is endorsed by the White majority 
opinion when it states that defendants can themselves call hearsay de-
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have placed the accused on notice of its intent to introduce the tes-
timonial hearsay in time for the accused realistically to compel the 
declarant’s attendance and testimony pursuant to this evidentiary 
rule.87
C. The Confrontation Clause’s Unavailability Requirement 
To dispense with present cross-examination of a witness who 
furnishes testimonial evidence against the accused, there must be a 
necessity to do so, and the accused must have had a prior meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  However, unlike under the 
pre-Crawford analytical framework,88 necessity under Crawford is lim-
clarants as hostile witnesses.  This idea borders on the ludicrous, par-
ticularly when such declarants are the victims of the alleged crime, as 
was the case in White.  The risk of calling a non-prepared and therefore 
unpredictable hostile witness, let alone the victim, are enormous. 
Swift, supra note 45, at 168 (footnotes omitted).  Similarly, another author offers the 
following: 
     The Inadi approach changes this scheme with regard to hearsay 
from an available declarant.  Now the defendant must produce the per-
son he wishes to confront, and he must wait until it is his turn to 
produce witnesses before he can cross-examine.  This approach sug-
gests that our entire trial system could be similarly restructured in such 
a way that the opposing side would not be allowed to cross-examine a 
witness after he testifies, but would only be permitted to call the witness 
and conduct cross-examination as part of its own case.  In other words, 
the prosecution would be allowed to introduce all its direct examina-
tion from several witnesses unimpeded by defense cross-examination.  
The defense would then call those witnesses unimpeded by the prose-
cution’s cross-examination.  Finally, the prosecution could call and 
cross-examine all the favorable defense witnesses.  If Inadi is correct, 
this system must be constitutional, for the defendant gets his chance to 
cross-examine.  The change, however, is clearly a radical alteration in 
the way we conduct trials, and one that should be found to violate the 
sixth amendment. 
Jonakait, supra note 5, at 620.  Additionally, at least one court would seem to oppose 
this possibility: 
     . . . [T]he State contends that Defendant waived his right to object 
to the introduction of the Sykes [murder victim’s wife’s] statement be-
cause the court had offered him the right to subpoena Sykes as a 
witness.  This begs the issue.  Calling Sykes as a witness, in and of itself, 
would hardly render the statement admissible.  Defendant should not 
be required to call Mrs. Sykes as a witness simply to facilitate the State’s 
introduction of evidence against the Defendant. 
State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 87 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (defining constitutional waiver 
as the voluntary and intentional relinquishment “of a known right or privilege”). 
 88 In addition to satisfying the necessity prong of the Roberts formula by demon-
strating the declarant was unavailable, subsequent pre-Crawford cases expanded the 
concept of necessity to include the “need” to introduce the “better” evidence.  Even 
though the declarant may be available, prior hearsay statements would be admissible 
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ited to the unavailability of the witness-declarant.89  What constitutes 
satisfaction of the requirement of unavailability of the declarant will 
likely be governed by previously existing Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence.  This jurisprudence reflects that unavailability of the 
declarant is not limited to the physical unavailability of the declarant 
but includes the unavailability of the present testimony of the decla-
rant.90  The declarant may be deemed presently unavailable because 
he or she is dead,91 ill,92 or incompetent,93 or cannot be located or 
compelled to appear.94  Additionally, the declarant may be deemed 
unavailable if his or her present testimony cannot be procured be-
cause of the assertion of a privilege95 or a refusal of the witness to 
respond to questions.96  These categories defining unavailability are 
if made under circumstances making it arguably more reliable than the present tes-
timony from the same declarant because those circumstances could not be 
replicated.  See supra note 42 (describing subsequent cases).  See generally White v. Illi-
nois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (regarding excited utterances and statements made for the 
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 
(1986) (regarding co-conspirator statements). 
 89 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence 
is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: un-
availability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”). 
 90 See DiBattisto v. State, 480 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that 
the availability of the declarant contemplates “more than mere presence and in-
cludes the reasonable likelihood that he is or soon will be able to give reliable, 
coherent testimony”). 
 91 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240–41 (1895) (upholding the admis-
sion of a deceased witness’ prior testimony). 
 92 See, e.g., Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981) (recognizing suffi-
cient “grave risks to the witness’ psychological health [to] justify excusing her live in-
court testimony”); State v. Burns, 332 N.W.2d 757 (Wis. 1983) (finding that severe 
mental illness that would be exacerbated if the declarant were required to testify at 
trial satisfied the unavailability requirement). 
 93 Even mental illness, short of incompetency, may render a witness unavailable.  
See, e.g., DiBattisto, 480 So. 2d at 169. 
 94 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75–76 (1980) (reporting on efforts un-
dertaken to locate a witness). 
 95 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004) (recognizing Washing-
ton’s marital privilege); People v. Seijas, 114 P.3d 742 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing 
unavailability resulting from the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination). 
 96 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 441 A.2d 1004, 1007 (D.C. 1982) (affirming the 
admission of former testimony upon bad faith refusal of the declarant to testify); 
State v. Page, 104 P.3d 616, 624 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an accomplice’s 
unequivocal refusal to testify rendered him unavailable).  Such refusal, however, 
though rendering the witness unavailable, does not necessarily have to be in “bad 
faith.”  See, e.g., In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding that a 
seven-year-old’s refusal to continue testifying as to the sexual assault against him re-
sulted in the child being “unavailable,” even though the child testified as to knowing 
the defendant and other preliminary matters); Howard v. State, 816 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that a twelve-year-old’s refusal to testify due to embar-
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consistent with the requirement for unavailability under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence for hearsay purposes.97
Whether a witness-declarant’s present claim of failure of recol-
lection would render him or her unavailable for confrontation 
purposes is more problematic.  The Supreme Court held in United 
States v. Owens98 that a witness’s present significant good faith lapse of 
memory did not render him “unavailable” for confrontation purposes 
where the witness, presently, willingly responds to questions.99  The 
Owens Court noted that a semantic oddity exists due to the fact that 
such a significant good faith lack of memory may render the witness 
“unavailable” for hearsay purposes under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence but “available” for confrontation purposes.100  Additionally, a 
bad faith claim of lack of memory would not render the witness un-
available if the witness willingly responds to questions presently 
propounded to him.101  However, if the witness suffers a good faith 
failure of recollection to the extent that he or she is virtually incom-
petent to testify to relevant matters, it is likely that the resulting 
absence of a meaningful opportunity to presently examine the wit-
ness would render that person unavailable for confrontation 
purposes.  Cross-examination under such circumstances would be 
tantamount to cross-examining a mound of clay.  In such cases, 
unless there was a prior opportunity for the accused to cross-examine 
such a witness, the witness’s testimonial hearsay may not be constitu-
tionally available as a substitute for his or her irretrievable memory.  
A definitive determination will have to await further illumination of 
the Owens decision by the Supreme Court.102
Unavailability for confrontation purposes has a corollary re-
quirement that the government must have made a good faith effort 
to secure the present testimony of the declarant, which proved to be 
rassment rendered her “unavailable”).  See also Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 466 
(Ind. 2005) (concluding that a witness’ refusal to answer questions while on the 
stand did not make the witness unavailable for confrontation purposes in absence of 
a request by the accused to compel the witness to answer). 
 97 FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1), (2), (4), (5). 
 98 484 U.S. 554 (1987). 
 99 Id. at 559. 
 100 Id. at 563.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) (announcing that unavailability for hear-
say purposes includes situations in which the declarant “testifies to a lack of memory 
of the subject matter of the declarant’s statement”). 
 101 Dicaro v. United States, 772 F.2d 1314, 1327 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 102 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (discussing Owens).  In contrast, 
lower court cases indicated a witness’ complete or near-complete memory loss will 
not render the witness unavailable for cross-examination.  See supra note 71. 
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futile.103  Post-Crawford, this requirement persists.104  What constitutes 
good faith in all cases of unavailability is a question of reasonableness 
under the circumstances.105  A good faith, diligent effort to produce 
the declarant’s present testimony is determined by a factual analysis 
of each case.  The effort must be more than perfunctory and more 
than simply the product of the prosecutor’s “indifference or strategic 
preference” for the admission of the testimonial hearsay.106  The 
proper inquiry is whether the effort not undertaken would have been 
pursued if no testimonial hearsay existed upon which the prosecutor 
could rely.107  If the answer to this question is “yes,” then such failure 
would amount to a lack of good faith effort.  The nature and circum-
stances of the unavailability, and of the viable means to overcome it, 
together with the gravity of the case and importance of the witness 
 103 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (“The basic litmus of Sixth Amend-
ment unavailability is established: ‘[A] witness is not “unavailable” . . . unless the 
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial’” 
(emphasis added by the Court, quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 
(1968))). 
 104 See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 540 (Cal. 2005) (applying the 
unavailability requirement post-Crawford, the court noted that the necessary “due 
diligence” component involves an inquiry into relevant factors such as the timeliness 
of the search, importance of the hearsay, and whether leads were pursued compe-
tently, and further explaining that the prosecution has no obligation to take 
“adequate preventive measures” to stop an important witness from fleeing absent 
prior “knowledge of a ‘substantial risk’ of such a potential flight”); State v. Grace, 111 
P.3d 28, 37 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the fact the prosecution made “no 
effort whatsoever” to procure declarants of testimonial statements for trial rendered 
those statements inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause); State v. Clark, 598 
S.E.2d 213, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding sufficient a demonstration of the 
“State’s good-faith efforts to procure [the declarant] in order for the trial court to 
declare her unavailable”). 
 105 Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 826–27 (D.C. 1981) (“This rule applies 
to all cases of witness unavailability, but is moderated by the recognition that ‘the 
lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of 
reasonableness.’” (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring))). 
 106 People v. Arroyo, 431 N.E.2d 271, 274 (N.Y. 1982) (observing that a missing 
witness’ “unavailability also had to be established to satisfy the court that the prosecu-
tor’s failure to produce her was not due to indifference or a strategic preference for 
presenting her testimony in the more sheltered form of hearing minutes rather than 
in the confrontational setting of a personal appearance on the stand”). 
 107 State v. Edwards, 665 P.2d 59, 64 (Ariz. 1983) (supporting the idea that “[a]n 
appropriate standard to apply is to ask whether the leads which were not followed 
would have been the subject of investigation if the State had been trying to find an 
important witness and had no transcript of prior testimony” (citing United States v. 
Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 367 (1st Cir. 1978))). 
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are important factors in determining the sufficiency of the govern-
ment’s efforts.108
Where the unavailability of the witness is a result of death, obvi-
ously little may be required to show a good faith effort.  However, 
even here concerns have arisen.  Should a key witness in a homicide 
case be required to be sustained by extraordinary life-support systems 
in order to make the witness available at a future date for cross-
examination by the accused?  One court found that the government 
had no authority to interfere with a patient’s privacy right to remove 
a life-sustaining apparatus to do so.109
In an interesting post-Crawford case,110 a murder defendant 
claimed that the introduction of an absent alien’s testimonial state-
ment, in spite of the fact that the defendant had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination, violated the Confrontation Clause because the 
declarant was deported by the government before his retrial.  The de-
fendant claimed that a good faith effort required the government “to 
ensure that its witnesses are not forcibly removed from the United 
States until all appeals in a case are exhausted, because of the possi-
bility of retrial.”111  Finding no authority for such a “sweeping” 
responsibility and observing that the defendant did not claim the 
government purposefully sought, by the deportation, to make the de-
clarant unavailable for a possible future retrial, the court found the 
 108 For example, in Roberts the victim of an unlawful credit card use offense testi-
fied at the defendant’s preliminary hearing, but did not appear at trial.  The court 
found that the government sustained its burden of establishing that its efforts to pro-
cure the witness were reasonable.  Those efforts, as determined in a “voir dire 
hearing” from the testimony of the victim’s mother, were essentially that the witness 
was living with the parents at the time of the preliminary hearing but had left that 
summer and was traveling outside Ohio.  As a result of a social worker from San Fran-
cisco contacting her, the mother had made an effort to locate her but determined 
that she was no longer in San Francisco.  The mother further stated that she would 
not know how to reach her in an emergency.  The prosecutor learned these facts 
some four months prior to trial, yet issued subpoenas to the witness at her mother’s 
home on five occasions—a place where she was known not to be.  Justice Brennan, in 
his dissent joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, took issue with this finding, writ-
ing, “It would serve no useful purpose here to essay an exhaustive catalog of the 
numerous measures the state could have taken in a diligent attempt to locate Anita,” 
and concluded that the sole reason why Anita was not available is that the state did 
not seek to find her.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 80, 81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The result 
may be explained by the fact that the prosecution was for a low-grade felony offense 
and the expenditure of further time and resources in an attempt to locate her may 
have been deemed unreasonable.  Still, this is a debatable conclusion under these 
facts. 
 109 People v. Adams, 265 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 110 Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557 (D.C. 2005). 
 111 Id. at 564. 
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
350 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:327 
 
prosecution had met its burden of demonstrating unavailability for 
confrontation purposes.112
Where the factor giving rise to a claim of unavailability is illness, 
the person’s importance and prognosis may justify requesting a brief 
delay of the trial, a continuance, or examination of the witness at 
bedside in order to permit the testimony.113
Unavoidable absence is a reason frequently invoked as a basis for 
witness unavailability.  A good faith effort in such cases depends 
largely upon the circumstances.  If the whereabouts of the witness are 
unknown, some “diligent” effort to locate the witness must be under-
taken.114  If the witness’ whereabouts are known and within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the testimony is sought, a 
good faith effort requires that a subpoena be properly sought and is-
sued.115  The mere showing that the witness is beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court does not satisfy the confrontation require-
ment, unless the government demonstrates a good faith effort to use 
available procedures to obtain voluntary cooperation of the witness 
or foreign jurisdiction.116  If no procedure exists for compelling the 
presence of a witness residing in a foreign country, a good faith effort 
may be found if request is made of the witness to return and testify 
and an offer to pay expenses incurred is tendered.117  Where the wit-
ness is residing in another state, a good faith effort may require using 
processes such as the Uniform Act to Secure Witnesses From Within or 
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.118  Under the Uniform Act, if 
the witness resides in a state recognizing the compact, all that is re-
quired is to apply for the issuance of a subpoena in the trial court of 
 112 Id. 
 113 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 1005 (Little Brown 
1995). 
 114 See supra note 108 (discussing the diligent effort described in Roberts). 
 115 See Stores v. State, 625 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1980) (finding that prior testimony in 
a deposition is inadmissible when the state knew that the witness both planned to 
leave the area and was willing to testify at trial if called); Palmieri v. State, 411 So. 2d 
985, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that merely sending a subpoena by nor-
mal mail does not meet the burden for a good faith effort to procure a witness). 
 116 See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1968) (concluding that a decision 
not to even ask for a federal prisoner in a different jurisdiction to be produced be-
cause authorities might deny the request does not render a witness unavailable). 
 117 See Mancuso v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 223 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that even though compelling a witness residing in another country to submit 
to a subpoena may be problematic, a state should still at least notify the witness of the 
trial and invite the witness to come at the witness’ own expense, perhaps offer to pay 
the witness’ expenses, and ultimately seek federal assistance in reaching out to the 
authorities of the other country). 
 118 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 942.01–.06 (2001). 
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general jurisdiction in the state where the witness is located, return-
able to the trial court in the state where the witness is to testify.  
Failure to comply with the subpoena would subject the witness to 
contempt in the state issuing the subpoena.  Where the prosecutor 
fails to use this available process, the court may find that a good faith 
effort has not been demonstrated.119  Where the witness is a United 
States citizen residing in a foreign country, a good faith effort to pro-
cure his attendance may require a state or federal prosecutor to seek 
the issuance of a subpoena from the federal district court pursuant to 
process provided for in the federal code.120  Failure to use this proce-
dure has resulted in a finding of a lack of good faith effort and the 
exclusion of testimonial hearsay.121
Finally, where a witness’ bad faith refusal is the basis for being 
unavailable, seeking a contempt citation may be a required effort.  
But, a contempt citation is not required in every case.122
 119 See State v. Zaehringer, 325 N.W.2d 754, 759 (Iowa 1982) (finding that failing 
to attempt use of the provisions of the Uniform Act to Secure Witnesses from With-
out the State until time constraints precluded success did not meet any standard for 
a good faith effort, particularly when the state knew fourteen months earlier that the 
witness moved). 
 120 The code provides, in part, as follows: 
A court of the United States may order the issuance of a subpoena re-
quiring the appearance as a witness before it, or before a person or 
body designated by it, of a national or resident of the United States 
who is in a foreign country . . . if the court finds that particular testi-
mony . . . is necessary in the interest of justice, and . . . if the court 
finds, in addition, that it is not possible to obtain his testimony in ad-
missible form without his personal appearance . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2000). 
 121 People v. St. Germain, 187 Cal. Rptr. 915, 921–22 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding 
that former testimony was improperly admitted where a state prosecutor failed to 
utilize this federal procedure, the witness was in Holland, and the witness refused to 
cooperate voluntarily). 
 122 One court chronicled the futility of seeking testimony in one such case as fol-
lows: 
Here, the government told Smith that he had no Fifth Amendment 
privilege to refuse to testify, and that refusing to testify would place him 
in contempt of court as well as in breach of his plea agreement.  It of-
fered him protection in exchange for his testimony.  Nevertheless, 
Smith persisted in refusing to testify; he told the government, the trial 
judge in voir dire, his appointed counsel, the trial judge again, and the 
jury of his refusal.  To continue efforts to try to convince the witness to 
testify would have been futile in light of his steadfastness.  When there 
is no possibility of procuring the testimony of a witness, the law re-
quires nothing of the prosecutor because further action would be 
futile. 
Jones v. United States, 441 A.2d 1004, 1007 (D.C. 1982) (footnote and citation omit-
ted). 
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
352 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:327 
 
D. The Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Rule Still Prevails 
The Crawford Court, while rejecting the Roberts “reliability” ap-
proach, expressly accepted the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing, 
which “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds.”123  Therefore, if the accused procures the absence of the 
witness-declarant, he cannot complain that the declarant’s testimo-
nial hearsay should not be introduced because he cannot presently 
confront that witness.124  The Seventh Circuit explained this rule as 
follows: 
 A defendant may waive his right to object on hearsay and Con-
frontation Clause grounds to the admission of out-of-court 
statements made by a declarant whose unavailability he intention-
ally procured. The primary reasoning behind this rule is 
obvious—to deter criminals from intimidating or “taking care of” 
potential witnesses against them. But the rule is also grounded in 
principles of equity.  Admission of the witness’s statements at least 
partially offsets the benefit the defendant obtained by his miscon-
duct.125
One post-Crawford case indicated that authority exists for ex-
panding the rule to apply even in cases where the predicate 
wrongdoing is the same crime for which the defendant is being tried 
and the wrongdoing was not for the purpose of precluding the wit-
ness from testifying.126  In United States v. Mayhew,127 a United States 
 123 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).  However, the Supreme Court 
did not address its applicability to the facts of the case even though Sylvia’s unavail-
ability to testify and be cross-examined stemmed from the defendant’s exercise of a 
state’s spousal evidentiary privilege.  The Court’s absence of comment may stem 
from the fact that the state did not raise before the Supreme Court the related issue 
of “waiver,” as it had in the state appellate court.  Id. at 40–43.  Additionally, the 
Crawford Court may have declined to do so because an exercise of a legitimate privi-
lege is not encompassed within the rule because it is not considered wrongful.  See id. 
at 42 n.1.  Recall that the Court was not inclined to force a “Hobson’s choice” on the 
defendant between marital privilege and confrontation.  See supra note 25 (discussion 
on waiver).  It seems advisable to expand the equitable rule to cases in which the de-
clarant’s unavailability is procured by the voluntary act of the defendant even where 
that act is not “wrongful.”  In such cases the defendant, truly desiring cross-
examination, holds the key to such process in his hands and should not preclude the 
introduction of testimonial hearsay simply because he does not want to put the key in 
the lock. 
 124 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
 125 United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (footnote 
and citations omitted). 
 126 People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 n.2 (Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding ap-
plying this expanded interpretation of the rule by finding the testimonial statement 
inadmissible upon state hearsay rules). 
 127 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
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District Court judge actually applied an expanded doctrine under 
these circumstances, stating clearly that: 
 Requiring the court to decide by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the very question for which the defendant is on trial may 
seem, at first glance, troublesome. . . . [H]owever, this Court 
holds as follows: equitable considerations demand that a defen-
dant forfeits his Confrontation Clause rights if the court 
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the decla-
rant is unable to testify because the defendant intentionally 
murdered her, regardless of whether the defendant is standing 
trial for the identical crime that caused the declarant's unavail-
ability.128
Another post-Crawford case has apparently applied the rule expan-
sively.129  However, a United States District Court has rejected such an 
expansion, concluding that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is 
applicable “to actions whose purpose is to prevent the testimony.”130  
Otherwise, no confrontation protection would be afforded to an ac-
cused in any murder prosecution regarding any deceased victim’s 
testimonial hearsay statements.131
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth 
v. Edwards,132 was called upon to adopt, for the state, the Doctrine of 
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Rule and to determine its scope.  Finding 
that some version of the doctrine had been adopted in at least four-
teen states and the District of Columbia, and noting that the rule is 
founded upon the sound equitable principle that one should not 
profit by his own misconduct, the court adopted the rule.133  The 
court cited as further justification the fact that the rule discourages 
misbehavior towards witnesses and serves to shield witnesses from 
threats or harm.134  Considering the appropriate scope of the doc-
trine, the court stated: “Without question, the doctrine should apply 
in cases where a defendant murders, threatens, or intimidates a wit-
 128 Id. at 968 (noting that the evidence described clearly indicated that the motive 
for the killing was other than to silence her as a witness). 
 129 Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex. App. 2004) (“In light of this doc-
trine, we hold that Gonzalez is precluded from objecting to the introduction of 
Maria’s statements on Confrontation Clause grounds because it was his own criminal 
conduct (in this case, murder) that rendered Maria unavailable for cross-
examination.”). 
 130 United States v. Jordan, No. CRIM. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *5 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 3, 2005). 
 131 Id. at *6. 
 132 830 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 2005). 
 133 Id. at 168. 
 134 Id. at 167. 
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ness in an effort to procure that witness’s unavailability.”135  Though 
finding that no court had yet expanded the rule to include collusion 
between the defendant and witness, it also found that the public pol-
icy interest underlying the rule would be best served by extending its 
scope to such collusive behavior.136  Thereupon the court held: 
that a defendant forfeits, by virtue of wrongdoing, the right to ob-
ject to the admission of an unavailable witness’s out-of-court 
statements on both confrontation and hearsay grounds on find-
ings that (1) the witness is unavailable; (2) the defendant was 
involved in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the 
witness; and (3) the defendant acted with the intent to procure 
the witness’s unavailability.  A defendant’s involvement in procur-
ing a witness’s unavailability need not consist of a criminal act, 
and may include a defendant’s collusion with a witness to ensure 
that the witness will not be heard at trial.137
Another court opined that the application of this doctrine in 
domestic violence cases will be problematic, stating the following: 
Application of the “wrongdoing” exception to the Confrontation 
Clause undoubtedly will be difficult in many domestic violence 
cases where a victim does not cooperate with the prosecution.  If 
that is the case, police and prosecutors may then have to embark 
on a separate investigation into whether the defendant caused the 
victim’s unavailability.  The question will probably also frequently 
arise as to what amounts to “wrongdoing” by a defendant in such 
a scenario, i.e. will only physical “wrongdoing” (another battery) 
by a defendant suffice, or can psychological pressure on a victim 
not to cooperate be enough, and if so, how is such pressure to be 
measured?138
Could the rule be expanded to apply to cases where, without “wrong-
doing,” the accused, in cross examining a state witness, elicits a 
portion of a testimonial statement of a non-testifying declarant, 
thereby “opening the door” on redirect to the revelation of addi-
tional details of the same statement?  A panel of the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that it could not, stating the following: 
Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Cromer’s right to confront 
the witnesses against him was violated by O’Brien’s redirect testi-
 135 Id. at 168–69 (footnotes omitted). 
 136 Id. at 169. 
 137 Id. at 170.  In collusion cases there must be a causal connection between the 
defendant’s actions and the witness’ unavailability.  Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 171.  The 
court suggested that such may be sufficient in cases where a defendant aids, encour-
ages, or facilitates a witness’ unavailability even where that witness had previously 
decided “on his own” not to testify.  Id. 
 138 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
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mony.  If there is one theme that emerges from Crawford, it is that 
the Confrontation Clause confers a powerful and fundamental 
right that is no longer subsumed by the evidentiary rules govern-
ing the admission of hearsay statements.  Thus, the mere fact that 
Cromer may have opened the door to the testimonial, out-of-
court statement that violated his confrontation right is not suffi-
cient to erase that violation.  In this, too, we agree with Professor 
Friedman, who has postulated that a defendant only forfeits his 
confrontation right if his own wrongful conduct is responsible for 
his inability to confront the witness.  If, for example, the witness is 
only unavailable to testify because the defendant has killed or in-
timidated her, then the defendant has forfeited his right to 
confront that witness.  A foolish strategic decision does not rise to 
the level of such misconduct and so will not cause the defendant 
to forfeit his rights under the Confrontation Clause.  O’Brien’s 
redirect testimony relating the [confidential informant]’s physical 
description therefore violated Cromer’s right of confrontation.139
E. Harmless Error Analysis Continues to be Applicable to Crawford 
Violations 
As pointed out by the minority in Crawford, a trial court’s mis-
taken applications of the new constitutional confrontation rule 
established by Crawford will be subject to harmless-error analysis.140  
Even though the majority in Crawford expressed no opinion regard-
ing the constitutional harmless-error analysis, virtually every case 
relying upon Crawford—and finding error—has undertaken to de-
termine whether the error was harmless.141  One court stated that 
 139 United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Friedman, 
supra note 36, at 1031) (internal citation omitted). 
 140 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 76 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 141 State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 939 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (asserting the need for 
harmless-error analysis despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to require it).  Courts 
engaging in such analysis often find a harmless Crawford error.  See, e.g., People v. 
Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 857–58 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the introduction of 
an accomplice’s statement, made during a “classic station-house interview,” violated 
the Confrontation Clause but finding it harmless); Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 
802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that, even if testimonial and erroneously ad-
mitted, the error is harmless if the accusations contained in the statement are proved 
by other witnesses such that the out-of-court statement is considered “merely cumula-
tive”); State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 
802 (Minn. 2005) (declining to examine whether statements made to police were 
testimonial after finding a jury’s verdict “surely unattributable” to the statements and 
finding that their admission was thus “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. 
Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 116 (N.C. 2004) (holding that a robbery victim’s prior testimo-
nial statement to investigating police, introduced during the penalty phase of a 
capital case, violated the Confrontation Clause but was harmless because the state 
was able to show other “overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt”); Wall v. 
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“[w]hile Crawford v. Washington fundamentally alters the way we ana-
lyze claims of error under the Confrontation Clause, the opinion 
does not change the way we evaluate the effect of any such error.”142  
The Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van Arsdall143 had previously pre-
scribed various factors the reviewing court should apply, among 
others, in order to determine harmlessness regarding Confrontation 
Clause violations: 
[T]he constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportu-
nity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause 
errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis.  The correct 
inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the 
cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might 
nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case de-
pends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing 
courts.  These factors include the importance of the witness’ tes-
timony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was 
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the 
State, 143 S.W.3d 846, 851–53 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that an assault victim’s ex-
cited utterance to police at the hospital and in response to questioning was 
testimonial, and that its admission was a violation of the Confrontation Clause, but 
the error in admitting it was harmless because other “lawfully admitted evidence 
overwhelmingly prove[d] the defendant’s guilt”). 
In other cases, courts found Crawford errors harmful.  See, e.g., People v. Pirwani, 
14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 688–89 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the victim’s videotaped 
statement to police regarding the loss of money was testimonial and that admitting it 
was harmful error because the statement contributed to evidence of guilt); People v. 
Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a child sexual assault vic-
tim’s videotaped statement in a police interview was testimonial, a significant part of 
the case rather than corroborative, and that admitting it was harmful error); People 
v. Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d 721, 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (determining it “not at all 
clear” that a jury would have returned a guilty verdict absent the erroneous introduc-
tion of an accomplice-boyfriend’s testimonial plea allocution, thus making the 
admission harmful error); State v. Johnson, 98 P.3d 998, 1007 (N.M. 2004) (holding 
that the introduction of a robbery eyewitness’ custodial police interview violated the 
Confrontation Clause and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the 
robbery conviction); State v. Morton, 601 S.E.2d 873, 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (find-
ing an accomplice’s custodial statement to police was testimonial and its admission at 
trial was both erroneous and harmful); Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570–71 (Tex. 
App. 2004) (holding that the roadside testimonial statement of a passenger of the 
defendant to an officer was erroneously admitted and harmful because of the “rea-
sonable likelihood” that its admission affected the jury’s deliberations). 
 142 T.P. v. State, No. CR-03-0574, 2004 WL 2418045, at *5 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 
2004). 
 143 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
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extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, 
the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.144
Post-Crawford decisions have continued to apply Van Arsdall’s factors 
in resolving harmless error issues under the Confrontation Clause.145
III. CONTROVERSIAL AFTERMATH IN THE WAKE OF CRAWFORD’S 
CONFRONTATION “RE-INTERPRETATION” 
Three important and problematic issues remain to be addressed 
in the wake of Crawford’s new and revolutionary interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause as it relates to testimonial hearsay.  They are: 
 What hearsay is testimonial and subject to the dictates of 
the Crawford opinion? 
 Should Crawford’s rule be applied retroactively? 
 To what extent, if any, does the Confrontation Clause 
regulate the introduction of “non-testimonial” hearsay? 
In the immediate post-Crawford period, many courts attempted to ad-
dress these questions and in doing so produced significant 
disagreement and controversy.  The balance of this Article examines 
each of these concerns in turn. 
A. What is “Testimonial Hearsay?” 
Though the Crawford Court held unequivocally that, where a 
prosecutor seeks to introduce “testimonial” hearsay against an ac-
cused, the Confrontation Clause requires that the declarant be 
unavailable and that the accused have had a prior, meaningful op-
portunity to cross-examine that declarant, the Court declined to 
define the scope of hearsay that would be considered testimonial.  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declared: “We leave for an-
other day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 
‘testimonial.’”146  In doing so, the Court was aware that its failure to 
adopt such a definition would lead to uncertainty in the lower courts 
but concluded that such confusion resulting from unpredictability 
would not be permanent.147  Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia had 
been alone in the White case advocating the rejection of the Roberts 
 144 Id. at 684. 
 145 There is an excellent discussion of Van Arsdall’s applicability in Johnson, 98 P.3d 
at 1002–04.  See also Cox, 876 So. 2d at 939; Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 852. 
 146 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  At oral argument, much of 
petitioner’s argument was interrupted by numerous questions from the justices as to 
the scope of the term “testimonial.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–23, Crawford, 
541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 22705281. 
 147 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10. 
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test in favor of the testimonial test, but would have limited the classi-
fication to a “discrete” category of “formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or confessions,” which 
were historically abused by prosecutors and constituted the principal 
evil the Confrontation Clause sought to prevent.148  In the majority 
opinion in Crawford, Justices Scalia and Thomas were joined by five 
colleagues.149  It is plausible that these new adherents to the testimo-
nial approach would not have joined the majority unless the scope of 
the classification of hearsay as “testimonial” was expanded from the 
limited and “discrete” category previously posited by Justices Thomas 
and Scalia.150
The Crawford Court provided some direction to guide courts in 
their struggle to apply the term “testimonial hearsay” to specific hear-
say statements.  First, the Court noted that the Clause applies to 
“witnesses” against the accused and that a “witness” is, according to 
an 1828 dictionary, one who bears testimony.151 Quoting that same 
dictionary, the Court stated, “‘Testimony’ in turn, is typically ‘[a] sol-
emn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact.’”152  The Court then drew a distinction between 
casual remarks and more formal statements: “An accuser who makes 
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense 
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
not.”153
The Court also emphasized, without adopting, some formula-
tions of testimonial statements that have been suggested: (1) the 
petitioner’s contention that testimonial hearsay should include “ex 
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material 
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the de-
fendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutori-
ally”;154 (2) Justices Thomas and Scalia’s view espoused in White about 
 148 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 149 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37, 70 (listing Justice Scalia as delivering the Court’s opin-
ion, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer). 
 150 It is also plausible that in order to maintain the seven-member majority the 
Court needed to leave the question open as to the continued viability of the Roberts 
test when applied to non-testimonial evidence.  See infra section III.C. (discussing 
non-testimonial evidence after Crawford). 
 151 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
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including “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized tes-
timonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or 
confessions’”;155 and (3) the position taken in an amicus brief filed by 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, which would 
include “‘statements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.’”156
The Court concluded that any categorization of testimonial 
hearsay would include statements taken by police officers in the 
course of interrogations, observing that “[p]olice interrogations bear 
a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in 
England.  The statements are not sworn testimony, but the absence of 
oath [is] not dispositive.”157  The Court further stated, “even if the 
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, 
that is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement offi-
cers fall squarely within that class.”158  Here again, the Court declined 
 155 Id. at 51–52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)). 
 156 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No.02-
9410), 2003 WL 21754961).  This view was also advanced in the amicus brief filed by 
an impressive array of law professors: Sherman J. Clark (University of Michigan Law 
School), James J. Duane (Regent University School of Law), Richard D. Friedman 
(University of Michigan Law School), Norman Garland (Southwestern University 
School of Law), Gary M. Maveal (University of Detroit Mercy School of Law), Bridget 
McCormack (University of Michigan Law School), David A. Moran (Wayne State Uni-
versity Law School), Christopher B. Mueller (University of Colorado School of Law), 
and Roger C. Park (Hastings College of Law, University of California).  Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J. Clark et al. in Support of Petitioner at 1, Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958.  This brief suggests that a 
statement is “testimonial” when “made with reasonable anticipation of evidentiary 
use.”  Id. at 13.  The amici further elaborated as follows: 
     Just as in this case, the question of whether a given statement should 
be considered testimonial can usually be rather easily resolved, as indi-
cated by the following “rules of thumb,” . . . . [1] A statement made 
knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is almost 
always testimonial.  [2] A statement made by a person claiming to be 
the victim of a crime and describing the crime is usually testimonial, 
whether made directly to the authorities or not.  [3] If, in the case of a 
crime committed over a short period of time, a statement is made be-
fore the crime is committed, it almost certainly is not testimonial.  [4] 
A statement made by one participant in a criminal enterprise to an-
other, intended to further the enterprise, is not testimonial.  [5] And 
neither is a statement made in the course of going about one’s ordi-
nary business, made before the criminal act has occurred or with no 
recognition that it relates to criminal activity. 
Id. at 21 (citation omitted). 
 157 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
 158 Id. at 53. 
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to provide a definition—in this case of the term “interrogation” as 
used to classify testimonial hearsay—but did note that it used the 
term “in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.”159  
Therefore, Sylvia Crawford’s taped statement to police officers, ob-
tained during their interrogation of her, clearly qualified.  Justice 
Stevens, dissenting in a case decided weeks after Crawford, opined 
that questioning pursuant to a Terry investigative stop and the re-
sponses “[s]urely . . . qualifies as an interrogation and it follows that 
responses to such questions are testimonial in nature.”160  It is likely 
that certain conversations with police officers would clearly not meet 
even the colloquial use of the term interrogation.161  As will be seen, 
however, the issue as to when questioning by police qualifies as “in-
terrogation,” in the colloquial sense, that is, when statements made to 
police amount to “testimony,” has and will likely remain for some 
time a matter of substantial controversy. 
The Court may have deemed its description of views regarding 
the critical classification of hearsay as testimonial to be helpful, but 
within these formulations uncertainty abounds.  Even at oral argu-
ment, some of this uncertainty was revealed.  Could statements made 
to nongovernmental officers be testimonial if the declarant had a 
reasonable expectation that they would have evidentiary use?162  Why 
is the intent of the declarant always critical in classifying his or her 
 159 Id. at 53 n.4 (“Just as various definitions of ‘testimonial’ exist, one can imagine 
various definitions of ‘interrogation,’ and we need not select among them in this 
case.  Sylvia’s recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police 
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition.”). 
 160 Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 195 (2004) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (describing actions associated with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
 161 A conversation with law enforcement officers that is not the product of police 
interrogation and made without any expectation by the declarant of evidentiary use 
would not qualify as testimonial.  See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex. 
App. 2004) (holding that statements made by a visibly upset owner of a car that had 
been wrecked and abandoned were not testimonial when the owner approached in-
vestigating officers inquiring about the status of her car and its occupants, and the 
officers were simply answering her questions and determining why she was upset). 
 162 The uncertainty is apparent in this interchange: 
QUESTION: Would there be anything that fit in your category where 
the person to whom the statement is made is not an officer, either a 
police officer or prosecutor? 
MR. FISHER: I think there may be, and the reason—I think there may 
be a—a rare, rare case, Justice Ginsburg, in a scenario—you know, 
come up with hypotheticals.  One possible scenario might be somebody 
giving a statement to their friend and directing them to tell the police.  
So, you know, simply using an intermediary where we know the state-
ment is going to the police, but— 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 
22705281. 
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statement as testimonial?163  If an undercover agent or confidential 
informant is used to obtain statements from declarants having no ex-
pectation of evidentiary use, are such statements testimonial?164  
 163 The Court challenged petitioner’s counsel on this point as follows: 
QUESTION: Why—why should it depend on the intent of the decla-
rant?  I—why is that—why does that make the declarant a witness 
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause?  I mean, suppose—
suppose the police get—get the statement from the declarant surrepti-
tiously.  They do not let—let him know that they are, in fact, the police.  
That—that would disqualify it under the law professors’ test from being 
testimony? 
MR. FISHER: Well, in that— 
QUESTION: Because he would not know that this was going to be used 
in court. 
MR. FISHER: Well, I mean, I think that’s a situation—you know, and 
this is where the definitional problem gets difficult.  I mean, because 
the other part of the Confrontation Clause is a limitation on State 
power, and it says—you know, going all the way [to] Blackstone, it’s a 
limitation on the State molding statements that it’s going to use later in 
a criminal investigation.  So if that kind of a situation were present 
where somebody is molding somebody’s statement, I think that might 
be something the Confrontation Clause is concerned with as well. 
     . . . . 
QUESTION: Are you—just—just with the dialogue with Justice Scalia, 
because I'm interested in the same problem, is it the intent of the 
speaker or the intent of the person taking the statement that would 
be—be more relevant in your view? 
     . . . . 
MR. FISHER: I see, Your Honor.  I think that proper—the proper test 
would be if—if one of the two people is so—you know, is doing some-
thing with the purpose of understanding it’s going to be used in a 
criminal case, then we have a testimonial situation.  I think you—this 
Court could say that, but it—you have to look back— 
QUESTION: You mean even the speaker or the person taking the 
statement.  Is that what you’re saying?  I don’t understand your re-
sponse. 
MR. FISHER: I think certainly the speaker and I think there may be 
situations—and this is—this is something the Court can deal with about 
when this—about when the—when the governmental officer is the only 
one and—and is under such a circumstance that the governmental of-
ficer is molding the statement in such a way and molding what 
somebody is going to say— 
Id. at 11–13. 
 164 The Court raised this question as follows: 
QUESTION: It’s your view that a co-conspirator statement is not testi-
monial then? 
MR. FISHER: I think that’s the ordinary course of events.  Yes, Justice 
Ginsburg. 
QUESTION: Well, why is that if it meets the test of a statement made to 
the police? 
MR. FISHER: Well, if there’s an undercover officer present, it meets—
it meets the—the—you know, the test of a statement made to the po-
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Where statements are recorded by police using a wiretap, are they 
testimonial?165
Respondent, reflecting in oral argument upon the uncertainty of 
formulations regarding the classification of hearsay as testimony, in-
dicated that whatever definition or test the Court might announce, 
[It] is going to have problems.  The bugs are going to have to be 
worked out.  It’ll take years of—of cases, and the—and the reality 
is—and I, of course, mean no disrespect to any judge—anytime 
you get—you have a judge making a discretionary decision, on 
the same set of facts there’s simply going to be some judges that 
will make exactly opposite decisions based upon the same set of 
facts.  That’s just human nature.166
Post-Crawford cases confirm this prediction. 
A flurry of decisions since Crawford have dealt with the questions 
posed in oral argument and have struggled with many more.  A sur-
vey of cases that have grappled with the questions left unanswered in 
Crawford may in some instances afford enlightenment, while others 
reveal the extent of the confusion.  In one of the earliest decisions 
grappling with the unanswered questions of Crawford in regard to 911 
calls, one judge advanced Chief Justice Rehnquist’s criticism of the 
Crawford majority for failing to provide needed guidance, stating: 
 The case of Octivio Moscat presently before this Court demon-
strates that the Chief Justice’s comments are apt.  If anything they 
are understated.  There are thousands of homicide and assault 
cases every year where a 911 call for help made by the victim to 
the police is an important piece of evidence.  Are such calls testi-
monial in nature, or not?  Do they constitute “police 
interrogation” (because the caller answers questions posed by the 
police operator), or not?  May they be admitted into evidence 
under various traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule? Or 
would their admission violate the Sixth Amendment?  The Craw-
ford decision is rich in detail about the law of England in the 16th, 
17th and 18th centuries, but—as the Chief Justice points out—it 
lice.  But then I think this is where the law professors have it right, and 
this is where I’m agreeing with Justice Breyer. 
Id. at 15. 
 165 This interesting question led to the following brief exchange: 
QUESTION: Well, how—how about a wire tap?  You’ve got a wire tap 
going, and you hear co-conspirators on—on the other end of the wire.  
Is that testimonial or not? 
MR. FISHER: I think that’s the traditional kind of co-conspirator 
statement that is not covered by the testimonial approach. . . . 
Id. at 16. 
 166 Id. at 52. 
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
2006] CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD 363 
 
fails to give urgently needed guidance as to how to apply the Sixth 
Amendment right now, in the 21st century.167
Interestingly, a New York Times column indicated that this judge may 
have actually relished the task of entering the fray and even made up a 
fictitious case to do so.168
In a number of situations, courts have not had any apparent dif-
ficulty in gleaning, from the Crawford opinion, the appropriate 
classification of statements as “testimonial” or “non-testimonial.”  For 
example, courts have generally agreed on rulings regarding state-
ments made to third parties unconnected to law enforcement,169 
statements made during custodial or structured interrogations,170 
statements made during a plea allocution or during testimony given 
in court proceedings,171 statements made by co-conspirators in the 
course of the conspiracy,172 and dying declarations.173  Surprisingly, 
controversy has arisen regarding the classification of sworn affidavits 
and certificates.174  Predictably, confusion and disagreement has re-
sulted in attempts to classify statements made during 911 calls,175 
statements made to first responders,176 statements made to police dur-
ing field investigations,177 and children’s statements of abuse to child 
 167 People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877–78 (Crim. Ct. 2004). 
 168 The article includes the following remarkable assertions: 
     There was a problem, however, with the decision rendered by Judge 
Greenberg in People v. Moscat.  None of the assumptions the judge 
based his opinion on were actually fact.  The person captured on the 
tape in that particular case was, it turned out, a neighbor, not the vic-
tim.  The call had been made some nine hours after the alleged assault, 
not while it was happening.  And prosecutors eventually abandoned 
the case. 
     Defense lawyers and prosecutors alike say the judge was simply eager 
to be one of the first to interpret the Supreme Court’s ruling, a way to 
get attention in the legal world.  The judge says that prosecutors told 
him the victim was on the tape, an assertion that prosecutors deny.  He 
says he is comfortable with the heart of his decision. 
Sabrina Tavernise, Legal Precedent Doesn’t Let Facts Stand in the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
26, 2004, at A1. 
 169 See infra notes 179–94 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 202–05 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 210–22 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra notes 223–31 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 232–75 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 276–325 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra notes 326–81 and accompanying text. 
 177 See infra notes 382–87 and accompanying text. 
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protective agents or doctors.178  We turn now to a review of post-
Crawford jurisprudence regarding each of these situations. 
1. Statements Made to Persons Not Connected to Law  
Enforcement 
As revealed below, statements made by children, adult victims, 
and witnesses to persons unconnected to law enforcement have con-
sistently been found to be non-testimonial and unaffected by 
Crawford.  Statements made by children to—or overheard by—parents 
provide the first examples of statements made to persons not con-
nected to law enforcement but which prosecutors may later wish to 
use.  Where there was no indication that the child reasonably con-
templated any evidentiary use of his or her statement of abuse and 
the statement was made to persons unconnected to law enforcement, 
courts, with rare dissension, have concluded that the statements were 
“non-testimonial.”179  One court, classifying such statements to par-
ents as non-testimonial, rejected the argument that they should be 
deemed testimonial since the parents, in questioning the ten-year-old 
molestation victim, suspected some “illegal or nefarious” activity, were 
engaged in “investigating” that suspicion, and turned over the fruit of 
their investigation to police.180
 178 See infra notes 181–89, 196–200 and accompanying text. 
 179 See, e.g., Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (rea-
soning that “testimonial” evidence would not include spontaneous statements made 
by a child to her mother while being dressed, nor statements the child made to her 
father a few minutes later); Somervell v. State, 883 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004) (considering as non-testimonial statements of abuse that the mother of an au-
tistic child heard while the child was pretending to talk to the accused on the 
phone); State v. Doe, 103 P.3d 967, 972–73 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a 
four-year-old’s statements to her mother and other relatives fell within the state’s ex-
cited utterance exception to hearsay and were thus not testimonial, and also 
affirming the lower court’s admission of statements made to a doctor by both the 
child and her mother as non-testimonial); State v. Bobadilla, 690 N.W.2d 345, 350–51 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming the admission of a statement made to a mother by 
her three-year-old child regarding abuse, reasoning that the mother’s questions arose 
from her concern for the child’s health and not in anticipation of a case against de-
fendant); State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a six-year-old 
victim’s statement to his foster mother describing acts of sexual abuse by his mother 
were non-testimonial).  Compare In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004) (holding a seven-year-old’s statements to her mother were non-testimonial) 
and People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding a three-year-old 
sexual abuse victim’s statement to mother and grandmother were non-testimonial) 
with In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1035–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding accusatory 
statements made by a child to a grandmother about abuse allegedly occurring more 
than a year earlier to be testimonial, even though not made to a governmental offi-
cial, and erroneously admitted at trial). 
 180 Purvis v. State, 829 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
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Other instances involve statements to physicians.  In one case, a 
four-year-old victim’s statement to an emergency room physician, 
admissible under the exception for statements made for purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment, was found not to be “testimonial,” 
with the court explaining as follows: 
We believe on the facts of this case that the victim’s statement to 
the doctor was not a “testimonial” statement under [Crawford].  As 
discussed above, the victim’s identification of Vaught as the per-
petrator was a statement made for the purpose of medical 
diagnosis or treatment.  In the present case, the victim was taken 
to the hospital by her family to be examined and the only evi-
dence regarding the purpose of the medical examination, 
including the information regarding the cause of the symptoms, 
was to obtain medical treatment.  There was no indication of a 
purpose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indica-
tion of government involvement in the initiation or course of the 
examination.181
Similarly, a fifteen-year-old abuse victim’s statement to an emergency 
room doctor was determined to be non-testimonial since the doctor 
was “not performing any function remotely resembling that of a Tu-
dor, Stuart or Hanoverian justice of the peace” and there was no 
government involvement except the duty that would apply to any per-
son having knowledge relating to a crime to furnish that information 
to the police.182
Statements describing abuse, related by children to medical per-
sonnel who are not acting in concert with police and who have no 
governmental obligation to investigate abuse offenses, have been 
generally denominated as non-testimonial even where these practi-
tioners may specialize in diagnosing child abuse, regularly preserve 
their interviews,183 and relay interview contents to appropriate law en-
 181 State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004). 
 182 People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854–55 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Crawford 
v. Washington, 514 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)) (referring to Crawford’s discussion of the role 
of justices of the peace in English common law). See also State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 
1262, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding a twenty-nine-month-old’s statement to a 
treating family physician stating that the child’s mother’s boyfriend hit him—which 
contradicted an earlier statement to an emergency room doctor to the effect that he 
fell down stairs—was admissible as a statement for the purpose of diagnosis or treat-
ment and non-testimonial because the physician was not a government official and 
the defendant was not then a suspect). 
 183 State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (finding child’s 
statement to a nurse practitioner employed by a children’s research center specializ-
ing in diagnosing abuse was non-testimonial, even though this practitioner was 
clearly aware her examinations might be used in a criminal case). 
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forcement authorities.184  However, in In re T.T.,185 an Illinois appel-
late court found that statements of a seven-year-old sexual abuse 
victim to a doctor, a pediatrician and chair of the Cook County Hos-
pital division of child protective services, were non-testimonial to the 
extent that the child’s statements responded to questions regarding 
the nature of the assault, described pain and injury, and aided the 
physical examination (thus qualifying under the medical treatment 
hearsay exception).186  But, to the extent that the doctor elicited “ac-
cusatorial” statements regarding fault and identity of the perpetrator, 
they were testimonial and governed by Crawford.187  The court empha-
sized that the fact that a Department of Children and Family Services 
agent engaged in a “prosecutorial” investigative role in regard to the 
sexual abuse had referred the child to the doctor “for medical evalua-
tion of alleged sexual abuse” was not controlling.188  In emphasizing 
this point, the court seemed to justify the admission of the non-
testimonial portion of the statement, rather than explaining the re-
jection of the testimonial portion.189  However, if such referral is not 
“controlling” in the latter instance, this case is authority for the 
proposition that “accusatorial” statements by children to physicians, 
unconnected to law enforcement, can be testimonial. 
Adult victim and other adult statements to relatives, friends, ac-
complices, co-conspirators and others unconnected with law 
enforcement have likewise been found to be non-testimonial,190 but 
 184 Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855 (“After all, anyone who obtains information rele-
vant to a criminal investigation might (and certainly should) pass it along [to] the 
police.”). 
 185 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 186 Id. at 804. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 803 (“We also find unpersuasive respondent’s assertion that the relation-
ship between DCFS and Dr. Lorand at the time of the examination indicated that she 
constructively acted as the government’s agent in interrogating G.F.”). 
 189 Id. at 804.  See also People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (apply-
ing T.T.’s rationale to a rape victim’s statement to an emergency room nurse and 
physician and excluding as testimonial under Crawford that portion of her statements 
concerning fault and identity). 
 190 Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d. 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) (avoiding the need for 
determining the retroactive application of Crawford in post-conviction proceedings by 
declaring entries of threats and abuse contained in the diary of a domestic homicide 
victim non-testimonial since the entries were not made with the expectation that they 
would be used at a trial); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding a 
homicide accomplice’s private conversation with a friend, made shortly before the 
killings and which related to one of the victims, to be non-testimonial and outside 
the scope of Crawford); State v. Smith, 881 A.2d 160, 172–74 (Conn. 2005) (holding 
that a murder victim’s state-of-mind statement to her mother that the defendant “was 
going to kill me” was non-testimonial); State v. Jones, No. 9911016309, 2004 WL 
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courts have yet to confront the situation, discussed in oral argument 
in Crawford, of a declarant communicating with a relative, friend, or 
other person unconnected to law enforcement with the expressed inten-
tion that the communication be relayed by that individual to law enforcement 
2914276, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2004) (deciding that statements made by the 
defendant to his girlfriend of his plan to murder another were not testimonial under 
Crawford, since he was not revealing his plan to a judge or policeman, but was simply 
bragging about it to his lover); State v. Leonard, 910 So. 2d 977, 987 (La. Ct. App. 
2005) (classifying a victim’s statement to his girlfriend, admissible under the Existing 
State of Mind hearsay exception, as non-testimonial); State v. Heggar, 908 So. 2d 
1245, 1248 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that a murder victim’s present sense ut-
terances made to a friend (former lover) during a telephone conversation 
immediately prior to the killing were non-testimonial); People v. Shepherd, 689 
N.W.2d 721, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that jailhouse statements the defen-
dant’s boyfriend made to visiting relatives, overheard by a guard, to be “clearly” non-
testimonial, reasoning that “[e]ven under the broadest definition of testimonial, it is 
unlikely that Mr. Butters would have reasonably believed that the statements would 
be available for use at a later trial”); State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2004) (finding that an adult victim’s hospital conversations about the cause of 
his injuries, made to his wife and daughter over a period of several days, were non-
testimonial because there were no circumstances indicating that the victim had a rea-
sonable expectation that they would be used prosecutorially); Miller v. State, 98 P.3d 
738, 744 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (ruling that a co-defendant’s confession implicat-
ing the defendant and made to fellow inmates while incarcerated was not testimonial 
under Crawford, since “[i]t was not admitted through affidavit, a formalized deposi-
tion, and was not a confession resulting from a custodial interrogation,” but holding 
it improperly admitted in contravention of the Confrontation Clause nonetheless 
after finding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability under the former 
Roberts reliability approach to non-testimonial evidence); Texas v. Woods, 152 S.W.3d 
105, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding a homicide co-defendant’s casual “street 
corner” statements to acquaintances both before and shortly after the murder to be 
non-testimonial, thus making the rules articulated in Crawford inapplicable); State v. 
Wilkinson, 879 A.2d 445, 447 (Vt. 2005) (finding an aggravated assault victim’s ex-
cited utterance to his cousin non-testimonial); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 407–08 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding one adult victim’s excited utterance immediately af-
ter a home invasion was not testimonial, and explaining that the utterance fit into 
none of the categories described in Crawford and “[i]t was not a declaration or affir-
mation made to establish or prove some fact; it was not prior testimony; and [the 
declarant] had no reason to expect that her statement would be used prosecutori-
ally”); State v. Ferguson, 607 S.E.2d 526, 528–29 (W. Va. 2004) (finding a murder 
victim’s “excited utterances” to friends were not testimonial, and refusing to extend 
“Crawford’s largely unexplored ban on ‘testimonial hearsay’ that has not been tested 
by cross-examination” to statements made separate from any official investigation to 
“non-official and non-investigational witnesses”); State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 
824 (Wis. 2005) (ruling that a homicide eyewitness’ spontaneous statement to his 
girlfriend in a private conversation without any expectation that she would relay it to 
police was non-testimonial); State v. Manuel, 685 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2004) (finding non-testimonial a statement an eyewitness to a homicide made to his 
girlfriend, describing the incident that had just occurred, because it fell within the 
state’s “statement of recent perception” hearsay exception, which required that the 
statement not be made in contemplation or anticipation of litigation). 
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for evidentiary use.191  Statements made under such circumstances may 
very likely be classified as testimonial by courts in the future.  How-
ever, it does appear that something other than simply a victim’s 
disclosure of a brutal attack and a plea for help to a stranger will be 
needed to make that stranger an “agent” of the police and the vic-
tim’s statement “testimonial,” even though the stranger subsequently 
relays that information to the police.192
In Hammond v. United States,193 the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals found a murder accomplice’s statement against interest im-
plicating himself and the defendant, made to his girlfriend soon after 
the killing, to be non-testimonial under Crawford since the statements 
were “not elicited during structured police interrogation or given by 
the declarant to any law enforcement officer.”194
Even though the person eliciting a structured statement is not 
classified as a member of law enforcement, if he or she has an inde-
pendent legal obligation to investigate (not just report) criminal 
activity—such as child abuse—or the person’s special abilities are util-
ized by law enforcement to facilitate an investigation, most courts 
have treated such statements as testimonial.195  Astonishingly, some 
 191 See supra note 162 (recounting discussion of this question during oral argu-
ment in Crawford). 
 192 West, 823 N.E.2d at 91–92 (distinguishing as non-testimonial statements made 
to a 911 dispatcher for the purposes of securing help and as testimonial statements 
to the dispatcher describing the direction in which the assailants fled and the prop-
erty they took). 
 193 880 A.2d 1066 (D.C. 2005). 
 194 Id. at 1100. 
 195 For example, one court classified as testimonial a child sexual abuse victim’s 
statement to a Department of Children and Family Services agent (who had a legal 
obligation to investigate reports of abuse) and who was working in cooperation with 
law enforcement.  In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).  The court 
commented that, because “child abuse has both criminal and social welfare implica-
tions, DCFS and the State’s Attorney may naturally share some involvement in a 
particular case,” and held that “where DCFS works at the behest of and in tandem 
with the State’s Attorney with the intent and purpose of assisting in the prosecutorial 
effort, DCFS functions as an agent of the prosecution.”  Id. at 801.  See also United 
States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding as testimonial state-
ments made by a child to a “forensic interviewer” referred by governmental officials 
and prior to the child being examined by a doctor, when two video recordings of the 
session were made consistent with the regular protocol, one was retained by the cen-
ter employing the interviewer, and the other was delivered to law enforcement); 
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756–57 (Ct. App. 2004) (ruling a four-year-
old child sexual assault victim’s statement was testimonial where the police utilized 
the service of the county’s Multidisciplinary Interview Center, a facility “specially de-
signed and staffed for interviewing children suspected of being victims of child 
abuse,” and the interview session, conducted by a forensic interview specialist, who 
was not a government employee, was personally monitored by a deputy district attor-
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courts196 reached a contrary conclusion by exaggerating and distort-
ing one of the illustrative formulations for determining whether a 
statement is testimonial (which was identified but not adopted in 
Crawford), that is, “pretrial statements that declarants would reasona-
bly expect to be used prosecutorially,” and virtually ignoring the 
others.197  One court in Ohio, for example, has held that statements 
made by a rape victim to a nurse, in a “specialized healthcare facility 
designed to provide expert care to victims of violent sexual assault,” 
were not testimonial, despite the investigating officer having taken 
the victim to the unit for treatment and remaining present during 
the interview198
A Minnesota court similarly held that a seven-year-old child-
molestation victim’s videotaped statement to a nurse practitioner with 
the Midwest Children’s Resource Center (MCRC) was not testimonial 
even though an investigating detective and child-protection worker 
ney and his investigator); In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
(finding that a child abuse victim’s statements were testimonial because they were 
made to an agent of a child advocacy center in an interview one week after the inci-
dent with a detective observing the interview through a two-way mirror); State v. 
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 325 (Md. 2005) (determining that statements of two child 
sexual abuse victim, ages eight and ten, were testimonial when elicited by a sexual 
abuse investigator of the Department of Health and Human Services during a struc-
tured interview conducted at the request of—and in the presence of—the 
investigating police officer); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004) (holding 
that a three-year-old child’s statement, in a child murder prosecution, was testimo-
nial where police had asked a Department of Human Services caseworker to conduct 
the interviews that produced the statements and the police were present and video-
taped the sessions). 
 196 State v. Karsky, 696 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); In re D.L., No. 84643, 
2005 WL 1119809 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 2005); State v. Stahl, No. 22261, 2005 WL 
602687, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005); State v. Lee, No. 22262, 2005 WL 
544837 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2005). 
 197 See supra notes 154–56 for a description of these formulations. 
 198 Stahl, 2005 WL 602687, at *4.  Though the officer, who had previously inter-
viewed the victim and obtained a statement, did not participate in the interview, a 
complete description of the assault was elicited for various purposes, including facili-
tating the collection of physical evidence consisting of photographs, swabs, dental 
floss, fingernail scrapings, hair samples, and descriptions of bruises.  Id. at *6.  The 
victim, prior to the interview, signed a form authorizing release of evidence “to a law 
enforcement agency for use only in the investigation and prosecution of this crime.”  
Id.  The court, though, took note that the form made no reference to statements 
made during the examination, id. at *7, and that the victim “could have reasonably 
believed that she was at DOVE for the purpose of providing physical evidence, with-
out necessarily understanding that she was also providing testimonial evidence.”  Id. 
at *6.  Stahl expanded upon a very similar decision reached by that court one week 
earlier, Lee, 2005 WL 544837.  The only material difference between the two cases 
was that no law enforcement officer was present during the interview in the Lee case.  
For another Ohio case arriving at the same conclusion on similar facts, see In re D.L., 
2005 WL 1119809. 
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referred the child to the nurse for the purpose of being interviewed 
and the detective observed the interview from another room.199  Justi-
fying its conclusion, the court stated: 
Here, although the MCRC examination may have been arranged 
by Detective Manuel and a child-protection worker, there is no 
indication that T.L.K. thought that her statements might be used 
in a later trial.  T.L.K. was driven to MCRC by her foster mother, 
and she was shielded from the police presence throughout the 
MCRC examination.  The record is clear that Detective Manuel 
did not interrupt or direct any portion of the interview or exami-
nation.  The length of time between the alleged abuse and the 
examination also suggests that T.L.K. was not aware of any prose-
cutorial purpose of the examination and did not “reasonably 
believe that her disclosures would be available for use at a later 
trial.”200
Apparently, the ability of the officer and others to disguise the evi-
dentiary purpose of the interview from a seven-year-old child was 
controlling.  The court concluded that the defendant failed to meet 
his burden of showing that “‘the circumstances surrounding the con-
tested statements led [the child] to reasonably believe her disclosures 
would be available for use at a later trial or, that the circumstances 
would lead a reasonable child of her age to have that expectation.’”201
2. Statements Made During Custodial or Structured  
Interrogations 
It is certainly not surprising that courts dealing with cases involv-
ing interrogations closely resembling Sylvia’s interrogation in 
Crawford faithfully classify them as testimonial.  Statements elicited 
from accomplices or co-conspirators, during police interrogations, 
are easily classified as testimonial.202  A formal voluntary statement of 
an eyewitness to a murder, which was reduced to writing, signed, and 
 199 Karsky, 696 N.W.2d at 819. 
 200 Id. at 820 (quoting State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2005)). 
 201 Id. at 820 (quoting Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d at 396). 
 202 See, e.g., State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (declaring co-
conspirator’s statement during police interrogation “falls squarely within the reach 
of Crawford”); State v. Morton, 601 S.E.2d. 873, 875–76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
statements made in an interview at the sheriff’s office after Miranda rights were given 
to be testimonial); State v. Carter, No. 84036, 2004 WL 2914921, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 16, 2004) (finding codefendant’s statement during police interrogation to 
be testimonial).  See also Hernandez v. State, 875 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004) (ruling statements of co-defendant after arrest during a police-controlled 
phone call with the defendant were testimonial). 
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given at the police station, was also determined to be testimonial.203  
The tape-recorded statements of two eyewitnesses to an assault, which 
were reduced to seventeen pages of transcript, were the product of 
structured police questioning and thus qualified as testimonial under 
any “conceivable definition” of the term “testimonial.”204  A child sex-
ual abuse victim’s tape-recorded statement that was the product of 
police questioning and was made during a “classic station-house in-
terview” was found to be “indistinguishable” from Sylvia’s statement 
in Crawford notwithstanding that Sylvia was in custody and this victim 
was not.205
3. Statements Made During a Plea Allocution or During 
Testimony Given in Court Proceedings 
The Supreme Court in Crawford stated that the “unpardonable 
vice of the Roberts test” was its capacity to admit “core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to ex-
clude.”206  Demonstrating this fact, the court cited numerous cases 
admitting under the Roberts test “plainly testimonial statements,” spe-
cifically noting that these included cases involving plea allocutions, 
grand jury testimony, and prior trial testimony.207  Courts, after Craw-
ford, have not engaged in this “vice.”  Post-Crawford cases have 
classified plea allocutions and grand jury testimony as testimonial.208  
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court applied Crawford to prelimi-
nary hearing testimony.209
 203 Samaron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701, 707 (Tex. App. 2004) (noting that the 
statement was written and signed after being questioned by police rather than a 
spontaneous statement about what had happened). 
 204 People v. Lee, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a tape 
recorded police interrogation filling seventeen pages of transcript certainly qualifies 
as testimonial “under any conceivable definition” (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 52 n.4 (2004))). 
 205 People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 206 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
 207 Id. at 64–65. 
 208 United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding “no question” 
that plea allocutions and grand jury testimony are testimonial statements under 
Crawford); United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding a plea 
allocution testimonial “as it is formally given in court, under oath, and in response to 
questions by the court or the prosecutor”); People v. Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d 721, 721 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling transcript of guilty plea to subornation of perjury by 
defendant’s boyfriend was testimonial and wrongly admitted); People v. Hardy, 824 
N.E.2d 953, 955 (N.Y. 2005) (finding use of redacted transcript of co-defendant’s 
plea allocution reversible error). 
 209 People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) (finding, en banc, that the opportunity 
to cross-examine the subsequently unavailable declarant, afforded to the defendant 
at a preliminary hearing, did not constitute a meaningful prior opportunity to cross-
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4. Statements Made by Co-conspirators in the Course and 
in Furtherance of the Conspiracy 
Statements made by co-conspirators in the course of and in fur-
therance of a conspiracy and made to co-conspirators or others 
unconnected to law enforcement appear to be clearly outside the 
realm of being testimonial.  Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority 
in Crawford, commented that statements in furtherance of a conspir-
acy are “by their nature” not testimonial.210  The declarants making 
such statements have no expectation of their eventual evidentiary use 
and they are not generated or elicited by the efforts of law enforce-
ment.  A Texas Court of Appeals concluded that a co-conspirator’s 
pre-murder statements made to fellow conspirators in planning the 
crime, and overheard by a girlfriend of one of them, did not qualify 
as testimonial under Crawford.211  The court noted that these state-
ments “were not made in a setting where it might reasonably be 
expected the statements would be used in judicial proceedings.”212  
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that co-conspirator state-
ments “made to loved ones and acquaintances . . . are not the kind of 
memorialized, judicial-process-created evidence of which Crawford 
speaks” and therefore were not testimonial.213
Beginning at the oral argument in Crawford, questions arose as to 
whether co-conspirator statements made in furtherance of a conspir-
acy—but made to confidential informants or undercover law 
enforcement agents who are feigning participation—would be con-
sidered testimonial.214  It has been advanced that where a confidential 
informant is participating in the conversations producing the co-
conspirator statements “for the very reason of obtaining evidence” 
examine since the right to cross-examine was limited at the hearing to the issue of 
probable cause, and further holding that the introduction at trial of the preliminary 
hearing testimony violated the defendant’s confrontation rights); State v. Stuart, 695 
N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005) (holding preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness not admissible because, for confrontation purposes, there was no meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine).  But see State v. McGowen, No. M2004-00109-CCA-R3-
CD, 2005 WL 2008183 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2005) (finding, for confrontation 
purposes, cross-examination opportunity at preliminary hearing sufficient to justify 
the introduction at trial of testimony generated at the preliminary hearing when the 
witness became unavailable). 
 210 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
 211 Wiggins v. State, 152 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App. 2004).  See also Bush v. State, 
895 So. 2d 836, 847 (Miss. 2005) (holding that “[u]nder Roberts, Crawford, Mitchell, 
and Rule [of Evidence] 803(d)(2)(E),” statements made by one co-conspirator to 
another in planning a robbery were admissible). 
 212 Wiggins, 152 S.W.3d at 659. 
 213 United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 214 See supra note 164. 
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against them, the statements so generated would fall within the rule 
of Crawford and be excluded, but it appears that even these co-
conspirator statements will be classified as non-testimonial.215
Consistent with the petitioner’s answer to a query on this issue 
during oral argument in Crawford,216 the Second Circuit applied the 
“reasonable expectation” test to answer the question of “whether [the 
co-conspirator] served as a ‘witness’ who bears testimony within the 
meaning of the Clause, despite the fact that he was unaware that his 
statements were being elicited by law enforcement and would poten-
tially be used in a trial.”217  In this case, the Second Circuit observed 
that the Crawford Court had alluded to various formulations of the 
reasonable expectation test and, though not adopting any of them, 
the Crawford majority commented that they share a “common nu-
cleus” and define the scope of the Confrontation Clause at “various 
levels of abstraction.”218  Predicting that the Supreme Court would ul-
timately use the reasonable expectation test as “the anchor of a more 
concrete definition of testimony,” the Second Circuit concluded that 
the co-conspirator’s unwitting statements to a confidential informant 
in furtherance of the conspiracy did not constitute testimony since he 
had “no knowledge of the [confidential informant’s] connection to 
investigators and believed that he was having a casual conversation 
with a friend and potential co-conspirator.”219
Using a different rationale, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
came to the same conclusion that a co-conspirator’s statements made 
to a confidential police informant in furtherance of the conspiracy 
 215 United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005), rev’g No. 
CRIM.2004-05F/R, 2004 WL 1125146 (D.V.I. May 11, 2004) (overturning a district 
court decision that incorporated this analysis and found that such statements were 
“testimonial,” the appellate court noted the analysis was “not without some appeal,” 
but stated “the conversations reasonably could be categorized as involving statements 
that [the confidential informant] expected to be used prosecutorially; obtaining evi-
dence for the prosecution is, after all, the raison d’être of being a confidential 
informant”).  As to this concern being raised in oral argument, see supra note 163. 
 216 See supra note 162.  Mr. Fisher, for the petitioner, cited the law professors who 
filed an amicus brief advancing the “reasonable expectation” test for classifying 
statements as testimonial.  The test was described as an objective one that would ask: 
“Would a reasonable person in the position of declarant anticipate that the state-
ment would likely be used for evidentiary purposes?”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
9–10, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 
22705281; Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors, supra note 156, at 20. 
 217 United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004).  See also People v. Re-
deaux, 823 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (arriving at the same conclusion but 
reasoning that the conspiratorial statement to the undercover agent was not the 
product of “interrogation” as that term was utilized in Crawford). 
 218 Saget, 377 F.3d at 229. 
 219 Id. 
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are not testimonial under Crawford.220  It justified this classification by 
noting that the Crawford Court cited with approval its own previous 
decision in Bourjaily v. United States221—where admission of such a 
statement was found to be proper under the Clause—and referenced 
it “as an example of a case in which non-testimonial statements were 
correctly admitted against the defendant despite the lack of a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”222
5. Dying Declarations 
The Crawford Court, though not deciding the question as to 
whether “testimonial” dying declarations should be exempted from 
the Crawford exclusionary rule upon historical grounds,  did note that 
such an exception would be sui generis.223  It hinted that such an ex-
ception might be warranted by stating, “[t]he one deviation we have 
found involves dying declarations.  The existence of that exception as 
a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed.  Although 
many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for 
admitting even those that clearly are.”224  Seizing on this, the Su-
preme Court of California, in a post-Crawford case, recognized such 
an exception when the dying declaration was given to police respond-
ing to the shooting of the declarant.225  The Supreme Court of 
California did so, concluding: 
[I]f, as Crawford teaches, the confrontation clause “is most natu-
rally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common 
law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the 
founding,” it follows that the common law pedigree of the excep-
tion for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth 
Amendment.226
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in dicta, hinted that it might be 
amenable to recognizing an exception from the Crawford rule for tes-
timonial dying declarations by quoting at length Crawford’s footnote 
 220 Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 183–84. 
 221 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
 222 Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 183.  See also Redeaux, 823 N.E.2d at 270–71 (co-
conspirator statement to undercover officer in the course of and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy was not the product of interrogation and was not testimonial). 
 223 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004). 
 224 Id. (citations omitted). 
 225 People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 971 (Cal. 2004). 
 226 Id. at 972 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54). 
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six.227  Other courts found that dying declarations fall outside the 
ambit of exclusion under the Confrontation Clause after Crawford.228
Arriving at the opposite conclusion, one federal district court, 
noting that the Crawford Court deliberately left the question open, 
concluded that a stabbing victim’s dying declaration, elicited through 
police questioning in the emergency room of a hospital, was “testi-
monial” under Crawford.229  The court stated that there was “no 
rationale in Crawford or otherwise under which dying declarations 
should be treated differently than any other testimonial statement.”230  
Another federal district court judge, though finding a murder vic-
tim’s dying declaration admissible regardless of its testimonial nature 
under the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine, rejected the conten-
tion by the government that otherwise it should be excepted from 
exclusion under Crawford.231
 227 Walton v. State, 603 S.E.2d 263, 265–66 (Ga. 2004) (discussing the unpreserved 
issue of the admission of a non-testimonial dying declaration made by the declarant 
to his brother). 
 228 For example, in State v. Martin, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a 
statement by a murder victim—who had been shot in the chest and stabbed in the 
neck (cutting an artery)—who told his girlfriend “Call the police.  Jeff and Lenair.”  
695 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. 2005).  The statement was made while the victim was in 
a great deal of pain, choking, and clutching his chest, just an hour before he died.  
Id.  The court found that the severity of his injuries was sufficient to demonstrate an 
awareness of the declarant of his imminent demise and thus his statement qualified 
as a dying declaration.  Id. at 583–84.  The court additionally found the admission of 
this declaration did not offend the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford 
“because an exception for dying declarations existed at common law and was not re-
pudiated by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 585–86.  Similarly, in People v. Gilmore, an 
Illinois appellate court found a critically wounded murder victim’s hospital state-
ment, describing his assailant and providing specific information that would lead to 
the perpetrator’s identification, made to officers who had asked if he knew who shot 
him, to be a dying declaration.  828 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  Turning to the 
confrontation violation claim, the court recognized that since the declaration was the 
product of police questioning for the purpose of investigating a criminal offense, 
under Crawford, the statement was “testimonial.”  Id. at 301–02.  However, the court, 
noting the dicta in Crawford’s footnote six, concluded that dying declarations were 
exempted from exclusion under the Clause.  Id. at 302. 
 229 United States v. Jordan, No. CRIM. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *3 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 3, 2005). 
 230 Id. (emphasizing further the inherent reliability concerns regarding dying dec-
larations and the fact that this exception was not even recognized at the time of the 
ratification of the Sixth Amendment). 
 231 United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 n.5 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (citing 
the inherent unreliability of such declarations as the reason they should not be ex-
empted). 
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6. Certifications and Affidavits 
It would appear that under even the narrowest interpretation, 
Crawford’s “testimonial” hearsay would include sworn affidavits and 
certifications.  Such an interpretation would seem apparent from the 
Crawford majority’s historical examination of colonial practices in 
admitting ex parte depositions and examinations,232 and the Court’s 
use of the definitions of a “witness” as one who “bears testimony” and 
“testimony” as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”233  Additionally, all of 
the formulations of this “core class” of “testimonial” hearsay that the 
Court selected to highlight would appear to include affidavits and 
certifications: 
 Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” state-
ments exist: [1] “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examina-
tions, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would rea-
sonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” [2] “extrajudicial 
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such 
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” [3] 
“statements that were made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial.”  These formulations all 
share a common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at 
various levels of abstraction around it.  Regardless of the precise 
articulation, some statements qualify under any definition—for 
example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.   
 Statements taken by police officers in the course of interroga-
tions are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.234
The Crawford Court even appeared to include unsworn—as well as 
sworn—affidavits in the category of testimonial hearsay sought to be 
regulated by the Clause, refuting the concurring Chief Justice’s con-
tention that it did not.235  The Court stated: “We find it implausible 
that a provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte 
affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.”236
 232 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 47–49 (2004). 
 233 Id. at 51. 
 234 Id. at 51–52 (citations omitted). 
 235 Id. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“Thus, while I agree that the Framers 
were mainly concerned about sworn affidavits and depositions, it does not follow that 
they were similarly concerned about the Court’s broader category of testimonial 
statements.”). 
 236 Id. at 52 n.3. 
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Concern and disagreement has arisen since the Crawford deci-
sion as to whether the term “testimonial” would include certifications, 
affidavits, or reports, sometimes authorized by law or sanctioned by 
rules of evidence, whereby an official or agent of the government or 
private entity makes certified statements as to whether certain proce-
dures were followed or results obtained, or whether certain records 
exist.  These certifications are often prepared with the knowledge 
they will be used as evidence and are often provided at the request of 
law enforcement officers or prosecutors.  Their use, in some cases, 
provides proof essential to a successful prosecution, but courts appear 
divided as to their admissibility under Crawford. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada considered a driving under the 
influence case in which the prosecution sought to admit into evi-
dence an affidavit authorized by Nevada legislation and prepared by a 
healthcare professional who drew blood from the defendant.237  The 
statute authorized its admission at trial to prove the identity of the 
declarant, the identity of the person from whom the blood was 
drawn, proper custody and control of the blood, and the identity of 
the person who received it.238  Prior to trial, the trial court ordered its 
exclusion upon the defendant’s assertion that its introduction would 
violate his confrontation rights and the state sought mandamus to re-
quire its admission at trial.239  The Nevada Supreme Court refused to 
issue the writ, and declared that the affidavit, prepared pursuant to 
statute and solely for the prosecution’s use at trial, was testimonial 
under Crawford and could not be introduced unless the affiant was 
made available at trial for cross-examination.240
Similarly, a report prepared by an employee of a private labora-
tory documenting the results of a sexual assault victim’s blood test, 
which had been requested by and prepared for law enforcement, was 
held by a New York appeals court to have been improperly admitted 
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and over 
the accused’s confrontation objection.241  The court found that the 
report of the blood test was inadmissible as a business record because 
it was prepared in contemplation of litigation and therefore lacked 
the necessary indicia of reliability.242  In finding a Crawford violation of 
the defendant’s confrontation rights, the court explained: “Because 
 237 City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004). 
 238 Id. at 593. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (App. Div. 2004). 
 242 Id. at 396–97. 
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the test was initiated by the prosecution and generated by the desire 
to discover evidence against defendant, the results were testimo-
nial.”243
In contrast, a Texas Court of Appeals decision ruled that an au-
topsy report, prepared by a now-deceased medical examiner, and 
admitted in a murder prosecution under the public records hearsay 
exception, was “non-testimonial.”244  After concluding that a medical 
examiner was not “other law enforcement personnel,” the court 
found his report was not excluded from the public records exception.  
Further, because, in part, it was an “objective, routine, scientific de-
termination of an unambiguous factual nature” and prepared by one 
who did not have a motive to fabricate, it did “not fall within the 
categories of testimonial evidence described in Crawford.”245  It is dif-
ficult to imagine that an autopsy report, prepared by a medical 
examiner, would not have been prepared with an eye toward its use 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution.  Since a report by a medical 
examiner is not simply an objective observation of a routine nature 
when it includes subjective analysis of the cause of death, it is difficult 
to justify the court’s classification of such a document as non-
testimonial. 
Recently, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals addressed this 
issue in a homicide case where the cause of death was not in dis-
pute.246  This court found an autopsy report of a non-testifying 
medical examiner admissible under the business records and public 
records hearsay exceptions, but went on to address a Crawford chal-
lenge: 
 We hold that the findings in an autopsy report of the physical 
condition of a decedent, which are routine, descriptive and not 
analytical, which are objectively ascertained and generally reliable 
and enjoy a generic indicium of reliability, may be received into 
evidence without the testimony of the examiner.  Where, how-
ever, contested conclusions or opinions in an autopsy report are 
central to the determination of corpus delecti or criminal agency 
and are offered into evidence, they serve the same function as tes-
timony and trigger the Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation.247
 243 Id. at 397. 
 244 Moreno Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 180–83 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 245 Id. (noting also that even if the autopsy report was testimonial, the error in 
admitting it was harmless). 
 246 Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
 247 Id. at 950–51, 954. 
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One judge of the Criminal Court of New York held that the 
statutorily-authorized certification by an agent of the Department of 
Motor Vehicles indicating that the defendant was properly noticed of 
his driver license suspension, was inadmissible because it was not a 
business record (not a contemporaneous entry) and because it vio-
lated confrontation rights of the defendant under Crawford.248  The 
court pointed out that “[p]ost Crawford, the people’s continued reli-
ance on [the statute authorizing the certification] to permit such 
affidavits of non-testifying witnesses to be received in evidence to 
prove an element of the crime charged is simply untenable.”249
A Florida court of appeal, in Shiver v. State,250 considered the ad-
missibility of a statutorily-authorized “breath test” affidavit, prepared 
by a non-testifying trooper and offered to establish an essential pre-
requisite to the admissibility of breathalyzer readings in DUI cases: 
that required maintenance had been performed upon the breatha-
lyzer.  The court concluded that this affidavit was testimonial since it 
had been prepared with a reasonable expectation that it would be 
used prosecutorially—in fact the only purpose the affidavit served was 
its use at trial.251
Though the Crawford Court specifically labeled hearsay admitted 
under the business records exception non-testimonial,252 modern ex-
 248 People v. Capellan, 791 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (Crim. Ct. 2004).  See also People v. 
Pacer, 796 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (App. Div. 2005) (deciding that an “affidavit of regular-
ity/proof of mailing” prepared by a Department of Motor Vehicles employee was 
erroneously introduced to prove a necessary element of the offense charged, that the 
defendant knew his driving privileges had been revoked, and concluding it was error 
due to the fact that under Crawford the document was testimonial and the declarant 
did not testify); People v. Niene, 798 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (Crim. Ct. 2005) (finding the 
affidavit of an official in the Department of Consumer Affairs to the effect that no 
vendor’s license had been issued by that office to the defendant was “testimonial” 
and inadmissible).  But see State v. N.M.K, 118 P.3d 368, 372 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) 
(finding that a certification by a Department of Licensing official, stating that no li-
cense had been issued to the defendant, was non-testimonial and admissible). 
 249 Capellan, 791 N.Y.S.2d at 318. 
 250 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  See also Belvin v. State, No. 4D04-
4235, 2005 WL 1336497, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 8, 2005) (concluding also that 
such a statutorily-authorized breath test affidavit was inadmissible testimonial hear-
say, stating: “A breath test affidavit thus appears to fall squarely within Crawford’s 
‘core class’ of ‘testimonial’ statements.”). 
 251 Shiver, 900 So. 2d at 618. 
 252 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (“Most of the hearsay excep-
tions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, 
business records . . . .”); see also id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“To its credit, 
the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some hearsay exceptions, such as 
business records and official records.”); United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, 111 F. 
App’x 732, 734 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding items contained in defendant’s immigration 
file were non-testimonial public records under Crawford); Johnson v. Renico, 314 F. 
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
380 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:327 
 
pansion of this exception permits its predicate—that it was made 
near the time of the happening of the event by a person with knowl-
edge of the event, that it was the routine practice of the business to 
make such an entry, and that the record is what it purports to be—to 
be established by certification in lieu of the testimony of a custodian 
or other qualified person.253  Obviously, since such certification will 
be made in contemplation of its use in litigation and will often be 
procured by law enforcement officers or prosecutors, its continued 
use in criminal prosecutions is suspect under Crawford.  A United 
States district judge, in a case of first impression, precluded the gov-
ernment from introducing business records by authentication using a 
certification authorized by Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11).254  Justi-
fying this ruling, the court explained: 
 The statements within a certification contemplated by Rule 
902(11) are testimonial statements because they contain “solemn 
declaration or affirmations made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact,” namely that the proper foundation for the 
admission of the business record exists.  They are the functional 
equivalent of ex parte in-court testimony that defendants cannot 
cross-examine.  Indeed, the Rule 902(11) procedure itself takes 
the place of live, sworn testimony of a witness.  Moreover, the 
Rule 902(11) declarants know that they are providing founda-
tional testimony for business records to the government, and 
thus, must reasonably expect that their certifications will be used 
prosecutorially.  Therefore, the Court concludes that the Rule 
902(11) procedure violates defendants’ right to confrontation.255
However, in one post-Crawford decision, a court concluded, re-
garding similar certification provisions, that their use was non-
Supp. 2d 700, 707 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding statements contained in petitioner’s 
police booking information sheets “admitted pursuant to the business records excep-
tion . . . are by their nature nontestimonial, and their admission would not violate 
the holding in Crawford . . . .”). 
 253 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2000 to allow proof that the record 
meets the criteria by means of testimony or certification); FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (al-
lowing proof of authenticity of a business record to be established by certification).  
See also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (as amended by 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 2003–259 § 2); 
MICH. R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2001); UTAH R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2001); 
PA. R. EVID. 803(6) (amended in 2001). 
 254 United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142JAR, 2005 WL 1227790, at *2 (D. Kan. May 
23, 2005) (noting that Rule 902(11) provides that authenticity of a business record 
may be established by “a written declaration of its custodian or other qualified per-
son” to the effect that it was made contemporaneous with the event recorded by a 
person with knowledge, and that it was made by and kept in the regularly conducted 
activity). 
 255 Id. at *2 (citations omitted). 
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testimonial and not controlled by Crawford.256  The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, reviewing the conviction of a previously-deported alien 
for reentering the United States without consent of the Attorney 
General or Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, held 
that admission of a Certificate of Nonexistence of Record (CNR), be-
ing non-testimonial, did not violate confrontation under Crawford.257  
Though the court cited a prior case258 that held the contents of an 
immigration file were admissible as business records, it did not ex-
plain how this justified the admission of a CNR that was not a part of 
the contents of the defendant’s immigration file, but merely an offi-
cial’s certification of the results of an inspection of that file.  In this 
case, the official’s observation was used to establish an essential ele-
ment of the offense.259  Regarding the identical issue, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the CNR certificate was 
prepared for litigation, but added that the certification addressed the 
absence of a document among “documents that were not prepared 
for litigation.”260  Noting that this certificate did not “resemble the 
examples of testimonial evidence” described in Crawford, the court 
concluded that the certificate was non-testimonial and admissible.261
Other post-Crawford cases likewise concluded that certifications 
or reports used in criminal prosecutions are non-testimonial under 
Crawford.  In a driving while intoxicated case, the New Mexico Su-
preme Court reviewed the decision of a trial court excluding, as 
violating confrontation under Crawford, a blood alcohol report pre-
pared by the Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), a division of the 
New Mexico Department of Health.262  The report described the 
 256 United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 257 Id. 
 258 United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, 111 F. App’x 732, 734 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 259 Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d at 680. 
 260 United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 261 Id. at 833. 
 262 State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004).  In a Massachusetts cocaine pos-
session prosecution, a statutorily authorized certificate, admissible thereunder to 
establish the composition, quality and weight of the substance, was found to be non-
testimonial under Crawford.  Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Mass. 
2005).  The court, citing language in Crawford, commented: 
[W]e do not believe that the admission of these certificates of analysis 
implicate[s] “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed . . . particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused.”  The documentary evidence at issue here has very 
little kinship to the type of hearsay the confrontation clause was in-
tended to exclude, absent an opportunity for cross-examination. 
Id. (citations omitted).  A similar Colorado statute authorizes admission of any report 
or finding by a criminalistics laboratory in lieu of the technician thereof personally 
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method the SLD used to test the defendant’s blood and the results of 
that testing.263  Holding the exclusion to have been improper, the 
court found the report admissible under the public records excep-
tion.  The court also found that since SLD employees were neither 
police officers nor law enforcement personnel and their report was 
neither investigative or prosecutorial nor prepared in an adversarial 
setting, the report was non-testimonial under Crawford.264  The court 
further explained that although this report was made by a govern-
ment officer, it was only made to ensure an accurate measurement, 
not to produce testimony for introduction at a trial.265  Likewise, in 
Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth,266 the Virginia Court of Appeals, “[g]uided 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford and the historical con-
text in which it was rooted, as well as the reasoning of appellate 
courts in other states,”267 approved the introduction, over a Confron-
tation Clause challenge, of an absent breathalyzer operator’s 
certificate attesting to the specific blood alcohol content of the de-
fendant’s blood and certifying that the equipment utilized was in 
good working order.268
In another driving while intoxicated case, the Court of Appeals 
of Indiana considered the constitutional propriety of introducing—
over the defendant’s confrontation objection—a certificate from the 
state’s Director of Toxicology regarding the required inspection and 
necessary maintenance of the breath test instrument used in the 
case.269  This certificate, statutorily authorized, was introduced to es-
testifying to the analysis, comparison, or identification.  People v. Hinojas-Mendoza, 
No. 03CA0645, 2005 WL 2561391, at *3–4 (Colo. Ct. App. July 28, 2005).  Regarding 
the introduction in this case of such a report finding a white powder substance to be 
cocaine, the Colorado court held that it was non-testimonial and that Crawford did 
not require its exclusion.  Id. at *4. 
 263 Dedman, 102 P.3d at 635. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at 636. 
 266 618 S.E.2d 347 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
 267 Id. at 355. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).  See also State v. 
Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) (Certifications, prepared by deputies, at-
testing to the proper inspection and maintenance of the Intoxilizer 5000 and which 
were a necessary prerequisite for the introduction of its blood alcohol reading in a 
DUI prosecution, were found to be non-testimonial.  The court justified the conclu-
sion that the certification did not fall within the “core group” of statements the 
Confrontation Clause was meant to exclude, stating: “[S]uch certification reports are 
not substantive evidence of a particular offense, but rather are foundational evidence 
necessary for the admission of substantive evidence.  In other words, the certification 
reports are nontestimonial in nature in that they are foundational, rather than sub-
stantive or accusatory.”). 
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tablish the necessary evidentiary predicate for admitting the result of 
the breath test.270  The defendant claimed that this certificate was an 
affidavit, prepared for use in his criminal trial, and therefore was tes-
timonial and controlled by Crawford.  The court, though conceding 
that the certificate may be said to be an affidavit, concluded, directly 
contrary to the Florida Shiver decision,271 that it was not testimonial 
within the meaning of Crawford.  The court explained: 
[W]e do not see how the admission of these certificates would 
serve to preclude any meaningful cross-examination of the breath 
test evidence presented against him.  Even though the inspector 
of the machine and the Director of Toxicology who executed the 
certification of inspection did not testify at trial, the information 
contained in the certificates does not pertain to the issue of guilt.  
Rather, that information simply goes to inspection and certifica-
tion matters.  In our view, a defendant’s inability to cross-examine 
that information which is contained in the certificates is not simi-
lar to the type of evidence that was of concern to the Crawford 
court.  Otherwise, the unreasonable alternative is to have a toxicologist in 
every court on a daily basis offering testimony about his inspection of a 
breathalyzer machine and the certification of the officer as a proper admin-
istrator of the breath test.  Such a practice is obviously impractical.272
It thus appears that, largely for pragmatic reasons, some courts 
are willing to create “exceptions” as to when an affidavit or certifica-
tion, prepared for use in a criminal prosecution, will be considered 
testimonial for Crawford purposes.  Such pragmatic concerns, how-
ever, may find compatibility with the dictates of Crawford without 
ignoring the obvious, which is that these certificates are testimonial.273  
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State v. Cunningham,274 found 
such compatibility to exist where a statutory scheme authorized such 
affidavits to be introduced in lieu of the affiant’s trial testimony only 
where: (1) sufficient and proscribed pretrial notice of the intent to 
do so is given by the state to the accused, (2) the accused had the 
election to have the state compel the attendance and testimony of the 
affiant at trial and (3) the accused fails to do so.  Finding that these 
statutory requirements were satisfied, the court in Cunningham con-
cluded that a criminalist’s report identifying the contents of a baggie 
as marijuana was properly admitted, since the accused failed to timely 
 270 Napier, 820 N.E.2d at 147. 
 271 Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 272 Napier, 820 N.E.2d at 149 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 273 For an analogous discussion regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 806, see supra 
notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 274 903 So. 2d 1110, 1121 (La. 2005). 
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object and require the attendance of the declarant, and therefore ef-
fectively waived his constitutional right to confront him.275
7. Statements Made by Victims, Informants or Witnesses 
to Law Enforcement Personnel 
a. Statements Made in 911 Calls 
Prior to Crawford, Professors Richard D. Friedman and Bridget 
McCormick urged in regards to “dial-in testimony” reconsideration of 
Roberts’s “reliability” or “trustworthy” approach in favor of the testi-
monial approach that was ultimately embraced by Crawford.276  They 
did so, in part, specifically to address the phenomenon of using do-
mestic violence victims’ prior 911 statements as substantive evidence 
against the accused where the victim does not testify at the trial.277  
These professors observed: 
The phenomenon we have described represents a dramatic 
change in the way criminal cases have traditionally been tried.  
Trying a case without the live testimony of the victim or com-
plainant is nothing new; as we have acknowledged, that is how 
murder cases are necessarily tried.  Instead, what is novel is that 
prosecutors are trying cases by relying on the out-of-court accusa-
tions of the complainant, sometimes in contravention of her live 
testimony and, most notably, often without presenting her live tes-
timony, even though she may be perfectly available to testify.  
What is more, prosecutors routinely do so, and the courts are let-
ting them do it.278
Anyone familiar with domestic violence and subsequent prosecu-
tions arising out of it is aware of this phenomenon.  Frequently, a call 
is made to 911 by someone asserting that she is the victim of abuse, 
often at the hand of her spouse or boyfriend, seeking an immediate 
law enforcement and emergency response.  A tape recording of this 
call is often made.  This domestic violence victim, unlike other vic-
tims, usually has a significant relationship to her alleged attacker.  
During the prosecutorial period and before the trial commences, cir-
cumstances often operate on such victims to render them reluctant to 
 275 Id. at 1122. 
 276 Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1171, 1172–74, 1224–28 (2002).  These professors also participated in preparing 
an amicus brief in Crawford advancing the “testimonial” approach.  See supra note 156 
(listing the other professors and referring to parts of their argument). 
 277 Id. at 1174–80. 
 278 Id. at 1180. 
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testify on behalf of the prosecution at trial.279  The victim may recon-
cile with her spouse or attacker and may even continue or resume 
living with him.  Because of this reconciliation, the victim may no 
longer desire to cooperate with the government.  In other cases, she 
may refuse to cooperate due to fear of retaliation or loss of financial 
support.  Finally, in some cases, the victim may not cooperate simply 
because she knows the 911 report was false and was made in anger.  
In such cases, prosecutors attempt to salvage their cases by seeking 
the introduction of the victim’s 911 statements as a substitution for 
her unobtainable present testimony.280  Could a victim’s statements 
made during a 911 call or to the responding officers be used substan-
tively at trial over the confrontation objection of the defendant?  
Would the statements be deemed “testimonial” under Crawford such 
that they could not be admitted unless the victim presently testified 
or the accused had a prior meaningful opportunity to cross-examine 
her? 
Professors Friedman and McCormack opined that not all state-
ments made during 911 calls would necessarily be classified as 
testimonial and offered these considerations for classifying them: 
 Now consider statements made in 911 calls and to responding 
police officers.  A reasonable person knows she is speaking to offi-
cialdom—either police officers or agents whose regular 
employment calls on them to pass information on to law en-
forcement, from whom it may go to the prosecutorial authorities.  
The caller’s statements may therefore serve either or both of two 
primary objectives—to gain immediate official assistance in end-
ing or relieving an exigent, perhaps dangerous, situation, and to 
 279 See Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (identifying fear 
of reprisal, hope of reconciliation, and financial and support concerns as reasons a 
victim might decide not to cooperate with a prosecution, and citing one source as 
estimating that between as many “as eighty and ninety percent of domestic violence 
victims recant their accusations or refuse to cooperate with a prosecution.” (citing 
Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 
IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003))); People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Crim. 
Ct. 2004) (“Prosecutors like to point out that some complainants in domestic assault 
cases are unwilling to testify at trial because they fear the defendant, because they are 
economically or emotionally dependent upon the defendant, or because they are re-
luctant to break up their own families.  Defense lawyers, for their part, like to point 
out that some complainants in domestic assault cases do not come forward to testify 
at trial because they fear that cross-examination will expose their original complaints 
as false or greatly exaggerated.”). 
 280 See, e.g., Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (“In any event, because complainants in 
domestic violence cases often do not appear for trial, prosecutors have in recent 
years increasingly tried to fashion ‘victimless’ prosecutions.  In such a case, the gov-
ernment tries to prove the defendant's guilt without testimony from the complainant 
through other evidence.”). 
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provide information to aid investigation and possible prosecution 
related to that situation.  In occasional cases, the first objective 
may dominate—the statement is little more than a cry for help—
and such statements may be considered nontestimonial, at least to 
the extent that they are not offered to prove the truth of what 
they assert.  But as our discussion in Part I has shown, these 
statements are often more detailed, providing significant informa-
tion that the police do not need for immediate intervention but 
that may be useful to the criminal justice system.  A reasonable 
person in the position of the declarant would realize that such in-
formation would likely be used in a criminal investigation or 
prosecution.  Accordingly, such a statement should be considered 
testimonial, and the confrontation right should apply to it. 
 . . . The more the statement narrates events, rather than merely 
asking for help, the more likely it is to be considered testimonial. 
 Thus, if any significant time has passed since the events it de-
scribes, the statement is probably testimonial.  When, as is often 
the case, the 911 call consists largely of a series of questions by the 
operator, and responses by the caller, concerning not only the 
current incident but the history of the relationship, the caller’s 
statements should be considered testimonial.281
In spite of the fact that the United States Supreme Court 
adopted the “testimonial” approach, advanced by these professors in 
order to curb this practice, a survey of post-Crawford cases indicates a 
strong desire of some lower courts to preserve this source of admissi-
ble evidence by classifying 911 calls as “non-testimonial.” 
Less than three weeks after the Crawford decision, the beginning 
of this trend was first, and perhaps prematurely,282 exhibited in the 
opinion of a City of New York Criminal Court judge in People v. Mo-
scat.283  In an opinion denying a motion in limine to exclude a 911 
call purportedly made by the victim in a domestic violence case, this 
judge described such evidence as follows: 
 Perhaps the most common form of such evidence is a call for 
help made by a woman to 911.  Typically, in such a call a woman 
tells the 911 operator (in New York City, a civilian police em-
ployee) that her boyfriend has just shot, stabbed or beaten her 
(and may be about to do so again); usually, the woman hurriedly 
answers a few questions from the operator and then asks the op-
 281 Friedman & McCormack, supra note 276, at 1242–43 (footnote omitted). 
 282 See supra note 168 (describing a New York Times article alleging the judge was so 
eager to rule on a Crawford issue that he invented facts not presented in the trial). 
 283 777 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
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erator to send police officers and an ambulance to her aid.  The 
present case fits that description.284
In concluding that the 911 call did not resemble police interroga-
tions or circumstances wherein the declarant is “bearing witness” in 
contemplation of future legal proceedings, under one of Crawford’s 
suggested formulations of the term “testimonial,” the court ex-
plained: 
 A 911 call is typically initiated not by the police, but by the vic-
tim of a crime.  It is generated not by the desire of the 
prosecution or the police to seek evidence against a particular 
suspect; rather, the 911 call has its genesis in the urgent desire of 
a citizen to be rescued from immediate peril.  Thus a pretrial ex-
amination is clearly “testimonial” in nature in part because it is 
undertaken by the government in contemplation of pursuing 
criminal charges against a particular person.  But a 911 call is 
fundamentally different; it is undertaken by a caller who wants 
protection from immediate danger.  A testimonial statement is 
produced when the government summons a citizen to be a wit-
ness; in a 911 call, it is the citizen who summons the government 
to her aid. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Typically, a woman who calls 911 for help because she has 
just been stabbed or shot is not contemplating being a “witness” 
in future legal proceedings; she is usually trying simply to save her 
own life.285
The court also noted that the 911 call would likely be admitted as an 
excited utterance; under this exception the declarant’s ability to en-
gage in reflective thinking must necessarily be diminished due to the 
stress produced by a startling event.  In such a state, the court rea-
soned, the victim is not likely to fabricate her statement nor 
contemplate its use in future proceedings.286  Since the 911 call was 
not “testimonial,” the judge ruled that it could be introduced into 
evidence “without offending the Sixth Amendment” as long as it 
meets the requirements for an exception to the hearsay rules.287
A California Court of Appeal decision, citing Moscat and apply-
ing its rationale, approved of the admission of a spontaneous 911 call 
 284 Id. at 878 (emphasis added). 
 285 Id. at 879–80. 
 286 Id. at 880.  See also Commonwealth v. Eichele, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 460, 469 (Pa. 
Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (deciding that an excited utterance a witness made to his girl-
friend was not testimonial, and commenting that “[c]onceptually, an excited 
utterance is at the opposite end of the hearsay spectrum from testimonial hearsay”). 
 287 Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 880. 
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from the victim over confrontation objections.288  This court empha-
sized that it would be “difficult to identify any circumstances under 
which a . . . spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial,’” since it 
must be made without reflection.289
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found a twelve-year-old’s 
911 call, made while witnessing an argument between his aunt and 
her boyfriend that escalated into an assault by firearm, was “emo-
tional and spontaneous” and not “deliberate and calculated” and 
therefore “was an excited utterance, and under these circumstances, 
nontestimonial.”290
A Minnesota court of appeals likewise admitted a victim’s 911 
excited utterance over a Crawford confrontation objection.291  Also cit-
ing Moscat, the court found that the victim’s statement describing the 
attack and identifying the attacker was not testimonial.292  It justified 
this conclusion by noting that statements made in 911 calls are nor-
mally made during, or moments after, a criminal episode, under 
stress, and the caller is usually seeking protection from an “immedi-
ate danger” and not because of a desire that the furnished 
information be used at a later trial.293  The court further explained 
the following: 
Even under the broadest definition of “testimonial” cited in Craw-
ford, which focuses on whether an objective witness would 
reasonably believe the statement would later be available for use 
at trial, the 911 call does not qualify as “testimonial” evidence.  
Statements in a 911 call by a victim struggling for self-control and 
survival only moments after an assault simply do not qualify as 
knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative 
environment in which the declarant reasonably expects that the 
responses will be used in later judicial proceedings.294
However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, though affirming this 
decision, rejected the categorical approach.295  The court noted that, 
 288 People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 289 Id. at 776. 
 290 United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 291 State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 
802 (Minn. 2005). 
 292 Id. at 302–03. 
 293 Id. at 302. 
 294 Id. 
 295 State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 2005).  The court noted that the 
911 call was placed shortly after the assailant had left and ended immediately after 
being notified by the operator of the perpetrator’s apprehension.  Id.  During the 
conversation, the caller was “trembling, stuttering, crying, [and] hyperventilating.”  
Id. (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the court 
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in reference to 911 calls whereby the caller is seeking protection from 
imminent peril, some courts have categorically found statements 
made by the caller to be non-testimonial and others have reached the 
opposite conclusion.296  The court, noting that most courts take an ad 
hoc approach, concluded: 
[I]t is appropriate to evaluate whether statements made during 
911 calls are testimonial in light of the circumstances under which 
the calls are made.  Accordingly, we decline to adopt a categorical 
rule that all statements made during 911 calls are nontestimo-
nial.297
Also adhering to the Moscat rationale, the Ohio Court of Appeals 
held that an eyewitness’s 911 report of a victim being attacked by her 
boyfriend, admitted as an excited utterance, was non-testimonial.298
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a “severely 
frightened” homicide victim’s frantic call to police reporting an in-
truder was not a “testimonial” statement, and therefore not the type 
of statement with which the Crawford Court was concerned.299  The 
court explained that the victim was “in no way being interrogated by 
[police] but instead sought their help in ending a frightening intru-
sion into her home.”300
In People v. Caudillo,301 a California appeals court considered the 
propriety of admitting, over a confrontation objection, a bystander’s 
eyewitness account made during a 911 call, describing a shooting and 
providing a description of the assailant and his car.  The court noted 
that the defendant contended 
that the 911 call in this case is distinguishable from the call con-
sidered by the court in Moscat.  He points out that the caller in 
this case called for the specific reason of providing the police with 
information identifying the shooter so as to help in his apprehen-
sion and potential prosecution.  He further points out that the 
caller was a third party witness, rather than the victim, arguing 
that the call was not part of the criminal incident itself.302
noted the operator was focused on “obtaining information for an immediate inter-
vention rather than a future prosecution” and sought to calm her and assure her that 
she was safe.  Id.  Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the victim’s 
911 statements were non-testimonial.  Id. 
 296 Id. at 810. 
 297 Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 811. 
 298 State v. Byrd, 828 N.E.2d 133, 136–37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
 299 Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, 683 & n.22 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 300 Id. 
 301 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion superseded by 23 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. 2005). 
 302 Id. at 588. 
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Rejecting these contentions, the court found the call to be non-
testimonial, and thus not barred under Crawford, because the decla-
rant was speaking to the dispatcher who was merely attempting to 
obtain information to permit an appropriate response in aiding the 
victim and apprehending the perpetrator, and this was in “stark con-
trast” to the statement Sylvia made to the police in Crawford, which 
was the product of formal interrogation and made after the arrest of 
both Sylvia and the defendant.303  Purporting to apply the “reasonable 
expectation” formulation described in Crawford, the court further jus-
tified its conclusion: “This was a classic 911 call, made immediately 
after a crime was committed.  The caller was simply requesting help 
from the police by describing what she saw without thinking about 
whether her statements would be used at a later trial.”304
In stark contrast to Caudillo in California, consider the New York 
case of People v. Dobbin.305  An eyewitness to the robbery of a parking 
lot attendant made a 911 call reporting the crime and describing the 
robber.306  This court found the call to be testimonial and inadmissi-
ble under Crawford, explaining: 
The 911 call, in this case, contains a solemn declaration for the 
purpose of establishing the fact that the defendant is committing 
a robbery.  The caller is making a formal out of court statement to 
a government officer for the purpose of establishing this fact.  
The caller’s statement is not a “casual remark to an acquaint-
ance.”  The caller was officially reporting a crime to the 
government agency entrusted with this very serious and important 
function.  As such, the 911 call falls within the category of out of 
court statements which reflect the focus of the Confrontation 
Clause; the out of court statements of “‘witnesses’ against the ac-
cused in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’”307
The respondent’s prediction during the Crawford oral argument, 
that two different judges looking at exactly the same facts might come 
to opposite conclusions no matter what definition was adopted by the 
Court, seems to have been borne out in these cases.308
 303 Id. at 590. 
 304 Id. 
 305 People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 306 Id. at 898. 
 307 Id. at 900 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).  The 
court also noted 911 callers would reasonably expect that evidentiary use would likely 
be made of the information conveyed.  Id. at 901. 
 308 See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing this reality of human na-
ture). 
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Contrary to the rationale and conclusion reached in Moscat, an-
other New York trial judge found to be testimonial, and thus 
inadmissible under Crawford, a 911 call from an eyewitness reporting 
a robbery and shooting who, in response to the operator’s questions, 
described the crime, its location, and the perpetrator.309  That the 911 
statements would qualify as spontaneous declarations did not pre-
clude this judge from finding it to be testimonial under Crawford.  
The judge observed: 
Crawford requires a reexamination of the basis for treating spon-
taneous declarations as admissible hearsay, including statements 
in a 911 call reporting a crime.  Calls to 911 to report a crime are 
testimonial under the test set out.  When a 911 call is made to re-
port a crime and supply information about the circumstances and 
the people involved, the purpose of the information is for investi-
gation, prosecution, and potential use at a judicial proceeding; it 
makes no difference what the caller believes.310
Some courts observing the contradictory rationales and conclu-
sions regarding Crawford’s application to 911 calls have opted for an 
ad hoc approach to determining whether a particular 911 call should 
be classified as testimonial under Crawford.  In People v. West,311 for ex-
ample, a female cab driver who had been raped by several men and 
whose cab had been stolen, approached the door of a house and 
cried out for help.312  The homeowner immediately called 911 and 
reported the crime, relaying to the victim the operator’s questions as 
to her condition and the description of her cab, and then providing 
the victim’s answers to the operator.313  Citing Crawford, the defendant 
contended that the homeowner’s statements during the 911 call were 
testimonial and therefore its admission, given the fact that the home-
owner was unavailable at trial, violated his Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights.314
Noting the conflicting views of other courts, the West court de-
clined to adopt a “bright line” rule for classifying all 911 calls as 
either testimonial or non-testimonial, but rather took a case-by-case 
approach to deciding the issue.315  The court explained that consid-
eration should be given to two questions in this inquiry.  First, was the 
statement volunteered in order to “initiate police action or criminal 
 309 People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 310 Id. at 415. 
 311 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 312 Id. at 85. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. at 87. 
 315 Id. at 91. 
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prosecution”?316  If so, it would qualify as testimonial because “an ob-
jective individual would reasonably believe that when he or she 
reports a crime they are ‘bearing witness’ and that their statement 
will be available for use at future criminal proceedings.”317  Second, 
was the statement procured by interrogation, the purpose of which 
was to obtain evidence?318  If so, it would be testimonial because, as a 
“product of evidence producing questions,” its use would “implicate 
the central concerns underlying the confrontation clause.”319  As to 
the 911 call by the homeowner, the court concluded that the portion 
of the call concerning the nature of the attack, the victim’s needs, 
and her age and location were not testimonial because the dispatcher 
was motivated by a desire to secure medical attention and not to gar-
ner evidence.320  However, that portion of the call wherein the 
homeowner described the cab, articles that were taken, and the per-
petrators’ direction of flight was garnered by the operator’s desire to 
involve the police and for evidentiary use.321
A Washington court of appeals, quoting at length the considera-
tions Professors Friedman and McCormack, thought pertinent to the 
classification of a 911 call as testimonial,322 also rejected a “bright 
line” rule in favor of a case-by-case approach.323  The case involved a 
911 call, in which the caller reported that the defendant had been in 
her home in violation of a no-contact order.  The court concluded 
that the call was testimonial because, “[d]espite the seriousness of 
Powers’ alleged conduct, [the declarant’s] call was not ‘part of the 
criminal incident itself’ or a request for help entitling the State to 
prove their case without affording Powers the opportunity to cross 
examine the [declarant], the right Crawford protects.”324  Additionally, 
the court characterized her call as a report of a violation of a court 
order by Powers, which she made for the purpose of his apprehen-
sion and prosecution.325
 316 Id. 
 317 West, 823 N.E.2d at 91. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. at 91–92. 
 322 State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).  See Friedman & 
McCormack, supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 323 Powers, 99 P.3d at 1266. 
 324 Id. at 1264, 1266. 
 325 Id. at 1266. 
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b. Statements to First Responders 
Another problematic area in the immediate post-Crawford period 
has been how to classify statements by victims and witnesses made di-
rectly to law enforcement personnel who immediately respond to a 
location upon being alerted to a possible criminal event. 
After Crawford, the Indiana Court of Appeals consistently and 
categorically concluded that statements elicited as a result of initial 
questioning by responding officers arriving immediately or shortly af-
ter the occurrence were not testimonial, reasoning that the lack of 
structure, adversarial quality, and formality in such an interchange do 
not bear any resemblance to the term “interrogation” as described in 
Crawford, and because excited utterances, by their nature, preclude 
reflection and the ability to anticipate that evidentiary use would be 
made of such statements.326  In Hammon v. State, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals concluded that, had Crawford intended that all statements in 
response to any police questioning would qualify as “testimonial,” the 
Supreme Court would have so stated.327  Instead, the Indiana court 
noted that Crawford’s holding was limited to police “interrogation,” a 
narrower term, explaining as follows: 
We conclude this choice of words clearly indicates that police “in-
terrogation” is not the same as, and is much narrower than, police 
“questioning.”  To the extent the Supreme Court said that it used 
the term “interrogation” “in its colloquial . . . sense,” we believe 
that reference to a lay dictionary for a definition of “interroga-
tion” is appropriate.  “Interrogation” is defined in one common 
English dictionary as “To examine by questioning formally or of-
ficially.”  This is consistent with our prior observation that the 
common characteristic of all “testimonial” statements is the for-
mality by which they are produced.  We also believe that 
“interrogation” carries with it a connotation of an at least slightly 
adversarial setting. 
 326 See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 814 N.E.2d 695, 701–02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
the excited utterance of a criminal negligence victim regarding a barroom alterca-
tion with a named individual, made to the first responding officers shortly after the 
occurrence, was non-testimonial); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2004) (finding excited utterances of a “crying” and “bleeding” domestic violence vic-
tim made to a responding officer within fifteen minutes of placing a 911 call was 
non-testimonial, noting the officer’s questioning did not “qualify as classic, ‘police 
interrogation’ as referred to in Crawford”); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 947–48 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling non-testimonial the excited utterances made by a 
“frightened” and “timid” domestic abuse victim in response to “preliminary investiga-
tory” questions of the first officer at the scene, and which described the incident and 
named the assailant), vacated, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
 327 Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952. 
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 . . . Whatever else police “interrogation” might be, we do not be-
lieve that word applies to preliminary investigatory questions 
asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred.328
The court added this additional reasoning regarding excited utter-
ances made to first responders being non-testimonial: “An 
unrehearsed statement made without time for reflection or delibera-
tion, as required to be an ‘excited utterance,’ is not ‘testimonial’ in 
that such a statement, by definition, has not been made in contem-
plation of its use in a future trial.”329
The Supreme Court of Indiana, approximately one year later, 
though affirming the case, vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision.330  
In doing so, it appeared to have rejected the Court of Appeals’ first 
 328 Id. (citations omitted).  For another court using similar reasoning, see People v. 
Bradley, 799 N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 2005).  That court found non-testimonial under 
Crawford a bloodied victim’s excited utterance, describing being thrown through a 
glass door by her boyfriend, which was given in answer to the initial question, “What 
happened?” by a police officer responding to a 911 call.  Id. at 478–79.  In doing so, 
the court rejected the formulation, suggested but not adopted in Crawford and ad-
vanced by the defendant, that the testimonial character of the victim’s utterance 
should depend on whether she had the expectation that her statement may be util-
ized in a subsequent trial.  Id. at 479.  Rather, the court considered controlling the 
determination of “the objective of the person posing the question.”  Id. at 480.  It 
stated: 
Where the purpose of the inquiry is to gain general familiarity with the 
situation confronting a police officer to determine what happened, the 
officer is making only a preliminary investigatory inquiry.  Thus, the re-
sponse is not the product of a structured police interrogation and 
should not be regarded as testimonial.  However, where the purpose of 
the inquiry is to gather incriminating evidence against a particular in-
dividual, the officer is advancing a potential prosecution, and the 
response takes on a testimonial character. 
Id. 
 329 Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 953.  Applying similar reasoning, see also State v. Ander-
son, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 171441 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 
2005), where the court, holding juveniles’ excited utterances to responding officers, 
implicating the defendant in a burglary that was still in progress, were testimonial 
under Crawford, stated: 
[T]he essential characteristics that cause the juveniles’ statements to 
fall within the ambit of the excited utterance exception conflict with 
the characteristics that would make them testimonial.  The underlying 
rationale for the excited utterance exception is that the perceived 
event produces nervous excitement, making fabrication of statements 
about that event unlikely.  Because an excited utterance is a reactionary 
event of the senses made without reflection or deliberation, it cannot 
be testimonial in that such a statement has not been made in contem-
plation of its use in a future trial. 
Id. at *4. 
 330 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
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categorical conclusion, but seemed to have ratified the second, stat-
ing: 
[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals in its view that responses to 
initial inquiries at a crime scene are typically not “testimonial.”  
We do not agree, however, that a statement that qualifies as an 
“excited utterance” is necessarily nontestimonial.  The Court of 
Appeals is likely correct that the declarant of an excited utterance 
will ordinarily lack the requisite motive because the heat of the 
moment makes it unlikely that the declarant is focusing on pres-
ervation rather than communication of information.  But an 
interrogating officer may be so motivated.  Thus, the “structured 
questioning” identified by some courts as an indicium of a testi-
monial statement may be best understood as evidence of a 
purpose to elicit testimonial statements.331
Consistent with the approach taken by the earlier Indiana Court 
of Appeals decisions regarding statements made to first responders, 
courts in other jurisdictions have likewise determined such state-
ments to be non-testimonial.332  The Nebraska Supreme Court, in 
doing so, commented, “[c]ourts have almost uniformly held that 
statements made to police officers responding to an emergency call 
for help were, at the initial stage of the encounter, not testimonial, 
because they were intended to help officers assess the situation and 
 331 Id. at 453. 
 332 People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding domestic 
violence victim’s responses to first responder’s “unstructured” and “preliminary” 
questions were not testimonial); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856–57 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (concluding that assault victim’s description of the assault and the iden-
tity of his mother as the assailant, made in the emergency room of a hospital to an 
officer responding to an “injured persons” call, and which consisted of what the de-
fense described as “detailed answers given in direct response to questions” was not 
testimonial); People v. King, No. 02CA0201, 2005 WL 170727, at *2–3 (Colo. Ct. 
App. Jan. 27, 2005) (finding excited utterances made by a stabbed and bleeding sex-
ual assault victim over a two-hour period to a responding officer both at the scene 
and during an ambulance ride were not testimonial under Crawford); United States v. 
Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *2–4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004) (de-
claring statements of an injured, bleeding and crying assault victim, responding to an 
officer’s repeated question as to what happened were non-testimonial because the 
questions that elicited them lacked formality and “premeditation” and were not pri-
marily motivated by the desire to collect evidence but rather prompted by a concern 
for the victim’s safety); State v. Maclin, No. W2003-03123-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 
313977, at *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2005) (holding aggravated assault victim’s 
excited utterances to responding police officers, whom she had summoned, were not 
testimonial because she was not involved in “a formal statement or a police interro-
gation” when she made the statements).  See also Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 
881 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding that a domestic violence victim’s excited utterance to 
responding officers, during the “initial assessment and securing of a crime scene” was 
not testimonial, but stating, “we decline to join those courts that have established a 
bright-line rule that excited utterances can never be testimonial”). 
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secure the scene.”333  Others, however, have applied an ad hoc ap-
proach to determining whether statements made to first responders 
qualify as testimonial under Crawford.  One court said such an ap-
proach required an inquiry centered around whether the responding 
officer was acting at the time in an investigative capacity seeking to 
produce evidence for prosecutorial purposes or was involved in the 
preliminary task of securing the scene.334  Another court taking a 
case-by-case approach identified factors it deemed appropriate to 
consider when determining whether statements made to responding 
officers at the scene should be considered testimonial.335  These fac-
tors included (1) the formality of the setting generating the 
statements, (2) whether they were recorded, (3) the declarant’s 
“primary purpose in making the statements,” and (4) whether an “ob-
jective declarant” in her position would realize the evidentiary use 
that would be made of them.336  If the statement had been made to 
law enforcement, further consideration should include a determina-
tion as to who initiated the contact and the existence of “structured 
questioning.”337
 333 State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005).  Finding that a “crying, 
hysterical, trembling” victim’s statements to responding officers who arrived within 
five minutes of receiving the call were non-testimonial under Crawford, the court 
concluded that these statements “were not made in anticipation of eventual prosecu-
tion, but were made to assist in securing the scene and apprehending the suspect.”  
Id.  It would seem that since an arrest is usually the initial, indispensable step towards 
a successful prosecution, a statement made for the purpose of “apprehending” the 
perpetrator would be made anticipating eventual prosecution. 
 334 People v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 172–73 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a 
“frightened and upset” domestic violence victim’s statements regarding an assault 
earlier that day, made initially to an officer responding to a domestic violence call 
placed by a concerned third party, where the officers were then unaware of the na-
ture of the crime or identity of the perpetrator, were not-testimonial, but several later 
statements made after the scene was secured were considered testimonial), review 
granted and opinion superseded by 105 P.3d 114 (Cal. 2005). 
 335 People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873–74 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (listing and ap-
plying these factors, the court found statements made by an assault victim to a police 
officer she flagged down, describing an assault by her boyfriend, were non-
testimonial).  See also State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004) (applying similar 
factors to determine that statements by a woman, under stress, who went to the po-
lice station and made statements to the police, at a time when they were unaware of 
any criminal activity, were not testimonial as they were not the product of “tactically 
structured police questioning”). 
 336 Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 873–74. 
 337 Id. at 874.  A New York court applied an ad hoc analysis utilizing similar factors 
and found two of three successive statements to be non-testimonial.  People v. Wat-
son, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *13–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004).  The 
court found a spontaneous and unsolicited statement of a robbery victim to the im-
mediately responding police officer about who robbed him, and another to the same 
officer prompted only by a question about whether anyone else was involved to be 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Wright338 likewise 
joined those jurisdictions applying an ad hoc approach in classifying 
statements made to first responders.  This court, reviewing decisions 
from other courts, identified eight useful considerations for deter-
mining whether such statements are testimonial: 
1. Was the declarant a victim or observer? 
2. What was the declarant’s motive for speaking to the  
officer? 
3. Who initiated the conversation? 
4. Where did the conversation take place? 
5. What was the declarant’s emotional condition? 
6. What was the level of structure and formality present in 
the conversation? 
7. What was the officer’s motivation in talking to the  
declarant? 
8. Was the conversation recorded, and if so by what 
method?339 
While noting that this list was long, the court emphasized that “other 
considerations also may prove useful.”340  Utilizing these factors, the 
court found that a statement made to a responding police officer a 
half hour after the incident by an “emotionally distraught” assault vic-
tim, who was not just an observer, who initiated the contact, and who 
was seeking protection, was non-testimonial.341  The court found the 
statements to be non-testimonial in spite of the fact that the conversa-
tion was recorded by the officer taking notes and that these notes and 
the conversation were utilized to support a lawful arrest and aided 
the officer in giving subsequent testimony.342
Other courts applying similar factors concluded that statements 
given at the scene and shortly after the occurrence of a crime, if elic-
ited by preliminary questions of responding and “investigating” 
officers, are non-testimonial.343
non-testimonial.  Id.  However, a third statement to the same officer, which 
amounted to a solicited narrative of crime, was testimonial.  Id. 
 338 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005). 
 339 Id. at 812–13. 
 340 Id. at 813. 
 341 Id. at 813–14. 
 342 Id. 
 343 People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311, 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (O’Malley, J., con-
curring) (pointing out that the victim’s statement was given “mere minutes” after the 
incident, in response to a simple police question about what was happening and in 
an informal and unstructured setting).  See also State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 
2005).  The Connecticut Supreme Court found non-testimonial a gunshot-victim’s 
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The current Indiana approach for classifying such statements as 
testimonial, as revealed by its Supreme Court in Hammon, requires a 
determination as to whether, in the context of answering preliminary 
questions of the initially responding officer, the answers were either 
given or obtained “in significant part for purposes of preserving it for 
potential future use in legal proceedings.”344  The court suggested 
that even where the victim or others may not have a prosecutorial 
motivation (because of the victim’s excitement and the resulting im-
pairment of the ability to reflect), if the officer was attempting to “pin 
down and preserve statements” as opposed to simply attempting to 
determine whether an offense has occurred, to provide protection 
and to apprehend the suspect, the statements obtained would be tes-
timonial.345
In United States v. Arnold,346 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied its previous broad Cromer criteria347 for determining the tes-
timonial nature of hearsay statements to the issue of whether a 911 
call and subsequent statements by a distraught victim to first re-
sponders were testimonial.348  As applied in Arnold, that criterion is 
whether the statements made “knowingly to the authorities . . . de-
scribe[ ] criminal activity.”349  If so, then the statement is “almost 
always testimonial.”350  The court found that an assault victim’s 911 
call and subsequent statements to responding police approximately 
fifteen minutes later describing the assault, the weapon used, and 
naming her attacker, to be testimonial.351  Though the court noted 
that during the conversation with the officer she was “upset to the 
point that she had difficulty speaking,”352 it concluded the statements 
statement given immediately after the incident to an officer he approached on the 
street.  Id. at 776.  The statement, to some extent possibly elicited by the officer, de-
scribed the location of the offense and informed the officer that he thought he had 
been shot.  Id. at 775.  He also informed the officer that he did not see his assailant.  
Id. at 712.  Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the statement “can 
be ‘seen as part of the criminal incident itself, rather than as part of the prosecution 
that follow[ed].’”  Id. (quoting People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 
2004)). 
 344 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456 (Ind. 2005). 
 345 Id. 
 346 410 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 347 United States v. Cromer, 398 F.3d 662, 665 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 348 Arnold, 410 F.3d at 903. 
 349 Id. at 904. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. at 897. 
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of the victim “were knowingly made to authorities” and “describe[d] 
criminal activity.”353
The foregoing description of varying attempts by courts to apply 
the Crawford testimonial approach to domestic violence and assault 
victims’ statements during 911 calls or to first responders gives rise to 
certain concerns.  The phenomenon that domestic violence victims 
often refuse or are reluctant to participate in the prosecution of their 
previously identified tormentor should neither prompt nor justify 
courts applying Crawford’s testimonial approach to suspend logic, to 
selectively emphasize Crawford criteria that support admission and ig-
nore others, or to undermine the underlying need and importance of 
confrontation in these situations.  Professors Friedman and McCor-
mack, by conceding that some 911 calls made by domestic violence 
victims may be non-testimonial “cries for help,” have unintentional-
ly354 opened the door through which some post-Crawford courts have 
leapt, allowing into evidence domestic violence statements that are at 
the core of what the Confrontation Clause was meant to exclude: ac-
cusatorial statements knowingly made to law enforcement officers.  
They have done so by selectively emphasizing those criteria described 
in Crawford that would justify admission of these statements and ig-
noring those criteria that did not.  Justifying the classification of 
statements made to first responders and 911 operators as non-
testimonial simply because the questioning was not highly structured 
or formal is but one example. 
Though Crawford clearly included structured and formal police 
interrogation in its concept of “testimonial,”355 it did not limit the 
classification to such.356  Many courts, but not all,357 seem to ignore or 
 353 Id. at 904. 
 354 The professors simply observed that in some cases the victim’s frantic 911 call 
could be admitted as a “cry for help” though they added, “at least to the extent they are 
not offered to prove the truth of what they assert.”  Friedman & McCormack, supra note 
276, at 1242 (emphasis added). 
 355 The Crawford opinion offers little evidence that structure and formality are 
necessary prerequisites for classifying police questioning as interrogation.  It simply 
concluded that, within any “conceivable” definition of “interrogation,” Sylvia’s “re-
corded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning” 
would qualify.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004).  But see State v. 
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 324 (Md. 2005) (“The [Crawford] Court, however, did em-
phasize the formal nature of police questioning in its articulation of when an 
‘interrogation’ occurs.  This characterization is buttressed by the most commonly 
understood sense of the verb ‘interrogate’: ‘to question formally and systemically.’” 
(citing MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 612 (10th ed. 1993))). 
 356 See Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 811–12 (D.C. 2005) (“[T]he term 
‘police interrogation’ is used frequently in the Crawford opinion, without any sugges-
tion that it means something more technical than questioning in a structured 
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minimize the fact that the Crawford majority clearly meant the term 
“interrogation” to go beyond that which was evidence by Sylvia’s in-
terrogation in Crawford, by specifically stating that they were using the 
term in its “colloquial” sense.358  The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,359 is one of the few courts 
that has not ignored the admonition of Crawford to construe the term 
“interrogation” in its colloquial sense.  As part of its formulation of an 
impressive and comprehensive analytical approach360 for determining 
whether hearsay is “testimonial” under Crawford, the court addressed 
the meaning of “interrogation.”361  Recognizing that Crawford utilized 
the term interrogation in the “colloquial” sense, the court attempted 
to determine its everyday common meaning within the general public 
and legal community.362  To do so, the court consulted Black’s Law 
Dictionary and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.363  In Black’s 
Law Dictionary, the court noted one definition of the term “investiga-
tory interrogation” as “routine, nonaccusatory questioning by the 
police of a person who is not in custody.”364  It held that the term “in-
terrogation” “must be understood expansively to mean all law 
enforcement questioning related to the investigation or prosecution 
of a crime.”365  It further concluded: 
[Q]uestioning by law enforcement agents, whether police, prose-
cutors, or others acting directly on their behalf, other than to 
secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or provide 
medical care, is interrogation in the colloquial sense.  This in-
environment.  Neither additional ‘formality’ nor an ‘adversarial setting,’ however 
slight, is required.”). 
 357 See, e.g., Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. App. 2005).  Rejecting the 
view that “interrogation” for Sixth Amendment purposes should be given similar con-
struction as that term is construed under the Fifth Amendment since the policies 
underlying these separate provisions are distinct, the Texas court concluded the in-
terrogation, as it relates to the Confrontation Clause, should not be limited to “words 
or actions on the part of the police that were normally attendant to arrest and cus-
tody.”  Id.  The  court went on to find that a victim’s excited utterance to a 
responding officer, describing an assault by her boyfriend,  prompted simply by the 
question as to why she had called the police, was the product of “interrogation” as 
that term is construed, under Crawford and in the context of the Confrontation 
Clause.  Id.  See also infra notes 359–66 (discussing the approach followed in Massa-
chusetts). 
 358 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
 359 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005). 
 360 For a full discussion of this analytical approach, see infra notes 388–90. 
 361 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554–55. 
 362 Id. at 555. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 365 Id. 
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cludes “investigatory interrogation,” such as preliminary fact 
gathering and assessment whether a crime has taken place.  Un-
der our reading of Crawford, statements elicited by such 
interrogation are per se testimonial and therefore implicate the 
confrontation clause.366
Similarly, an Arizona court of appeals decision367 classified as tes-
timonial an eyewitness’s statements describing a homicide, given at 
the scene of the crime to an officer (who already was aware that the 
defendant had shot the victim).368  The eyewitness who gave this 
statement, Cory, had been previously separated from another witness, 
Harold, before providing his version of the incident, and Cory’s ques-
tioning occurred only after the defendant had been arrested, 
handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car and after Harold had been in-
terviewed for fifteen or twenty minutes.369  The court, in arriving at its 
conclusion that Cory’s statement was testimonial, made the following 
observation: 
 The historic underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause 
as analyzed in Crawford lead us to the following conclusions.  
First, not every police-citizen encounter will generate a tes-
timonial statement because not every police-citizen 
encounter will be an interrogation.  Statements made by 
witnesses to police so the police may secure their own or the 
witnesses’ safety, render emergency aid, or protect the secu-
rity of a crime scene may not be testimonial.  Questioning 
incidental to other law enforcement objectives, for exam-
ple, “exigent safety, security, and medical concerns” 
implicates core confrontation clause concerns less than 
does police questioning directed toward the production of 
evidence for use in a potential prosecution.370
 366 Id. 555–56 (footnote omitted). 
 367 State v. Parks, 116 P.3d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 368 Id. at 642. 
 369 Id. at 633–35. 
 370 Id. at 641. 
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Some courts, but not all,371 that appropriately consider all or 
most of the Crawford criteria and formulations for determining the 
testimonial classification suspend logic in order to satisfy them.  As 
shown above, some courts, following the lead of the early Moscat 
opinion, have divined that domestic violence victims making a 911 
call or excitedly reacting to the first responder do so solely as a cry for 
help and without any motivation that their statements may be used as 
evidence to prosecute the abuser.372  It is inconceivable that a victim, 
aware of the perpetration of a crime against her and purposely pro-
viding historical information about that crime to those she is aware 
are law enforcement personnel, would not be at least partially moti-
vated by the desire to assist in the eventual prosecution of the 
perpetrator.  To categorically speculate that in such situations she has 
no motivation to assist law enforcement in making the assailant atone 
for his criminal act is simply untenable. 
Likewise, some courts’ analytical leapfrog in using the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of the excited utterance exception—that it 
 371 The following cases are illustrative of courts applying the Crawford formulations 
with sound logic and common sense.  Mason v. State considers statements made to an 
officer responding to a 911 disturbance call.  173 S.W.3d 105, 106 (Tex. App. 2005).  
Upon arrival and in response to the officer’s query about why she called the police, 
an upset, crying and angry domestic violence victim described an attack by her boy-
friend.  Id.  The court held that such qualified as interrogation in the colloquial 
sense, and even if it did not, the victim’s description of the crime and identity of the 
perpetrator to a policeman at the scene would lead an objective person to believe his 
or her statement would be available for use in a future prosecution.  Id. at 111. 
A Florida court considered similar statements in Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).  In response to a report of a kidnapping and assault, a po-
lice officer was dispatched to an apartment complex, where the officer encountered 
the victim, who was nervous and upset.  Id. at 695.  Upon the officer’s query, the vic-
tim described being kidnapped and assaulted at gunpoint, pointed to the 
perpetrator, and said the gun was in his car.  Id.  The court held that though these 
statements qualified as excited utterances under Florida evidence law, they were tes-
timonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause in light of the Crawford 
decision.  Id. at 702.  The court concluded that the utterances of the victim, even 
though made in response to a question by police, were not likely the result of “inter-
rogation” because it lacked sufficient structure, and the court determined that the 
statements clearly did not fall within the classification of “formalized testimonial ma-
terials.”  Id. at 698.  However, it found that the statements were testimonial in light of 
the fact that, under the circumstances, “he surely must have expected that the state-
ment he made to Officer Gaston might be used in court against the defendant.”  Id. 
at 700.  But see Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354, 356 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) 
(claiming the Lopez court, in its holding, “apparently stands alone,” and finding an 
assault victim’s excited utterance in answer to a responding officer inquiry as to what 
happened (assailant hit victim with a pipe) was non-testimonial in spite of its accusa-
torial nature). 
 372 See supra notes 167, 280–85 and accompanying text (discussing Moscat); supra 
notes 286–92, 296, 299 and accompanying text (discussing cases following Moscat). 
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
2006] CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD 403 
 
necessarily be made while the declarant’s ability to engage in reflec-
tive thought had been suspended by the stress of a startling event—to 
jump to the conclusion that one making a qualifying excited utter-
ance could not be aware of the evidentiary use that might be made of 
them373 seems equally untenable.  Even in the excitement and stress 
of the moment, a domestic violence victim’s ability to provide useful 
and apparently accurate historical information—at least from a 
prosecutor’s standpoint—about the abuse and abuser and purposely 
communicate it to inquiring officers, or persons acting on behalf of 
law enforcement officers, seems to belie the reality of such a conclu-
sion.374
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a well rea-
soned opinion, emphasized this by observing that courts over the 
years have broadened the excited utterance exception to include 
“non-spontaneous statement[s] made ‘within a reasonably short pe-
riod’ after a startling event, even if it was made in response to police 
questioning.”375  Rejecting the categorical notion that all excited ut-
 373 See supra notes 284–95, 298–304 and accompanying text (describing reasoning 
in Moscat and other cases). 
 374 Strictly construing the requirement that to qualify as an excited utterance the 
statement must be made “without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate,” one court 
found a seven-year-old burglary victim’s statement to a responding police officer did 
not qualify.  State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 689–90 (N.J. 2005).  In doing so the court 
observed the following: 
     There is no question that Juliana’s statement related “to a startling 
event,” i.e., the burglary.  There is little question that Juliana was still 
“under stress of excitement caused by the event” fifteen to twenty min-
utes after the burglary when the detective questioned her while she sat 
on her mother’s lap.  But it is somewhat doubtful that the statement 
was made “without opportunity to deliberate,” at least in the way those 
words are commonly understood. 
Id. at 689.  This court avoided a Crawford concern by deciding the issue on a state 
evidentiary ground.  Id. at 691.  However, many of the cases described above, which 
have found statements made to first responders or during 911 calls to be excited ut-
terances, have not applied such a rigid interpretation to the exception’s “lack of 
opportunity to deliberate” requirement.  In spite of this fact, however, they still use 
this requirement to justify the conclusion that the statement is not testimonial under 
Crawford. 
 375 Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 808, 815 (D.C. 2005) (determining 
nonetheless that sufficient uncertainty existed regarding the separation of various 
portions of the witness’ utterances to the responding officers into testimonial and 
non-testimonial statements such that the case had to be remanded to determine 
“which, if any, statements by [the witness] were volunteered during Stage I, before 
interrogation began, rather than having been made in response to [an officer’s] 
questions in Stage II; and what, if anything, [the witness] said before the officers had 
completed their initial task of securing the scene, separating the principals, and re-
storing a reasonable measure of calm”).  See also Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2005) (finding, without classifying the statements as excited utterances, that a 
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terances, because of their nature, are non-testimonial, this court con-
cluded: “Some excited utterances are testimonial, and others are not, 
depending upon the circumstances in which the particular statement 
was made.”376  Other courts have also rejected the categorical classifi-
cation of all excited utterances as non-testimonial.377  One Texas 
appellate court said to do so would leave “the regulation of the Con-
frontation Clause to the Rules of Evidence, which is specifically 
prohibited by Crawford.378  A Florida court observed: 
 In our view, the findings necessary to support a conclusion that 
a statement was an excited utterance do not conflict with those 
domestic violence victim’s 911 call informing the operator that her husband, in viola-
tion of a court order, had broken into her house and was preventing her from 
leaving, made while the offense was still in progress and without “premeditation or 
afterthought” was non-testimonial, but that her later statements describing the inci-
dent to the first responders, shortly after their arrival, but after the husband had 
been arrested and taken away, were testimonial), cert. granted, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 534 
(Ga. Sept. 19, 2005). 
 376 Stancil, 866 A.2d at 809 (suggesting that excited utterances, made in response 
to an officer’s preliminary inquiry while attempting to secure the scene and to en-
sure the safety of those involved, including themselves, would not be classified as 
testimonial, while those excited utterances rendered to police engaging in structured 
questioning after the immediate emergency has passed would be deemed testimo-
nial).  One could imagine that, applying the Stancil rationale, an excited utterance 
would be classified as non-testimonial in this hypothetical scenario: An officer spots a 
crying and obviously distraught woman flagging him down, approaches her to ask 
about what is wrong, and receives the reply, “I’ve just been raped by that man driving 
off in the red car!”  However, if the scenario is broadened to include the following, 
the subsequent excited utterances would qualify as testimonial: After radioing for 
others to intercept the fleeing assailant, the officer places the woman in his patrol 
car, encourages her to calm down, and then asks her to tell him exactly what hap-
pened, whereupon the victim, still sobbing, responds by giving him a narrative 
description of the attack and her attacker.  See also Drayton v. United States, 877 A.2d 
145, 151 (D.C. 2005).  Following Stancil, the Drayton court found to be testimonial a 
child victim’s excited utterances made to responding officers.  Id.  These officers 
sought his “account” of an incident during which his mother, in an argument over 
money, displayed a knife and threatened him.  Id.  The court concluded that since 
the scene had been secured, the officers at that point “were investigating a crime and 
fact-gathering in anticipation of potential future prosecution.”  Id.  This conclusion 
was justified by the fact that the boy made the statement to the officers approxi-
mately fifteen minutes after the incident, after his mother had been disarmed, 
arrested and placed in a patrol car, and after police had received a description of the 
incident from a bystander.  Id. 
 377 See Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (discussed su-
pra note 371); Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. App. 2005) (“We 
understand the State’s position to be that, by definition, an excited utterance is not 
made under circumstances conducive to subjective contemplation of future legal 
proceedings.  We cannot agree.”); Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tex. App. 
2005) (“Each statement must be analyzed individually independent of whether it is 
an excited utterance under the Texas Rules of Evidence.”). 
 378 Moore, 169 S.W.3d at 474. 
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that are necessary to support a conclusion that it was testimonial.  
A statement made in the excitement of a startling event is likely to 
be more reliable given the fact that the declarant had little time 
to make up a story.  But, under Crawford, reliability has no bearing 
on the question of whether a statement was testimonial.  Some 
testimonial statements are reliable and others are not.379
It is clear that to avoid the same dilemma as was created by the 
Roberts “reliability” approach, where “indicia of reliability” were sub-
jectively determined by judges,380 the Supreme Court will need to 
categorically identify specific factual applications of its classifications 
of “interrogation” and “testimonial” in the context of 911 calls and 
statements to first responders, otherwise result-oriented and contra-
dictory applications will continue.381
c. Statements Made During Law Enforcement’s “Field  
Investigation” 
Where formality and structure exist in field investigation ques-
tioning sessions, courts have been quite uniform in classifying 
statements generated thereby as testimonial.  For example, where an 
assigned officer spoke first to the mother of a three-year-old sexual 
abuse victim at the hospital, then interviewed the child the next day, 
the child’s statements elicited by the officer’s query that she repeat 
what she had told her mother were determined to be the product of 
police interrogation and thus testimonial.382  Another court found 
that the existence of audio and video recordings of a patrol officer’s 
vehicle stop was sufficient to render the subsequent roadside ques-
tioning of a passenger, after the arrest of the driver, sufficiently 
structured and formal so that the resulting statements were “testimo-
nial.”383  Other courts have considered it significant that officers tape-
recorded the session384 or otherwise recorded it verbatim385 in their 
 379 Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 699. 
 380 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–68 (2004) (surveying and criticizing 
courts’ application of the Roberts reliability approach). 
 381 See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“Moreover, a court’s 
attempt to fashion such factors into some type of litmus test for testimonial evidence 
would undermine the confrontation clause’s protections.  Vague standards are ma-
nipulable, and the neutral motives of the government official toward the declarant 
are irrelevant.”). 
 382 People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 383 Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570–71 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 384 See, e.g., People v. Lee, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 2004) (referring to 
tape recorded statement of two witnesses, which filled seventeen pages of tran-
scripts); People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 688–89 (Ct. App. 2004) (considering 
theft victim’s videotaped statement to police concerning the loss as testimonial); 
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conclusions that the statements were the result of “interrogation” and 
were testimonial.  Special circumstances, such as the fact that the po-
lice questioning occurred during the execution of a search warrant,386 
or that the declarant being interviewed was a confidential infor-
mant,387 have also contributed to the classification of witnesses’ 
statements to officers during field investigations as testimonial. 
8. The Massachusetts Analytical Approach 
Approximately a year and a half after Crawford’s reinterpretation 
of how hearsay should be analyzed under the Confrontation Clause, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Gon-
salves,388 confronted for the first time the thorny issues left in that 
decision’s wake.  The court formulated an impressive analytical ap-
proach for analyzing the admissibility of hearsay under the Clause in 
light of Crawford.  This approach appears to remain faithful to the 
core values of the Clause as articulated in Crawford.  In its formula-
tion, the Massachusetts court recognized that prosecutors must adjust 
the manner in which they prosecute domestic violence and gang-
related cases heretofore prosecuted without subjecting the alleged 
victims to cross-examination.389  Such an adjustment, the court ob-
People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 261–62 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a video-
taped interview of a seven-year-old child abuse victim by a specially trained 
interviewer was an interrogation in spite of the fact that it was conducted in a relaxed 
setting and used non-leading and open-ended questioning). 
 385 See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 603 S.E.2d 559, 562–63 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that an assault victim’s verbatim narrative statement taken by an officer was the 
product of interrogation and thus testimonial, as was the victim’s subsequent photo 
identification of the assailant). 
 386 See, e.g., United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581–82 (9th Cir. 2004) (observ-
ing that answers given to questions about who had access to the place where drugs 
were found, when asked by agents executing a search warrant, were testimonial). 
 387 See, e.g., United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding 
that such a statement falls “squarely within Professor Friedman’s paradigm: ‘A state-
ment made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is almost 
always testimonial’” (citing Friedman, supra note 36, at 1042))). 
 388 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005). 
 389 Id. at 559.  The court commented: 
     We recognize the ground shift this means for the prosecution of 
crimes, in strategy and method.  The remedy of calling out-of-court de-
clarants to the stand will not always be available, although it should be 
noted that they need only appear, not affirm their previous statement.  
Likewise, we recognize the particular impact this decision may have on 
the prosecution of domestic violence, as well as some gang-related 
crimes, which have been prosecuted not infrequently based on out-of-
court statements in the absence of the initial complaining witness.  In 
such cases, however, the prosecution can still present powerful evi-
dence that a crime has occurred and that the defendant was the 
LATIMER 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  12:11:42 PM 
2006] CONFRONTATION AFTER CRAWFORD 407 
 
served, is essential in order to conform “to the dictates of the Con-
frontation Clause as it is now understood,” adding, “[t]he system, 
over time, must adjust.”390
In Gonsalves, a woman overheard her twenty-year-old daughter 
arguing with her boyfriend in a nearby bedroom.391  The mother 
heard “yelling, screaming, and crying.”392  When she entered the bed-
room, the boyfriend was gone and her daughter was on her bed 
crying.393  When her mother asked what had happened, the daughter 
described being assaulted by her boyfriend.394  Although neither the 
victim nor her mother called the police, they arrived fifteen minutes 
after the argument began, but after the defendant had left and the 
assault had ended.395  Upon their arrival, the victim was ambulatory 
but “hysterical, ranting, loud, hyperventilating, and pacing around 
the room.”396  The officers observed no apparent visible injuries.397  In 
response to their query as to what happened, the victim described the 
attack and identified her assailant by name and by physical descrip-
tion.398  This interview took no more than five minutes.399  The 
specific details of her statement were recorded in the officer’s inci-
dent report.400
The Massachusetts court recognized that under Crawford, in cir-
cumstances where the declarant is not presently—nor has she 
previously been—subject to cross-examination by the accused, the 
central issue regarding the admissibility of hearsay in a criminal 
prosecution under the Confrontation Clause is whether the hearsay is 
“testimonial.”401  Additionally, it recognized that were the hearsay to 
perpetrator.  In the case at bar, the Commonwealth could offer the re-
sponding officer’s testimony as to the complainant’s physical 
appearance, her screams, her medical records, and photographs, as 
well as testimony from the mother as to the complainant’s screams and 
the fact that no one else was in a position to have inflicted her injuries.  
There will be an unavoidable adjustment period as past practices are 
modified and new approaches are developed. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 390 Id. 
 391 Id. at 552. 
 392 Id. 
 393 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552. 
 394 Id. 
 395 Id. 
 396 Id. 
 397 Id. 
 398 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552–53. 
 399 Id. at 552. 
 400 Id. at 561. 
 401 Id. at 552. 
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be classified as “testimonial” under these circumstances, the Clause 
would bar its introduction.402
The court noted that Crawford had concluded that some hearsay 
would always be classified as “testimonial,” such as an affidavit, depo-
sition, confession, testimony at a preliminary hearing, testimony 
before a grand jury and at trial, and statements that are the product 
of police interrogation.403  The Massachusetts court concluded these 
statements are “per se testimonial and no further analysis is necessary.”404  
Apparently, if the statement falls within this “per se” category, the de-
clarant’s motivation in giving it is not considered.  For example, if the 
statement were the product of police interrogation, the fact that the 
emotional state of the declarant precluded awareness of the prosecu-
torial use that may be made of her statement would not be a relevant 
concern.  In addressing the per se category, the court concentrated 
on the question of what constitutes “interrogation” in its colloquial 
sense, as that term was used in Crawford.  As indicated earlier,405 this 
court gave an appropriately broad interpretation to the term “inter-
rogation,” stating that it “must be understood expansively to mean all 
law enforcement questioning related to the investigation or prosecu-
tion of a crime.”406  Though its expansive interpretation would not 
encompass police questioning to “secure a volatile scene or to estab-
lish the need for or provide medical care,” it would include 
“investigatory interrogation,” such as preliminary fact gathering and 
assessment whether a crime has taken place.”407
Under this court’s analytical approach, if it is determined that 
the statement cannot be classified as testimonial per se, additional 
analysis would be required.  Statements not deemed testimonial per 
se would include statements made in response to officers seeking to 
secure the scene or to determine the need for medical care, state-
ments made to persons unconnected to law enforcement, and 
unprompted spontaneous statements to anyone.408  In this second 
analytical step, a court should evaluate whether the statement should 
 402 Id. 
 403 Id. at 554, 561. 
 404 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554 (emphasis added). 
 405 See supra notes 359–63 and accompanying text. 
 406 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555. 
 407 Id. at 556–57 (disagreeing with the concurrence that judges will have difficulty 
delineating the difference between police questions that are or are not testimonial; 
this interpretation saying that judges are “familiar” and “well equipped” to make the 
necessary distinctions). 
 408 Id. at 557. 
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be classified as “testimonial in fact.”409  Seeking a “tool” to aid courts 
in resolving this classification issue, the court adopted the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ articulation of a test: “‘The proper inquiry, 
then, is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the 
accused.  That intent, in turn, may be determined by querying whether 
a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement 
being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.’”410  
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court elaborated that this test 
does not require any formality in the statement nor knowledge of ju-
dicial processes by the declarant.411  Its focus is on the intent of the 
declarant determined by evaluating the surrounding circumstances.412  
The court concluded that “all statements the declarant knew or 
should have known might be used to investigate or prosecute an ac-
cused” should be classified as de facto testimonial.413
Applying the two-step analysis to the facts of record in the instant 
case,414 the court concluded that the victim’s statements to respond-
ing officers were the product of police interrogation (the scene had 
been secured and there was no apparent medical concern at the time 
of the interview), and therefore her generated statements would be 
deemed per se testimonial and inadmissible were she to remain un-
available for trial.415  No further analysis was required.  Regarding the 
daughter’s statements to the mother prior to the arrival of the police, 
the court (on a “limited record”) concluded that they were not per se 
testimonial since they were not “part of an affidavit, deposition, confes-
sion, or prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial or procured through law enforcement interroga-
tion.”416  Necessarily taking the second analytical step, the court 
concluded that the victim’s statements to her mother were also not 
testimonial in fact, explaining: 
Nothing in the record indicates the complainant offered the 
statements in order to establish the facts for later use by law en-
 409 Id. 
 410 Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 411 Id. 
 412 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 558. 
 413 Id. 
 414 The state requested an interlocutory review of an adverse pre-trial ruling on a 
motion in limine, which excluded the statements as testimonial under Crawford.  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted review and through this decision va-
cated the lower court’s order, but remanded for further pretrial proceedings and 
instructed that the parties must be given an opportunity to reopen the evidence in 
light of the opinion.  Id. at 562. 
 415 Id. 
 416 Id. 
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forcement.  We see no reason why a reasonable person in the 
complainant’s position would anticipate that her statement, made 
in her own bedroom, to her mother, apparently without any 
knowledge that the police would become involved, would be used 
against the defendant in investigating and prosecuting the alleged 
assault.417
The Gonsalves court’s analytical approach, being faithful to the 
core values of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford, 
deserves emulation by other jurisdictions struggling for a viable and 
straightforward solution to the perplexing problem of determining 
the compatibility of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause. 
B. Crawford’s Retroactive Application 
Any discussion of Crawford’s impact must consider the retroactive 
application of its remarkably altered construction of the Confronta-
tion Clause’s relationship to the introduction of testimonial hearsay.  
Clearly, the Court’s establishment of a new rule concerning the ad-
missibility of testimonial evidence under the Confrontation Clause 
must be given retroactive application to all criminal cases still pend-
ing at the time of the decision.418  Though it may be applicable to 
pending cases, whether the accused had to preserve a confrontation 
 417 Id. 
 418 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (“When a decision of this 
Court results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on 
direct review.” (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987))).  See also Peo-
ple v. Price, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 237–38 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that while Crawford 
itself does not address retroactivity, both parties in this case agreed it applied to the 
case at hand because “even a nonretroactive decision governs cases that are not yet 
final when the decision is announced”); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854 
(Ct. App. 2004) (holding that “Crawford indubitably applies retroactively in this case” 
(citing Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 348)); State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App. 
2004) (“Even though the decision in Crawford is very recent, other courts have al-
ready considered its application to cases which had been tried before Crawford was 
decided. . . . [T]he Fifth Circuit applied the Crawford test even though Crawford was 
decided after the conclusion of [a] trial . . . . Other courts have also held Crawford to 
be applicable even though it was decided after the trial in those cases.” (citations 
omitted)); People v. Bell, 689 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (applying 
Crawford retrospectively because the case was on appeal when Crawford was an-
nounced); Samarron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701, 706 n.6 (Tex. App. 2004) (noting that 
no retroactivity analysis is needed because the case was still on direct appeal and not 
yet final when Crawford was announced). 
In a rare case, a proceeding may not be final until habeas relief has been ex-
hausted.  See, e.g., Ash v. Reilly, 354 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding 
Crawford applicable in a parole revocation proceeding, in spite of the fact that under 
the department’s regulations revocation of parole is final and non-appealable, since 
the only permissible judicial review available was by habeas and such had not been 
exhausted). 
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issue by objection in the trial court is subject to some disagreement.419  
The more difficult question is whether, in post-conviction or habeas 
corpus proceedings, the Crawford rule should apply retroactively to 
cases that were final when Crawford was rendered. 
The starting point for this issue’s resolution is the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane.420  There, the Supreme Court, re-
viving Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity in cases collaterally 
attacking a conviction,421 held that “new constitutional rules of crimi-
nal procedure” are not applicable in cases where the conviction had 
become final before the new rule was announced.422  However, the 
Teague Court specified that retroactive application of a new rule 
would be permitted under two circumstances: (1) if the new rule 
categorizes private individual conduct as beyond the authority of the 
criminal law to regulate; and (2) if the new rule can be classified as a 
“watershed” rule of criminal procedure.423  The first exception is 
clearly not implicated by the Crawford decision.  However, Crawford 
must be examined to determine if it actually creates a “new rule” as 
contemplated by Teague.  Noting that it is often difficult to determine 
whether a decision proclaims a new rule, Teague made this observa-
tion: 
[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or im-
poses a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.  
To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was 
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s con-
viction became final.424
 419 Compare People v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 169 (Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting 
forfeiture by failure to object where an objection below, if made, would have been 
futile and without support of then-existing law), and Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 854 (re-
jecting waiver by failure to object below in cases, such as this, where the change in 
the law is so unpredictable that it could not have been reasonably foreseen by trial 
counsel), with Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 801 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (ex-
pressing doubt that the issue was preserved because of a failure to raise an objection 
based upon the Confrontation Clause unlike what was done in Crawford), and Cour-
son v. State, 160 S.W.3d 125, 129 (Tex. App. 2005) (observing that Crawford clearly 
pointed out that the right of confrontation is neither “new nor novel” and therefore 
an objection on confrontation grounds was necessary to preserve the issue).  See also 
United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1237–38 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding a Craw-
ford error had not been preserved and refusing to address it in the absence of a 
determination that it was plain error); State v. Page, 104 P.3d 616, 622–23 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2005) (finding a Crawford violation was “plain error,” justifying review even 
though the error had not been preserved). 
 420 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 421 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971). 
 422 Teague at 310. 
 423 Id. at 311. 
 424 Id. at 301. 
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The majority in Crawford, though clearly rejecting Roberts’s previ-
ously applied analytical framework, exhaustively surveyed the results 
of the Court’s previous decisions and concluded that those results 
were consistent with its current decision: 
Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ under-
standing: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial 
have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and 
only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.425
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion, though criticizing the major-
ity’s rejection of the Roberts analytical approach, noted that the  
result the majority reached “follows inexorably from Roberts and its 
progeny . . . .”426  In light of this, one United States District Court con-
cluded that Crawford did not establish a new rule and therefore its 
reasoning can be applied in a post-conviction proceeding involving a 
case that was final before the decision was handed down.427
The Ninth Circuit, conceding that the ambiguity of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion makes it plausible that Crawford was simply a “correc-
tion of a misinterpretation” and not a “new rule,” rejected this 
contention,428 stating: “On balance, an analysis of the historical appli-
cation of the Confrontation Clause cases leads to the conclusion that 
Crawford announces a new rule that must be put through the  
[Teague-]Summerlin strainer.”429  Most courts considering the retroac-
tive effect of the Crawford decision under the Teague guidelines have 
so far concluded or assumed that Crawford does indeed announce a 
new rule and have simply considered whether the second Teague ex-
ception applied.430
 425 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 426 Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 427 Richardson v. Newland, 342 F. Supp. 2d 900, 924 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (observing 
that the Crawford Court’s “opinion makes clear that the Supreme Court had never 
applied Roberts to out-of-court testimonial statements. . . . Crawford did not articulate a 
change in procedure, it merely reaffirmed and clarified procedures that had long 
been in place.”). 
 428 Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 429 Id. at 1015–16 (finding that Crawford’s new rule satisfied the “watershed” ex-
ception in Teague and therefore was applicable to the case).  See also Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53 (2004) (distinguishing between substantive and 
procedural rules in determining retroactivity); see infra note 434 and accompanying 
text (exploring Summerlin further). 
 430 See generally Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859 (7th Cir 2005); Murillo v. Frank, 
402 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2005); Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1012; Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 
327 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004); Hiracheta v. 
Att’y Gen. of Cal., 105 F. App’x 937 (9th Cir. 2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438 
(8th Cir. 2004); Coleman v. United States, No. Civ.A.04-4803, CRIM.A.01-038, 2005 
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There has been, and will probably continue to be, debate over 
whether Crawford’s new rule is a “watershed” rule as contemplated by 
Teague, which suggests that such watershed rules would be rare,431 
would have to “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural ele-
ments that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular 
conviction,”432 and significantly reduce the impermissible risk that the 
innocent would be convicted by enhancing the pre-existing fact-
finding procedures.433  Contemporaneous with the Crawford decision, 
the Supreme Court recently emphasized: “That a new procedural 
rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule 
must be one, ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction 
is seriously diminished.’”434  An example of a new procedural rule that 
would qualify as a watershed rule was the Gideon v. Wainwright435 deci-
sion, which created the right to court-appointed counsel for indigent 
defendants.436
So far, the prevailing view is that the new rule in Crawford does 
not qualify under the Teague exception as a watershed rule.437  Adher-
ents to this view suggest Crawford’s new rule is not of the “magnitude” 
WL 1595427 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2005); People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2004); Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); People v. 
Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 2004); People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 
2567124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (en banc); In re Markel, 111 P.3d 249 (Wash. 
2005). 
 431 One court noted that, in the fifteen years since the Teague decision, only on 
eleven occasions has the Supreme Court considered whether a new rule qualified as 
a watershed rule warranting retroactive application to cases finalized before the new 
rule’s creation, and in each instance, the Court held that the new rule was not.  
Muyet v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 4247, 2004 WL 2997866, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 
2004). 
 432 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989). 
 433 Id. 
 434 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354–56 (2004) (holding that the new pro-
cedural rule precluding a sentencing judge, without a jury, from making factual 
aggravating findings required to impose the death penalty was not a watershed rule 
because it was not necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and to prevent miscar-
riages of justice; therefore the rule does not apply retroactively to cases in which a 
conviction is already final) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313)). 
 435 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 436 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 407 (2004) (“This Court has yet to find a new 
rule that falls under this exception.  In providing guidance as to what might do so, 
the Court has repeatedly, and only, referred to the right-to-counsel rule of Gideon v. 
Wainwright which ‘altered [the Court’s] understanding of the bedrock procedural ele-
ments essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’”) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). 
 437 See supra note 430 (cataloging several decisions espousing this view).  See also 
Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying Teague, but without ex-
planation, and holding that Crawford’s new rule was not retroactive). 
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of Gideon, since Crawford did not “cut a new rule from whole cloth.”438  
Since the Crawford rule does not necessarily enhance accuracy deter-
minations in criminal cases,439 and since Crawford violations may be 
excused under the harmless error analysis, it is difficult to conclude 
that the rule “alters rights fundamental to due process.”440
The Ninth Circuit441 and two New York court decisions442 have 
concluded that the new Crawford rule is a watershed rule under 
Teague and is applicable retroactively in post-conviction cases.  The 
Ninth Circuit, applying the Summerlin test, concluded that retroactive 
application of the new rule in Crawford is required in order to avoid 
the likelihood of the serious diminution of the accuracy of convic-
tions and stated: “The difference between pre- and post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is not the sort of change that can 
be dismissed as merely incremental.  Instead, it is an ‘absolute pre-
requisite to fundamental fairness.’”443  The court rejected the conten-
tion that a rule of constitutional law that is susceptible to a harmless 
error analysis could not also be a “bedrock rule of procedure.”444  It 
explained that the two concepts “hinge” on different considerations.  
The harmless error rule “depends on whether the impact of the error 
can be measured,” while the determination of whether a new rule is a 
bedrock rule depends on whether “it increases the likelihood of ac-
curate convictions.”445  Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
conclusion that Crawford enhances reliability or accuracy in some 
 438 People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (“[Crawford] did 
not define or otherwise alter our understanding of the meaning of the right itself.”).  
See also Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Unlike Gideon, 
Crawford does not ‘alter[] our understanding of what constitutes basic due process,’ 
but merely sets out new standards for the admission of certain kinds of hearsay.”) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 439 Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 2004) (“As we see the operation 
of the Crawford rule, it is likely to improve accuracy in some circumstances and di-
minish it in others.”).  This Second Circuit decision makes a compelling argument 
that, though Crawford will invariably exclude unreliable testimonial hearsay, it will 
also exclude testimonial hearsay that under the prior Roberts rule would have been 
admissible precisely because it was reliable, and thereby Crawford will diminish rather 
than enhance accuracy.  Id. at 335–36. 
 440 Uphoff, 381 F.3d at 1226–27. 
 441 Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 442 People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905–06 (Sup. Ct. 2004); People v. Watson, 
No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (en banc). 
 443 Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 244 (1990)). 
 444 Id. at 1021. 
 445 Id. at 1020. 
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cases but not in others446 and for that reason should not qualify as a 
“watershed” rule, stating: 
The flaw in this analysis is that the Second Circuit has substituted 
its judgment of whether the Crawford rule is one without which 
the accuracy of conviction is seriously diminished, for the Su-
preme Court’s considered judgment.  The Court has found 
repeatedly that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to 
promote accuracy . . . .447
Expressing a similar view, one New York judge concluded: 
[T]he violation of a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness 
who has made a testimonial statement against him or her, accord-
ing to Crawford, calls into question the reliability of the testimony 
admitted at trial.  This concern implicates the fundamental fair-
ness of the trial, may have a significant effect on the integrity of 
the fact-finding process, and could compromise the jury’s deter-
mination of a defendant’s guilt, as long-standing Supreme Court 
precedent has shown.  Accordingly, applying Teague’s teachings, 
this court finds that the rule announced in Crawford is a “water-
shed” rule of Criminal Procedure, and thus applies to cases on 
collateral review.448
 Given Teague’s extremely high standard for qualifying under 
the watershed rule exception, it is unlikely that Crawford’s “new rule” 
meets it.  Though retroactive application of Crawford’s new rule could 
dramatically enhance the accuracy of the determination of guilt in 
some cases, it would not likely have such effect in others.  In spite of 
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary, it appears that, to 
meet the Gideon example, the accuracy enhancement must perva-
sively apply in all cases. 
C. The Confrontation Clause and Non-Testimonial Hearsay: the  
Remaining Viability of the Roberts Reliability Approach 
Clearly, the Crawford Court rejected the Roberts “reliability ap-
proach” as it applied to testimonial hearsay, articulating the following 
reasons: 
 The legacy of Roberts in other courts vindicates the Framers’ wis-
dom in rejecting a general reliability exception.  The framework 
 446 Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335 (2004) (“[The Crawford Rule] is likely to 
improve accuracy in some circumstances and diminish it in others.”). 
 447 Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1020. 
 448 People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *7–8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(en banc) (recognizing as well that lower federal courts have, for the most part and 
with little analysis, disagreed). 
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is so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection 
from even core confrontation violations. 
 Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.  
There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is re-
liable . . . . Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends 
heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much 
weight he accords each of them.  Some courts wind up attaching 
the same significance to opposite facts. . . . 
 The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its 
unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core tes-
timonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant 
to exclude.449
Though Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor stated their 
“dissent from the Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts,”450 a close 
examination of the majority’s opinion does not warrant this emphatic 
characterization of the impact of the decision on the continued vi-
ability of the Roberts analytical approach. 
Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion, noted that as to non-
testimonial hearsay, “it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design 
to afford the states flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as 
does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such state-
ments from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”451  Clearly, the 
Court left for “another day” the determination of the Confrontation 
Clause’s role, if any, in the regulation of non-testimonial hearsay and 
whether the Roberts reliability approach should have any continued 
vitality in this context.452  It is plausible that, to get the consensus of 
seven judges, a significant majority, on a monumental clarification of 
the Confrontation Clause, it was necessary to leave open the possibil-
ity of a continued role for Roberts to play with respect to non-
testimonial hearsay.453  Lower courts, however, have struggled with 
this question on the possibility of Roberts’s continued role. 
In one post-Crawford case, an Oklahoma appellate court applying 
the Roberts two-pronged analytical approach to non-testimonial hear-
say read Justice Scalia’s comment in Crawford regarding non-
testimonial hearsay as having “noted that non-testimonial hearsay 
 449 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–63 (2004). 
 450 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 451 Id. at 68. 
 452 Id. 
 453 As one post-Crawford court noted, “A close reading of Crawford indicates that 
Roberts still applies to non-testimonial hearsay evidence, though the Court appears split 
on whether it should.”  State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004) (emphasis 
added). 
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might still be admissible against an accused in a criminal trial if both 
prongs of Roberts were satisfied, regardless of whether the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” 454  The 
Oklahoma court found the non-testimonial hearsay—a confession 
made to fellow inmates, which implicated the declarant and the de-
fendant—lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and therefore, under 
the Confrontation Clause, it should not have been admitted.455  In 
another case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals read the same 
Scalia comment and concluded: “Although Crawford overrules the 
Roberts framework to the extent that it applies to testimonial state-
ments, Roberts remains good law regarding non-testimonial 
statements.”456  The North Carolina court went on to conclude that a 
non-testimonial excited utterance was reliable, as it fell within a 
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception.457  A Florida appellate court, how-
ever, read Justice Scalia’s comment and reached the opposite 
conclusion.458  The Florida court stated that “Crawford made clear that 
where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, such as that involved in this 
case, the individual states have ‘flexibility in their development of 
hearsay law’ and can even exempt such statements from confronta-
tion clause scrutiny altogether.”459  The court, upon determining that 
the admitted statement was non-testimonial, ended the inquiry and 
affirmed.460
 454 Miller v. State, 98 P.3d 738, 743 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 
 455 Id. at 748. 
 456 State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 423 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 457 Id. at 423. See also Rios v. Lansing, 116 F. App’x 983, 988 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Justice Scalia’s comment regarding the treatment of non-testimonial hear-
say, the court concluded simply: “Because non-testimonial hearsay is at issue here, 
the reliability test of Roberts still applies”). 
 458 Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).  See also Pur-
vis v. State, 829 N.E.2d 572, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Justice Scalia’s 
ambiguous comment and concluding: “Thus, when the hearsay statements at issue 
are not testimonial, ordinary state law evidence laws and rules determine their ad-
missibility”). 
 459 Herrera-Vega, 888 So. 2d at 69 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(2004)). 
 460 Id. 
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In contrast, most courts, if they even address the issue,461 are 
more cautious and simply note the ambiguity.  After determining the 
statement to be non-testimonial, most courts go on to apply the Rob-
erts two-pronged analytical approach, choosing to err on the side of 
caution in case the Supreme Court later declares Roberts to have con-
tinued vitality.462  However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
applying the Roberts framework to non-testimonial co-conspirator 
statements, categorically concluded: “Crawford did not alter the appli-
cation of Roberts to non-testimonial statements; therefore, we accept 
the continued viability of Roberts to such statements.”463
 461 Not all courts acknowledge that there is an issue as to Roberts’ applicability to 
non-testimonial statements.  See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83–84 (1st Cir. 
2004) (holding Crawford inapplicable unless statements are testimonial and applying 
Roberts to non-testimonial statements); People v. Shepherd, 689 N.W.2d 721, 729 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding simply that “Crawford left Roberts intact regarding 
admissibility of non-testimonial hearsay”). 
Other post-Crawford cases, without mentioning the issue, end their Confronta-
tion Clause inquiry and resolve the case after simply determining the hearsay in 
question was non-testimonial under Crawford.  See, e.g., Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 
144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (determining that “inspection and operator certifica-
tions are simply not included in the class of evidence” giving rise to Crawford 
concerns); Texas v. Woods, 152 S.W.3d 105, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (finding the 
statements in question did not “fall within the categories of testimonial evidence de-
scribed in Crawford”). 
 462 See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile the 
continued viability of Roberts with respect to nontestimonial statements is somewhat 
in doubt, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that its reliability analysis con-
tinues to control nontestimonial hearsay . . . .”); see also United States v. Franklin, 415 
F.3d 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting with approval the assumption described in 
Saget); State v. Doe, 103 P.3d 967, 972 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (concluding the Su-
preme Court left it “open to dispute” as to whether Crawford “abrogates” Roberts as to 
non-testimonial hearsay, this court determined that “caution requires” the Roberts test 
be applied); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 326–27 (Neb. 2004) (noting that Craw-
ford made “no explicit statement regarding non-testimonial hearsay” but simply 
suggested that the Confrontation Clause may have no role in regulating such or that 
Roberts and its progeny may still apply to statements that are non-testimonial; al-
though apparently convinced that no constitutional confrontation scrutiny need be 
applied to non-testimonial hearsay after Crawford, the court went on to apply the Rob-
erts test anyway); State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 780 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting the 
ambiguous language in Crawford, and stating: “Accordingly, we turn to analyze 
whether [the nontestimonial statement] fall[s] under a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion or else bear[s] particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. . . .”); State v. 
Manuel, 685 N.W.2d 525, 532–33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning that, because Craw-
ford did not “expressly overrule Roberts” and its answer on this issue was “equivocal,” 
the question remains open as to what constitutional test is to be applied to non-
testimonial hearsay; the court went on, in an “abundance of caution,” to apply the 
Roberts test to non-testimonial hearsay). 
 463 Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1099 (D.C. 2005).  See also United 
States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding persuasive the argument 
that the Roberts framework survives Crawford as to non-testimonial hearsay); Manuel, 
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The likelihood of Roberts’s survival after Crawford appears 
unlikely since much of the criticism leveled by Crawford at the Roberts 
analytical approach as applied to testimonial hearsay would apply 
equally to non-testimonial hearsay.464  Crawford criticizes the Roberts 
approach as vague, amorphous, subjectively applied, and leading to 
contradictory conclusions regarding the same factors when consid-
ered by different judges or courts.465  However, the cautionary 
approach taken by many courts in applying Roberts to non-testimonial 
hearsay, in the absence of a clear determination of the issue by the 
Supreme Court, appears to be prudent. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Crawford was correct to take the difficult, 
but necessary, step of rejecting the jurisprudence derived from the 
Roberts reliability approach and thereby restoring confrontation to its 
true purpose, which is ensuring that the accused has a meaningful 
opportunity to participate, through cross-examination, in the devel-
opment of the testimonial evidence produced against him or her.  
The Crawford decision accurately revealed what many previously rec-
ognized: the Roberts reliability approach was seriously flawed and, as a 
result, capable of inconsistent application and the facilitation of the 
egregious introduction of core testimonial evidence that the Clause 
was designed to forbid.  Because of the demonstrated flaws of the 
Roberts analytical approach, the Supreme Court should, in the near 
future, clearly discard its use even in the regulation of non-
testimonial hearsay under the Clause. 
Post-Crawford jurisprudence has shown both predictable and un-
predictable controversy regarding the application of the key—but not 
clearly delineated—“testimonial” classification.  The Supreme Court 
must clarify more precisely the parameters of the constitutional scope 
of testimonial hearsay.466  It must do so by describing appropriate and 
697 N.W.2d at 826 (“We accept [the] argument that Roberts ought to be retained for 
nontestimonial hearsay, as we agree that evidence that may be admissible under the 
hearsay rules may nevertheless still be inadmissible under the Confrontation 
Clause.”). 
 464 Doe, 103 P.3d at 972 (noting that support for the conclusion that Roberts is ab-
rogated and should not be applied to non-testimonial hearsay may be founded upon 
the fact that “Crawford thoroughly criticizes the failing of the Roberts reliability analysis 
and the inconsistencies in application that it has wrought”). 
 465 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (exploring more fully many criti-
cisms of Roberts). 
 466 Perhaps in a manner consistent with the Massachusetts Approach described 
supra notes 388–417 and accompanying text. 
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concrete factual applications of this term and not by perpetuating 
vague, broad formulations, which are too often applied in contradic-
tory and inconsistent ways.  The Supreme Court, in delineating the 
precise contours of the term “testimonial,” should ensure the inclu-
sion of statements by victims and others, knowingly describing or 
reporting historical information concerning the commission of a 
crime and its perpetrator to law enforcement personnel, or those 
known to be acting on behalf of law enforcement.  Such inclusion 
should not depend on the relative closeness in time of the statement 
to the criminal incident reported nor on the emotional state of the 
declarant. 
Finally, the Supreme Court needs to affirm the current post-
Crawford majority position that the “new rule” announced in Craw-
ford does not fall within the Teague “watershed” exception.  Even 
though the rule might significantly increase the accuracy of the truth 
determining process in a particular case, it would not do so perva-
sively in all cases. Thus, Crawford’s new rule regarding regulation of 
testimonial hearsay under the Confrontation Clause falls short of the 
polestar Gideon “watershed” standard and should not be applied to 
cases that were final before its announcement. 
 
